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CUM PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

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

The Most Reverend Aniceto Fernandez, O.P.

Master General

DEDICATION

Just one year ago, on the Feast of St. Mary Magdelen, Protectress of the Dominican Order, 118 provincials and electors met at Toulouse, France, to choose a successor to Father Michael Browne, O.P., recently named a Cardinal of the Church. A vigorous, sixty-seven year old Spaniard, Aniceto Fernandez Alonso, was there elected the eighty-third Master General of the Order of Preachers.

Father Fernandez was born in Pardesivil, in the province of Leon, Spain, on 17 April 1895. He received the black and white habit of a Friar Preacher at Padron in 1913, and continued his studies for the priesthood at Corias, Austuria, and in the historic convent of Salamanca, where he was ordained in 1923. Three years later he received his degree in Physical Science from the University of Madrid.

As a young priest, Father Fernandez taught for many years in the Spanish House of Philosophy. But his great zeal for souls and the apostolic ministry also brought him much success as a spiritual director and preacher. From 1934 to 1950, he was assigned to teach at the Angelicum in Rome, where Dominicans and others from all over the world were able to benefit from his learning and scholarship. It was during this time that he was honored with the title of Master in Sacred Theology, the highest degree the Dominican Order can confer on one of its members.

His remarkable spiritual qualities of charity, prudence, and wisdom caused Father Fernandez to be chosen first as Vicar of the Angelicum, and later as its Rector. Under the Generalate of Father Emmanuel Suarez, he was named Vicar of the entire Dominican Order. He held this position until 1950, when he was elected provincial of the Province of Spain. He was re-elected to this important office in 1954, and again in 1958. While he was provincial, the Spanish province greatly increased in vocations and added many new houses and apostolic works.

He also played a leading role in the formation of the Spanish Confederation of Religious. He was elected its first president in 1954, and was twice again chosen as head of this group representing all the religious Orders and Congregations in Spain. As president, he was instrumental in the organization of the National Congress on the States of Perfection and on the Apostolate held in March of 1957, and in the creation of the Pastoral Institute at Madrid in 1958.

Although many of the remarkable events in the life of Father Fernandez were not unknown to us before his election as Master General, he was perhaps most familiar to the Fathers and Brothers of the Province of St. Albert the Great as an author. His various works on philosophy, especially *Cursus Cosmologiae* and *Ciencia y Filosofia segun Santo Tomas,* have been widely read. More important to us, however, is an article written while he was professor at the Angelicum, "Scientiae et philosophia secundum S. Albertum Magnum" (The Sciences and Philosophy According to St. Albert the Great). In this significant article the author sought to establish that Aristotelian philosophy and the empirical sciences constitute one specific discipline. It was this work of Father Fernandez that provided one of the initial stimuli leading to the foundation of the Albertus Magnus Lyceum, for philosophy and the history of science, begun at River Forest in 1951, under the direction of William H. Kane, O.P. A testimonial to the efforts and achievements of the Lyceum, and indirectly to the insight of Father Fernandez, was the publication, on the Lyceum's tenth anniversary, of *The Dignity of Science,* a valuable and well received collection of essays by leading philosophers and historians from the United States and Europe.

It is, we believe, appropriate that we should honor Father Fernandez. Through his writings he has been the teacher of us all. As the eighty-second successor of St. Dominic, he is the spiritual father of Dominicans throughout the world. We thank him and wish him well. We promise him our continued prayers and beg him to accept the dedication of this issue of *Reality* as a token of our filial esteem.

Celestin D. Weisser, O.P.
Editor

22 July 1963
Menominee, Michigan

MATTHEW FOX, O.P.

THE ARISTOTELIAN FIRST MOVER AND MODERN CRITICISM

We find no God
either in history
or in nature
or behind nature.
Nietzsche

It is commonly acknowledged that great crises in human affairs frequently produce achievements of lasting import. Such was clearly the case in the hurried harnessing of atomic power to meet the needs of the Second World War; such was also the case in the thirteenth century when St. Thomas, challenged by a prevailing suspicion of Aristotle's philosophy, brandished his pen to defend the truth of Aristotle's system. Facing the needs of his times, Thomas produced many works that will survive all time. One of these works is his

Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle.[1] Here we will discuss the last two books of this work insofar as they involve a question that is as germane in our day as it was in fourth century B.C. Greece or thirteenth century France: Whether the First Mover exists.[2]

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[1] St. Thomas composed his commentary on the *Physics* around 1268, shortly before returning to Paris. What provoked Thomas, a professor of theology at the time, to compose this work was the increasing popularity of Averroes. This Moslem philosopher, who had commented extensively on Aristotle's works, was considered extremely dangerous by ecclesiastical officials, and his influence drew suspicion on those defending Aristotle's philosophy as a useful aid for Christian teaching. St. Thomas, who by 1268 had only six more years to live, and had already composed the first part of his *Summa theologiae,* had spent his life in synthesizing Aristotle with Christianity and was not going to sit by idly during this conflict. Averroes' main theses which cast shadows on Aristotle's philosophy were his denial that Aristotle admitted personal immortality and his assertion that Aristotle demonstrated the eternity of the world in the seventh and eighth books of the *Physics.* Thomas requested his fellow Dominican, William of Moerbeke, to translate the *Physics* anew from the Greek. With this translation before him, he wrote his commentary and defense of Aristotle's *Physics.* See Jules A. Bainsee, "St. Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of the Existence of God Presented in Their Chronological Order," *Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius Smith O.P.*, ed. Ryan (Westminster, Maryland: Newman, 1952), p. 55; St. Thomas Aquinas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio,* ed. Leonina (Rome: Marietti, 1954), praefatio, p. vi and Bk. VIII, lect. 2, nn. 973-974 (All references are to this edition). *Averroes' Destructio destructionum philosophiae Algazalis,* ed. Beatrice Zedler (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 1-22.

[2] The proof for an Ultimate Mover deals with the world about us from the standpoint of its motion, not from the standpoint of its existence. It is therefore a proof for God's existence distinct from the proof of efficient causality. Although efficient causality is involved in this proof (as it is in all five proofs—see Thomas C. O'Brien, *Metaphysics and the Existence of God* [Washington: Thomist Press, 1960], p. 229), to reduce this proof to the proof from efficient causality is to confuse the study of mobile being with the study of metaphysics and to do violence to the Aristotelian method of natural science. Thomas refers to this proof for the existence of God as "the first and more obvious proof." "Prima et manifestior via, quae sumitur ex parte motus." *Summa theologiae,* I, q. 2, a. 3, ed. Leonina. He employs it in at least six other places: *Contra gentiles,* I, c. 13;

The seventh and eighth books of the *Physics* were not written in quest of a First Mover. They were simply the last chapters in a book devoted to the general science of nature. The subject matter for this science is changeable being, which we encounter in our daily experience.

> The science that treats of those things which depend upon matter in order to exist and in order to be known is the natural science that we call *Physics*. Because everything that has matter is changeable, it follows that *changeable being* is the subject of natural philosophy.[3]

Natural science studies natural things. What distinguishes a natural thing from an artificial or unnatural thing is what is intrinsic to the object. A piece of wood is natural, but a boat made of wood is not natural. Nature is a principle of movement and of rest that exists primarily and not secondarily in a body. Nature accounts for the phenomenon that wood may sprout and produce more wood, whereas a boat that is planted could never produce a boat.[4]

> Natural philosophy is concerned with natural things; but natural things are those whose principle is nature, while nature is a principle of motion and of rest in the body in which it exists.[5]

Compendium theologiae, I, q. 2, n. 3; *In VII Phys.*, lect. 2; *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1-3, 7, 13, 21-23; *In XII Meta.*, lect. 5-10; *In Evangelium S. Joannis*, prologus.

[3] "Scientia quae tractat de his vero quae dependent a materia non solum secundum esse sed etiam secundum rationem, est naturalis, quae *Physica* dicitur. Et quia omne quod habet materiam mobile est, consequens est quod *ens mobile* sit subjectum naturalis philosophiae." (*In I Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 3.)

[4] Aristotle, *Physics* (Oxford trans.), II, 1, 192 b 21-3. For a thorough explanation of the Aristotelian concept of nature see Athanasius Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation* (River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1955), pp. 1-32. Thomas has no time for those who imagine nature to be an imp, or what is worse, an immutable imp, within a body. "Unde deridendi sunt qui volentes definitionem Aristotelis corrigere, naturam per aliquid absolutum definire conati sunt, dicentes quod natura est vis insita rebus, vel aliquid hujusmodi." (*In II Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 145.)

[5] "Naturalis enim philosophia de naturalibus est; naturalis autem sunt quorum principium est natura; natura autem est principium motus et quietis in eo in quo est." (*In I Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 5.)

We see that the *Physics* is a study of physical bodies and has as its primary purpose the explanation of why physical bodies move. It was in answering this question that Aristotle found it necessary to posit an unmoved Mover.[6]

Since the importance of this empirical approach can hardly be over-emphasized, it would be well to consider the relation of the last two books of the *Physics* to the whole work under the light of the methodology which Aristotle left us in the *Posterior Analytics.*

> A science is one, if it is concerned with a single genus or class of objects which are composed of the primary elements of that genus and are parts of it or essential modifications of those parts.[7]

The class of objects under consideration in the *Physics* is physical bodies, and their essential modification is movement or mutability. To know this science is to know the reasons why motion is attributable to natural bodies.[8]

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[6] Athanasius Weisheipl, *The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages,* in the Philosophy of Science Series (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), pp. 32-33. See Antoninus Finili, O.P., "Is there a Philosophical Approach to God?," *Dominican Studies,* 4 (1951), 80-101. He says, "St. Thomas points out that philosophy considers that order of reality which is to be found in nature with a view to discovering the ultimate causes of things" (p. 86). One's picture of the universe understandably has an important part to play in his analysis of nature. The astronomy of Aristotle and St. Thomas was unrefined due to the obvious lack of adequate instruments with which to probe space. The planets seemed to them to manifest no fundamental change. From this they concluded that the planets must be immutable and of an ethereal matter different from the matter of the earth. We shall not consider this antiquated view here except to note that both men accounted for this astronomy in their total picture of nature and in their analysis of a necessity for a First Mover. As we shall see, however, the validity of their proof for an Ultimate Mover transcends any particular astronomical theory. See Athanasius Weisheipl, "The Celestial Movers in Medieval Physics," *The Thomist,* 24 (1961), 286-326. In fact, since the findings of Galileo and the demonstrations that there are changes on other planets similar to changes on our planet, the principles by which Aristotle proved a First Mover, since they are derived from the properties of changeable being, are more immediately applicable to the whole universe than they were in the Aristotelian or Ptolemaic system. For if, as moderns hold, the other planets are simply "more of the same," then the principles applicable to mobile being on the earth are applicable to mobile being wherever it be found in the universe.

[7] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* (Loeb trans.), I, 28, 87 a 38-40.

For Aristotle, knowing the reason *why* is far more than knowing merely that the phenomenon exists. It is to know "that the cause from which the fact results is the cause of that fact, and that the fact cannot be otherwise."[9] Thus the question under discussion is—Why does anything move at all?

Aristotle treats the principles of natural science and the principles of mobile bodies in Books I and II of the *Physics* and arrives at a definition of motion in Book III: "The fulfillment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially."[10] Motion is a phenomenon attributable to all bodies insofar as they are always capable of being changed; as they undergo this change from one state of existence to a possible different one, they are in motion. The next four books consider motion itself, its parts and the processes that follow from it. Certain conditions are found to be required for motion. The first of these is a source of motion, and this is the problem considered in Books VII and VIII.

> The question *why*, then, is answered by reference to the matter, to the form, and to the primary moving cause.[11]

Book VII treats of the fact that a First Mover is necessary and compares one motion with another, while Book VIII re-examines the necessity for an unmoved source of motion, and then seeks to find what kind of thing the First Mover is.

> After the Philosopher shows in the preceeding book [VII] that it is necessary to posit a first mobile, a first motion and a first mover,

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[8] *Ibid.*, I, 7, 75 a 39-b 2.

[9] *Ibid.*, I, 2, 71 b 9-12; and St. Thomas, *In II Post. Anal.*, lect. 4, n. 34, ed. Spiazzi (Taurini: Marietti, 1955).

[10] *Physics*, III, 201 a 10-11.

[11] *Ibid.*, II, 198 a 33-35.

> he intends in this book [VIII] to investigate what kind of thing this first mover is.[12]

It is clear that these two questions and the order of their resolution fit perfectly into Aristotle's methodology.

> For some objects of inquiry we have a different kind of question to ask, such as whether there is or is not a centaur or God. (By "is or is not" I mean "is or is not without further qualification"; as opposed to "is or is not e.g., white".) On the other hand, when we have ascertained the thing's existence, we inquire as to its nature, asking, for instance, "What, then, is God."[13]

Each question, both *an sit* and *quale sit*, seeks a reason, or medium of demonstration.[14]

QUEST FOR THE FIRST MOVER

There are two parts to Aristotle's quest for an ultimate Mover. The first argues that whatever is moved is moved by another; the second argues that there cannot be an infinite regression of movers. From these premises he concludes that there must be a first Mover, itself unmoved.[15]

Whatever is moved is moved by another

Preliminary to establishing that all that is moved is moved by another, we must understand the terms and precise concepts that we are using. We are not speaking of every motion in this world but of the motion of a body that moves as a subject of its own motion. This is called per se or original motion and is distinguished from the motion of a body that is carried or moves only accidentally because it inheres in something else that is moving (e.g., the motion of red, white and blue when the flag waves, or of a man when the ship he is on sets sail). The motion we are discussing is per se and primary. By a primary motion we mean that the whole subject moves and not a part of it. Thus the motion we are speaking of is the motion of the whole body that is initiated properly in that body.[16]

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[12] "Postquam Philosophus in praecedenti libro ostendit quod necesse est ponere primum mobile, et primum motum, et primum motorem, in hoc libro intendit inquirere qualis sit primus motor, et primus motus et primum mobile." (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 965.)

[13] *Posterior Analytics*, II, 1, 89 b 33-35.

[14] *In II Post. Anal.*, lect. 1, n. 412; and Athanasius Weisheipl, *Aristotelian Methodology: A Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle* (River Forest, Ill.: unpublished), pp. 38-9.

[15] *In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 891.

The term "is moved" is equivocal. In its strictest sense, to be moved primarily and originally refers to local motion and a body is moved only so long as it is in motion here and now produced by another. Passing from a standstill to a moving state is not motion but generation, for such a change occurs instantaneously.[17] To say that whatever is moved is moved by another is to say that whatever moves is being generated or has been generated by another.[18] All motions imply generation because without generation the body with its intrinsic capacities for motion would not exist[19] and because "in every motion there is a kind of generation and corruption."[20]

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[16] St. Thomas goes out of his way to make these distinctions clear. He discusses the various uses of the term *per se motion* and what is meant by primary motion in *ibid.*, lect. 1, n. 887 and *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 7, n. 1022, and lect. 23, n. 1171.

[17] *Ibid.*, lect. 20, n. 1139.

[18] St. Thomas frequently equates generation with motion: "Sed causa movens est eadem secundum speciem utrique earum . . . sicut homo generat hominem." (*In II Phys.*, lect. 11, n. 242); "Motus est unus genere, qui est in eodem predicamento, . . . sicut omnis generatio substantiae est eadem genere . . ." (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 892); "Cum ergo corruptio sit mutatio quaedam . . ." (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 985); "Generationem et corruptionem et hujusmodi mutationes" (*ibid.*, lect. 13, n. 1084); "Quoniam generatio videtur esse prima motuum in his quae generantur" (*ibid.*, lect. 14, n. 1093); "Transmutatio vero generationis et corruptionis" (*ibid.*, n. 1095); when speaking of generation, "res quae *movetur*, in illo instanti est subjecto passioni posterioris temporis" (*ibid.*, lect. 17, n. 1119. [Italics mine]); see also lect. 6, n. 1015. The principle of motion within a body or nature may be considered insofar as it is an active principle or the spontaneous source of activity in bodies, and as it is a passive principle or potentiality for motion that must be actualized by external agents. Nature as a passive principle demands that a body be moved by another. *Ibid.*, lect. 10, n. 1053. See Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation,* pp. 17 *et seqq.*

This being the case, our next step in answering the question "Why do bodies move?" is to examine moving bodies. Three arguments forced Aristotle to conclude that things are moved only by other things. The first of these calls upon experience. Look about you and examine bodies that change their place. Can they move without something else moving them? Does a stone move without being lifted or poked? It is clear that for inanimate things there must be an external mover, but a problem arises in regard to living things, for an animal seems to move itself.[21]

The difficulty is resolved by examining living things more carefully in order to determine in what sense they move themselves. In a living animal the soul informs the body so that one part, or organ moves another in such a way as to produce locomotion. That the person is dependent upon the soul for his motion is evidenced at death, when the motion of the composite ceases. The soul itself, however, is not moved per se but *per accidens,* for it is so closely entwined with the organic body that it is moved only insofar as it is a part of the composite. Therefore a living thing moves itself only by one part moving another part, not by a primary and per se motion.[22]

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[19] "Prior est generatio mobilis quam motus ejus" (*In VIII Phys.,* lect. 2, n. 985); "Et non solum primum movens et primum subjectum considerantur circa generationem, sed etiam ea quae consequenter sunt. Et sic patet quod ad naturalem pertinet considerare formam, moventem et materiam" (*In II Phys.,* lect. 11, n. 245); "Generatio videtur est prima motuum in his quae generantur, quia primo oportet rem fieri quam movetur; et hoc verum est in quocumque generato" (*In VIII Phys.,* lect. 14, n. 1093).

[20] "In omni motu est quaedam generatio et corruptio, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid" (*Ibid.,* lect. 18, n. 1127). See lect. 6, n. 1015.

[21] "Circa hoc potest esse dubium an ab alio moveatur" (*In VII Phys.,* lect. 1, n. 885). The special problems of gravity and projectile motion that arise in regard to inanimate bodies will be treated in detail later.

Aristotle observes that a thing that moves itself primarily and per se should not have to rest from its motion when a mover rests. But *de facto* things do cease moving when other things stop moving. Considering this phenomenon of nature, Aristotle demonstrates why a whole can never move itself and St. Thomas insists that his argument is a *propter quid* proof.[23] Let us assume that a thing moves itself primarily and per se. We can divide it, since anything that moves is divisible.[24] Having divided the whole, we have a part of the whole; when this part rests, the whole must rest. If not, then when the whole is moving and the one part resting, the remaining part must be moving the whole, since we said that the body is moving itself. But no whole moved in this way (one part moving and one resting) is being moved primarily and per se as we originally assumed. In such a case, when the first part is at rest, the whole must be at rest. It follows that what is being moved ceases to be moved upon the occasion of something else resting. Therefore the whole is being moved by another, albeit a part of the whole.[25]

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[22] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 7, and 13, nn. 1080-1081 and lect. 4, n. 1002. Thomas concludes that a soul is moved *per accidens* but not per se. "Ista enim causa est assignata quare animalium animae non movent semper, quia moventur per accidens." In lect. 7, n. 1024, St. Thomas cautions against so distinguishing the soul from the body that the motion of living things be reduced to mechanical motion. See St. Thomas, *In I De anima,* lect. 10, nn. 160-161, 167, ed. Pirotta (Taurini: Marietti, 1924), where the word "motion" is said to be applicable only to the sensible and vegetative operation of the soul and not to the intellective because the intellect acts independently of any organ; and Aristotle, *De anima* (Oxford trans.), I, c. 4, 408 b 15-20. See Ferrariensis, *In Contra gentiles,* I, c. 13, comm. IV: The whole is the formal cause and the parts the material cause of the motion of a continuum; and John of St. Thomas, *Cursus philosophicus thomisticus,* ed. Reiser (Taurini: Marietti, 1932), I, q. 22, a. 3: The soul is the formal, not the efficient cause of motion of a living thing.

[23] *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, nn. 886, 888-889.

[24] The reason that everything that changes is divisible is that what changes passes from one state to another gradually. Consequently, at a given term in the motion part of the body is in one state and part is on its way to the state. Since divisibility is merely the body's capacity for being divided into parts, it is clear that all changeable bodies qualify as divisible. See *In VI Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 796.

The second proof that everything that is moved is moved by another is from an induction. Everything seems to be moved in one of the following ways: a thing is moved by nature and at the same time by itself, e.g., an animal running; it is moved by nature without being moved by itself, e.g., a leaf falling; or it is moved contrary to nature, e.g., a missile that is shot into the air.[26]

We have already resolved the problem of the motion of animals by determining what the mover is and what is being moved in a living creature. It does not seem that a leaf falling to the ground is moving itself, for self-motion belongs to living, not dead or inanimate bodies. Furthermore, a falling or rising body, unlike a living body that moves itself, cannot stop its motion nor change its direction: a leaf invariably falls downwards and cigarette smoke rises upwards.[27] Moreover, when a body falls the whole body falls and there is no differentiation of parts. Consequently, one part could not be moving another part. Such a body that is one and continuous both in quantity and quality, cannot be moving itself, since motion demands an agent and patient that are in some way differentiated.[28] The third category of moving objects, that of bodies moving contrary to nature, clearly demands a mover different from the objects, since these bodies are moved by compulsion.

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[25] Avicenna, a Moslem paraphraser of Aristotle who preceded Aquinas, objected to this argument on the grounds that to propose that a part of a moving body is at rest is an impossible supposition. Thomas resolves the difficulty by careful examination of Aristotle's text, in which he merely assumed that a part of a moving whole be at rest. Thus the conclusion is no less true than is the statement "man is irrational," given the assumption that man is a donkey. *In VII Phys.*, lect. 1, nn. 886, 888-889.

[26] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 7, nn. 1022-3; *Cont. gent.* I, c. 13, n. 8. H. D. Gardeil, *Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,* II, trans, Otto Bird (St. Louis: Herder, 1958), p. 138, says that "this list of possible motions is exhaustive."

[27] Cp. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 7, nn. 1025-1027. St. Thomas says that these arguments are merely dialectical.

The third argument proving that everything that is moved is moved by another proceeds from an analysis of motion. Motion is a reduction from potency to act in something capable of act. Since a thing cannot be both in potency and in act to the same operation at the same time, a whole cannot reduce itself from potency to act. It is necessary that either an outside agent reduce the whole or a part move another part.[29]

With this triple argument we are prepared to answer our initial question of why bodies move. We have found that bodies are endowed with intrinsic principles by which they can move. When we pursue the question further, however, we discover that an outside agent had to beget the natural body and, once begotten, the potential principles within the body must be actualized by an agent that is either a part of the body or exterior to it. Thus Aristotle rests his case with the conclusion that nothing inanimate moves itself: whatever is moved is generated or has been generated by another.[30]

There cannot be an infinite regress of movers

The second proposition necessary for proving a First Mover is that there cannot be an infinite series of movers. The series must cease with a single Mover that is itself unmoved.

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[28] *Ibid.*, n. 1028. The question of what is the mover of heavy and light objects will be taken up later. The basis for the distinction between mover and moved is the fact that no single part of an object can be both in potency and in act for the same motion at the same time.

[29] *Cont. gent.*, I, c. 13. See *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 10, n. 1053.

[30] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 14, n. 1093. "Moventur enim levia quidem sursum, gravia autem deorsum a generante quidem, inquantum dat eis formam quam consequitur talis motus; sed a removente prohibens, per accidens et non per se. Quidem vero posuerunt quod postquam speciem sunt adepta hujusmodi corpora, indigent ab aliquo extrinseco moveri per se: quod hic Philosophus removet" (*In I De caelo et mundo*, lect. 18, n. 1).

Before we examine Aristotle's three arguments regarding the impossibility of an infinite series of movers, it would be well to explain our terminology. By denying the possibility of an infinite series of movers we are not saying that motion, from the philosophical standpoint, could not have always existed. What we are insisting is that any series of movers, however long it extends, has always existed dependent on a mover that transcends that series by being unmoved.

In this discussion Aristotle presumes that motion is eternal. Although this appears to be an undemonstrable supposition that may jeopardize his consequent arguments, we shall see that Aristotle's proof for a First Mover is in no way harmed by this presumption. To prove that God exists on the supposition that the world is eternal is the more difficult, but it is the "more efficacious way" of proving God's existence, as St. Thomas points out. For with this argument God's existence is far less obvious than would be the case if one assumed that the world began in time.[31]

Having established that everything moved in the universe is moved by another, Aristotle presents three arguments to prove that an infinite regress of motions is impossible. The first argument considers the motion of bodies from place to place[32] and the time in which such motions occur.[33] Let us assume that this motion does proceed to infinity. At the same time that a single body is moved, the body that moves it is also moved, and so on for the remaining moved and moving bodies. Consequently there will be an infinite number of bodies moved at the same time. Thus if a stone is moved by a stick and the stick is moved by a hand, the motions of the stone, stick and hand occur simultaneously. It is clear that the stone's motion occurs in a finite time, and therefore the motion of the moved and the mover occurs in the same finite time. Since the motion of an infinite number of bodies is an infinite motion, we must conclude that the infinite motion of this single chain has been completed in a finite time. Since this is impossible, the supposition that there is an infinite motion is impossible and we must admit that the number of movers ceases short of infinity. There must, therefore, be a First Mover that is unmoved.[34]

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[31] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 1, n. 970; lect. 2, nn. 985-987; and lect. 3, nn. 995-996. It is a false assumption to think that because something always is it does not have a cause simply because "those things that are caused about us begin anew." Thomas (n. 996) explains why a thing that has existed from eternity still demands a cause other than itself when he distinguishes between a thing that exists and that which causes a thing to exist. Thus, for example, if sunlight always was and always will be, nevertheless, it is always dependent upon the sun. He also distinguishes between first in time and first in nature. See lect. 2, nn. 972, 990; lect. 14, n. 1089; and lect. 19, n. 1134.

[32] *Physics*, VII, 242 b 24-29. Cf. *In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 894, where St. Thomas says that for a body to be moved from place to place it is necessary that there be some kind of continuity between the mover and moved. Either the body must be touched by what moves it, e.g., a branch that is grasped by the hand, or it must be continuous with what moves it, as

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happens in the parts of an animal's body that move each other. Elsewhere (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 7, n. 1028) Thomas makes the point that a perfect continuum—one in which there is no differentiation of parts—cannot move itself for just this reason, because one part does not move another part. Heavy bodies are continuous in this way; objects that are moved by animal motion are said to be "more a collection of parts than a perfect continuum."

[33] Time is defined in *In IV Phys.*, lect. 17, n. 580 as "the number of motion according to before and after."

[34] *In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 892 and *Cont. gent.* I, c. 13, nn. 12-13. The arguments for simultaneity of cause and effect in motion are discussed in lect. 3 and 4, nn. 897-912. The possibility of an infinite number of infinite motions occuring in a finite time is presented as an objection in n. 893 and resolved in n. 894. See also James A. McWilliams, *Physics and Philosophy, A Study of St. Thomas' Commentary on the Eight Books of Aristotle's Physics* (Washington: Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc., 1946), pp. 100-101. Ferrariensis (*In Cont. Gent.*, I, 13, comm. LX) and Ross (Aristotle's *Physics*, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936], p. 670) raise an objection to this proposition on the basis of the dialectical argument that Thomas presents in *In VI Phys.*, lect. 9, nn. 842-5. This argument fitted the Ptolemaic astronomy very neatly but is invalidated by the Copernican system. Their objection, that a part of an infinite series of motions will move in a finite time, fails to take account of the demonstration presented for the proposition in *In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, nn. 892, 894. The proof concerns

The second argument why there cannot be an infinite number of movers is that every moving body presupposes a mover that is relatively unmoved in relation to this motion. Thus a man walks because one of his feet remains unmoved while the other foot moves. Should his planted foot be broken or for some other reason lose its rigidity, walking becomes impossible. To withdraw the unmoved foot or to extend the movers infinitely eliminates motion, since each mover continues to depend on an immobile mover. An infinite series that excludes an unmoved mover is then an impossibility so long as one admits this phenomenon of motion.[35]

The third proof considers the kind of movers that comprises an infinite series. In a series of movers each mover is a moved mover, or an instrument.[36] An infinite regress of such instruments, however, would be no more in motion than an infinitely long pencil with no one to write. Since *de facto* there is motion, there must be a non-instrumental, or principal, unmoved Mover.[37]

Accepting these two propositions, namely that everything that is moved is moved by another, and that there can be no infinite regress of moved movers, we conclude that there must be a First Mover that is unmoved.

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primary and per se motion, or motion of the whole moving as a whole; the whole infinite motion moving as a whole cannot move in a finite time. The same objection is rejected immediately by John of St. Thomas (*op. cit., Summa textus septimi Physicorum,* c. 1, prop. 2). The ultimate question, of course, is not whether St. Thomas depended on Ptolemaic astronomy for this proof, but whether the proposition is true or not.

[35] *In VIII Phys.,* lect. 9, n. 1044; and *Cont. gent.,* I, c. 13, n. 14.

[36] *In VIII Phys.,* lect. 9, n. 1044. An instrument is said to be whatever moves other things and is moved itself.

[37] *Ibid.,* 1041. Cajetan, realizing that this principle of no infinite regression is employed in three of Thomas' proofs for God's existence, develops the argument from the nature of causes. Intermediate causes depend not only on a prior or antecedent cause but also on the first cause. *Commentaria in Summam theologicam s. Thomae Aquinatis,* ed. Leonina, IV (Rome: Poly. Vat., 1888), I, q. 2, a. 3, E and F.

> Every generator is the cause of generation for a body that is generated; still corruptible generators owe the fact that they are the cause of generation to some first incorruptible [generator].[38]

St. Thomas concedes that Aristotle has "demonstrated" the existence of an ultimate Mover.[39]

MODERN OBJECTIONS

Such a proof seems adequate to satisfy the scientific naïveté of the thirteenth century philosophers, some might say, but can it possibly survive the scrutiny of the physical sciences as developed from Newton's time to the twentieth century?

It is a tribute to the thoroughness with which Aristotle and St. Thomas studied nature that they anticipated the major objections to their thesis—even those of our century. The first of these objections rises from the law of inertia. As we shall see, Aristotle and St. Thomas provided the principles for mastering this problem in their discussions of projectile motion. The second objection concerns gravity and, as we shall see, a physical understanding of gravity such as Aristotle proposed resolves this modern difficulty as well.[40]

The law of inertia is stated thus: "Every body continues in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it."[41] The first portion of this law seems to disprove our first proposition by which we prove a First Mover, namely that whatever is moved is moved by another. How universal is this law? Is it a purely physical law, or is it a physico-mathematical law?

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[38] "Omne generans est causa generationis generato, sed tamen generantia corruptibilia habent quod sint causa generationis, ab aliquo primo incorruptibili" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 12, n. 1074).

[39] "Ad demonstrandum primum motorem" (*In VII Phys.*, lect. 2, n. 891). Although this Ultimate Mover is a first generator of bodies, when we recall that all other changes are consequent to this change, it follows than an Ultimate Mover is presumed in changes of place and consequently of growth and quality as well.

[40] Much of the following discussion is taken from the excellent work by Augustine Wallace, O.P., as it appeared in his article "Newtonian Antinomies against the Prima Via," *The Thomist*, 19 (1956), 151-192; and also from Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation*, pp. 35 *et seqq.*

[41] Newton, *Mathematical Principles*, ed., Florian Cajori (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1947), p. 13.

If we refer to Newton's work in which he formulated the law of inertia, we find it listed first among the mathematical principles of natural philosophy.[42] When we examine Newton's interpretation of the law, we find that he means that as the resistance of a medium about a moving body diminishes, the distance travelled by the body will increase, even to infinity.[43] The principle of inertia considers a physico-mathematical approach to a limit, rather than a strictly physical approach. Since from all available evidence, resistive media seem to be universal physical phenomena, this law could never be established as self-evident or demonstrable.

The second half of the law, far from verifying the first half, merely says, "Every particle continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight line, except insofar as it doesn't."[44] To establish that an approach to a limit is also verified in the limit itself is to establish a far from universal principle. This is clear from the impossibility of converting a polygon to a circle by multiplying its sides. However much it approaches the limit or circle, the polygon remains a polygon.

What is of most importance in understanding the law of inertia's relevance to our thesis is its presupposition, namely, that a body's motion has already been initiated. It is precisely this question of the source of motion, a problem which Newton's law never raises, that we have to answer. Properly understood, the law of inertia in no way whatsoever lessens the need for another mover. We find Newton in explicit agreement.

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[42] *Ibid.*

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

[44] A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1946), p. 124.

> By this principle [of inertia] alone there never could be any motion in the world. Some other principle was necessary for putting bodies into motion; and now they are in motion, some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion.[45]

We have found that the principle that puts bodies into motion can be a part of the body or an extrinsic force, but it is ultimately the generator of the body, or of the outside force. What is the principle required for conserving motion? When a ball is thrown through the air, or when a satellite is hurled into space, is a mover required beyond the moving object itself? To Aristotle and St. Thomas, such a motion is clearly a compulsory one, since it does not proceed from a cause intrinsic to the moving object. As compulsory, it is moved by something other than the body itself, and without this mover it will cease to move.[46] Aristotle and St. Thomas were mistaken about what the mover of a projectile was (they thought that the disturbed air behind the object moved it); however, their true principle, that an outside force was necessary, left the door open for a more plausible explanation. This is the theory that the projector impresses a force on the object that moves the object until it is impeded by nature, resistance or friction.[47] Even this impetus, which is a formal or material cause, needs a generator.

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[45] Newton, *Opticks*, ed. G. Bell (New York: Dover, 1952), p. 397. See Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation*, p. 64: "The logical basis of the principle [of inertia] lies in the nature of mathematical abstraction, which must leave out of consideration the qualitative and causal content of nature."

[46] *Physics*, VIII, 10, 267 a 4-9; *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 22, nn. 1162-63; *Cont. gent.*, III, c. 24.

[47] "There is no reason to suppose that St. Thomas held the impetus theory which was developed later. However, the theory of impetus is a clear development of his principles" (Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation*, p. 41, fn. 30). Newton speaks of his *vis inertiae* as a passive principle that receives the force of some active principle: "The *vis inertiae* is a passive principle by which bodies persist in motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted" (*Opticks*, p. 397). St. Thomas says: "An instrument is said to be moved by the principal agent, so long as it retains the power imparted to it by the principal

The second recent antinomy questioning the traditional proof for an ultimate Mover is the question of gravity. Were gravity a mere mechanical pulling or pushing between two bodies, then the nature of falling and rising bodies appears to be irrelevant to their motion.

If Newton's work is studied carefully, one can see that his use of the word "attraction" in describing gravitational phenomena was not intended as a physical explanation of the way bodies fall.

> I likewise . . . use the words attraction, impulse or propensity of any sort towards a center, promiscuously, and indifferently, one for another; considering those forces not physically, but mathematically; wherefore the reader is not to imagine that by those words I anywhere take upon me to define the kind, or the manner of any action, the causes or the physical reason thereof, or that I attribute forces, in a true and physical sense, to certain centers (which are only mathematical points); when at any time I happen to speak of centers as attracting, or as endued with attractive powers.[48]

Newton repeats this theme after deriving the inverse-square law.

> I here use the word "attraction" in general for any endeavor whatsoever, made by bodies to approach to each other, . . . In the same general sense I use the word "impulse," not defining in this treatise the species or physical qualities of forces, but investigating the quantities and mathematical proportions of them.[49]

Later in his life Newton reiterated his position.

> How these attractions may be performed I do not here consider. What I call attraction may be performed by impulse, or by some

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agent: hence an arrow continues on its course so long as it retains the impulsive force imparted to it by the projector" (*De pot.*, q. 3, a. 11 ad 5). If inertia is given the status of a physical law, an interesting philosophical question arises: How could a finite impulse impart an infinite motion? See R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and His Nature,* II, trans. Rose (St. Louis: Herder, 1936), pp. 447-452.

[48] Newton, *Mathematical Principles, ed. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

> other means unknown to me. I use that word here to signify only in general any force by which bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the cause.[50]

Newton admits that there are physical causes that account for gravity, but he confesses that their discovery has eluded him.

> Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause . . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis.[51]

There are formidable arguments why gravity could not be an attraction between bodies. The first is that gravity has never been shielded as have other attractions of magnetism and electricity.[52] Moreover, Einstein's theory of relativity, which has proved more universally applicable than Newton's laws in describing certain phenomena, disregards the concept of gravity as an attraction.[53] Hamilton's "least action" concept also explains observable phenomena while ignoring gravity's attraction.[54]

We find a source for a solution to the question of gravity in the work of Thomas and Aristotle. For them, gravity understood physically is far from being a compulsory motion caused by the mechanical pull of another body; it is a natural motion, proceeding from a principle intrinsic to the body itself.[55] Gravity as an intrinsic principle is only a formal cause, so it too demands a mover.

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[50] *Opticks*, p. 376.

[51] *Mathematical Principles*, pp. 546-547.

[52] Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

[53] Eddington, *op. cit.*, p. 121. For a discussion of the theory of relativity in relation to the Aristotelian concept of nature, see Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation*, pp. 105-111. The conclusion is that "the Aristotelian theory of nature and gravitation finds a satisfactory complement in Einsteinian relativity." See also, Augustine Wallace, "St. Thomas, Galileo, and Einstein," *The Thomist*, 24 (1961), 1-22. He concludes that "Einstein does have a message for the modern mind, and it is this, namely, that the mathematical realism of Galileo, or the space-time absolutism of a Newton, are antiquated notions that can no longer function fruitfully for the modern scientist."

[54] See Andrew G. Van Melsen, *The Philosophy of Nature* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ., 1953), p. 161.

> It is asked why heavy and light things are moved to their respective places. But the reason is that they have a natural aptitude to such places. For this is what it means to be light, to have an aptitude to that which is 'up' . . . Whence to ask why a heavy thing moves downward is to ask nothing else than why it is heavy. And so that same thing that made it heavy, makes it to be moved downward.[56]

Consequently gravity too, when analyzed from a physical point of view, owes its motion to a generator of the body.

To summarize what has been said regarding these two modern antinomies raised in objection to the existence of an ultimate Mover, we can do no better than to quote Newton himself, who called the principles that formed the basis of these objections "mathematical principles." While their value has no doubt asserted itself when they have been applied to the mechanical and mathematical behavior of motion, they are of limited value in explaining why moving bodies act as they do.[57] For these principles abstract from that property that is universal of all bodies—motion. They leave the question of what causes motion unanswered.

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[55] See Weisheipl, *Nature and Gravitation,* pp. 65-111. Thomas devotes an entire lectio (*In VIII Phys.,* lect. 8, nn. 1029-1036) to discussing gravity.

[56] "Quaeritur quare gravia et levia moventur in loca. Sed causa hujus est, quia habent naturalem aptitudinem ad talia loca. Hoc enim est esse leve, habere aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum . . . Unde nihil est aliud quaerere quare grave movetur deorsum, quam quaerere quare est grave. Et sic illud idem quod facit ipsum grave, facit ipsum moveri deorsum" (*Ibid.,* n. 1034). See nn. 1033, 1036. Gravity causes a body both to fall and to rest in its place.

[57] "In his *Principia* Newton did not venture to make suggestions on the cause of gravity" (*Principia,* appendix, p. 677). For a more thorough acquaintance with the Thomistic philosopher's appreciation of mathematico-physical sciences and where they stand in reference to the whole of human

Although the sciences of nature, mostly quantitative and metrical, that have been developed since the time of St. Thomas have ignored the necessity of an ultimate Mover, they have in no way discredited the proof presented by Aristotle and St. Thomas. We are, therefore, forced to conclude that the galloping of a horse, the blossoming of a rose, or the lapping of waves in the sea, when analyzed in light of physical causes, demand an unmoved mover that has ultimately generated the natures that account for these motions.[58]

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knowledge, see Benedict Ashley, "Aristotle's Sluggish Earth," *The New Scholasticism*, 32 (1958), 23-31. "In discussing these concepts [mass and force], Galileo and Newton were not making a statement of fact. They were finding units of a code, an alphabet in which mechanics could be written coherently and consistently. The formula I have written [$F = m \times f$] is one of its basic messages, and what is important in it is not the fact but the discovery of the code" (Jacob Bronowski, "Science as Foresight," in *What is Science?*, ed. Newman [New York: Washington Square Press, 1961], p. 455).

[58] We have not introduced the Ultimate Mover as a *deus ex machina* nor as a meddler in natural phenomena. The Ultimate Mover does not intrude but concurs with nature. The science of philosophy, whose scope is broader than that of the natural sciences, distinguishes the secondary causes, or the causes that are observed and measured in the strictly empirical sciences, from the primary cause that accounts for these causes in nature. The scientist presupposes the motion that he finds and studies; the philosopher explains how it got there in the first place. The Ultimate Mover is a primary cause of motion without whose action there would be no secondary or observable motion. The fact that this demonstration presumes an understanding of nature, motion, time and the continuum hampers attempts to arrive scientifically at this conclusion without a general study of changeable being such as Aristotle and St. Thomas developed in the first six books of the *Physics*. See Vincent Edward Smith, "The Prime Mover: Physical and Metaphysical Considerations," in *Proceedings of the Amer. Cath. Phil. Assoc.*, 28 (1954), 78-94; and Gerard Verbeke, "La structure logique de la preuve du Premier Moteur chez Aristote," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 46 (1948), 137-160.

QUALITIES OF THE ULTIMATE MOVER

> After the Philosopher shows . . . that it is necessary to posit . . . a first mover, he intends . . .to investigate what kind of thing this first mover is.[59]

We would expect that in a science of mobile being, any description of an immobile being would be undertaken *passim,* and would be couched in analogous terms referring to familiar changeable being.[60]

Having established that the First Mover is immobile, it must follow that it is incorporeal, for a body is always capable of being moved.[61] From the fact that motion is eternal, Aristotle argues that the First Mover is eternal.[62] It is infinite because an infinite force demands an infinite power and because only an infinite Mover can cause motion for an infinite time.[63]

> Whence as perpetual motion demonstrates the infinite power of the mover, but not of the mobile itself, so also the perpetual duration of motion demonstrates the infinite power of the cause by which it has existence.[64]

There exists one unmoved Mover. A single unmoved Mover suffices to explain motion, and since causes are not multiplied in nature, it is not necessary to posit many such movers.[65] Moreover, the regularity and continuity of motion suggest a single Mover.[66]

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[59] *In VIII Phys.,* lect. 1, n. 965.

[60] Thomas draws the analogy between the First Mover and living things: "Nor ought it to be thought strange that something move itself, because we plainly see many such in the genus of living things and animals" (*Ibid.,* lect. 13, n. 1079). "Because the Prime Mover has no part, it is indivisible as is the point" (lect. 23, n. 1172).

[61] *Ibid.,* lect. 9, n. 1040; lect. 11, n. 1068; lect. 12, n. 1076; lect. 13, nn. 1079, 1081-2; lect. 23, nn. 1166-7, 1172.

[62] *Ibid.,* lect. 12, nn. 1073-4.

[63] *Ibid.,* nn. 1074, 1076; lect. 21, n. 1154; lect. 23, n. 1172.

[64] "Unde sicut motus perpetuus demonstrat infinitam virtutem motoris, non autem ipsius mobilis; ita et perpetua ejus duratio demonstrat infinitam virtutem causae a qua habet esse" (*Ibid.,* lect. 21, n. 1154).

St. Thomas declares that Aristotle's "principal purpose" in describing the First Mover further is to establish that it possesses neither magnitude nor quantity and that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. The Prime Mover "exists as it were outside the genus of magnitude."[67] It is clear that its kind of being is vastly different from that of the changeable beings that we experience about us and whose motion led us to posit the Ultimate Mover's existence in the first place.[68]

The existence of an Ultimate Mover has been proved, and a portion of its qualities have been discussed within the science that asks: Why do things about us change? This proof for the existence of an Ultimate Mover is still valid so long as we have variables among us.

> The Philosopher ends the general consideration of natural things with the first principle of the whole of nature—God—, who is above all things and blessed forever. Amen.[69]

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[65] *Ibid.*, lect. 12, nn. 1075-6.

[66] *Ibid.*, lect. 23, nn. 1165-7, 1171; lect. 13, n. 1084. Aristotle argues to the unicity of the Ultimate Mover from the supposition that there is only one universe. See *On the Heavens* (Oxford trans.), I, cc. 8-9. John of St. Thomas says "Nothing is so foolish as to think that there could be more than one" First Mover. His reason is that one infinite First Mover would necessarily exclude another infinite mover (*op. cit.*, I, q. 24, a. 3). St. Thomas uses both of these arguments plus a demonstration from the simplicity of the Ultimate Mover (*Sum. theol.*, I, q. 11, a. 3).

[67] *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 27, n. 1172.

[68] The discovery of a being that is incorporeal inaugurates a new science for Aristotle and St. Thomas; a science that will study what is common to corporeal and incorporeal things that we know: being as such. This is the science of metaphysics.

[69] "Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus, in primo principio totius naturae, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Amen" (*In VIII Phys.*, lect. 23, n. 1172). We have not proven that God, with all His attendent attributes, exists, but that an immobile, infinite and spiritual Being exists. Cf. Cajetan, *op. cit.*, I, I, q. 2, a. 3, D.

MICHAEL J. DUFFY, O.P.

PATRISTIC CATECHETICS

The chief aim of this kerygmatic renewal
is to present the truth of our faith
as an organic whole.
Its core is the Good News
of our redemption in Christ.
Its fruit should be the grateful response
of our love.
Eichstätt Catechetics Congress

At the International Congress for Mission Catechetics in 1960, the classic contemporary statement of the role of catechists in their instructions on the Christian faith was formulated. The catechists stated that:

> It is for us to communicate to the generation of mankind living today the message of salvation which has been entrusted to us as Christ's heralds—to pass it on without any distortion, in the organic unity given to it by God himself, and in all its unparalleled inner beauty and lifebuilding power.[1]

In an attempt to implement this ideal a renewal of interest in catechetical method has been a basic consideration of the "kerygmatic movement." The study of catechesis has resulted in a reconsideration of the elements which should dominate fruitful instruction. Modern catechists have concluded that for success in catechizing, the faith must be proclaimed through a religious instruction close to real life, to the Bible and to the liturgy.[2]

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[1] Johannes Hofinger, S.J., (ed.), *Teaching All Nations,* A Symposium on Modern Catechetics (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961), p. xiv.

Catechesis is being revitalized by this attempt to fashion a stimulating approach to the imparting of the Christian message. The attempt does not, however, constitute a new concept of Christian instruction. Even a superficial study of catechetics in the early Church reveals that the instruction in this period was based upon precisely those elements which the modern renewal insists should be emphasized in catechetical work: a sound doctrinal treatment close to real life, based on the Bible, and made meaningful through the liturgy.

The catechesis of the early Church certainly sought to be close to real life. The controlling principle and main purpose of the early catechetical period was not the imparting of knowledge, but rather the formation of the Christian way of life in the catechumen.[3] The evidence is overwhelming that the catechesis in the Church's early centuries was solidly based on Holy Scripture. The liturgy was also a catechetical device in patristic instruction, especially the sacrament of Baptism and the Mass of the Catechumens.

There is a current awareness that the apostolic zeal of the early Church and its vital religious energy were derived to a great extent from success in imparting to the catechumens the full meaning of the message of Christ.[4] The kerygma or the proclamation of the good news of our salvation in Christ was the first stage in the Apostles' preaching to non-Christians. The kerygma is distinguished from catechesis, the second stage, which aims at giving a fuller instruction in Christian doctrine and morality.[5] Basically, however, both the kerygma and catechesis are concerned with the conversion of one's life to a Christ-like way of life. Deeply concerned with the full understanding of the faithful of the message of Christ, the Church is today examining the methods of early Christianity in an attempt to rekindle the remarkable spirit of the Apostolic Church. Fortunately, the methods of instruction of the early Church are revealed in the patristic writings which pertain to catechetics up until the time of St. Augustine.

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[2] *Ibid.*, p. xv.

[3] Guy de Bretagne, "The History of Catechesis," *Lumen Vitae*, 5 (1950), 365.

[4] Johannes Hofinger, S.J., *The Art of Teaching Christian Doctrine* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1957), p. 79.

St. Paul is the great catechist of the ancient Church. Paul feels that ultimately his mission is "to announce among the Gentiles the good tidings of the unfathomable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men as to what is the dispensation of the mystery which has been hidden from eternity in God."[6] For Paul the essence of his whole catechesis is simply "the mystery of Christ."[7] Both the Epistles of St. Paul and the Gospels express clearly that the mystery of Christ is the fundamental theme and unifying principle of all Christian religious instruction.

The earliest non-canonical treatment of instruction in the Church is generally considered to be the *Didache*.[8] The sixteen brief chapters of the *Didache* are regarded as probably written between 100 and 150.[9] It is noteworthy that the complete title of the work, *The Lord's Instruction to the Gentiles Through the Twelve Apostles,*[10] connects the work in one way or another with the Apostles, and there is good reason to conclude that it was their method of catechizing that found its way into the *Didache*.[11]

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[5] William DuBay, "The Kerygma," *Jubilee,* 10 (April, 1962), 37.

[6] Eph. 3:8. (All references to the New Testament are taken from the Confraternity Edition.)

[7] Col. 4:3.

[8] *Didache,* James A. Kleist, S.J., (trans.), "Ancient Christian Writers Series" n. 6 (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1948), pp. 15-25. (All subsequent references to this series will employ the abbreviation ACW.)

[9] Johannes Quasten, *Patrology,* I, (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1950), p. 37.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The patterns of instruction in the synagogues and pagan schools probably influenced Christian instruction.[12] A time honored Greek approach used in the Hellenistic synagogues to instruct proselytes was the notion of a way of life and a way of death.[13] This is precisely the basic method employed in the *Didache* for training catechumens. The way of life is developed in the first four chapters of the *Didache*. The main stress in these chapters falls on outward action. The love of God and neighbor is proposed at the outset and is referred to as the central belief in the way of life.[14]

Chapters five and six of the *Didache* outline the way of death. Certain outward actions as adultery, theft, and sorcery are forbidden. These deeds along with such inward feelings as anger, lust and pride constitute the way of death.[15] It would seem that the method of the early Church in making converts among ordinary men was to state with authority what was to be done and what was to be avoided. Later writing will indicate more developed methods suited for other levels of catechumens.

There is no use made of Bible incidents in the *Didache*, but a limited number of phrases from both Testaments are found throughout. There is an important outline of liturgical functions. Mention is made of Baptism, the Eucharist, public confession, and fasting.[16] The *Didache*, a valuable remnant from the Apostolic Church, provides the first real glimpse of the care of the Church for the instruction of converts.

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[11] James A. Kleist, S.J., (trans.), *Didache*, ACW n. 6, p. 5.

[12] Joseph P. Christopher (trans.), *St. Augustine, The First Catechetical Instruction*, ACW n. 2 (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1946), p. 3.

[13] Johannes Quasten, *Patrology*, I, p. 31.

[14] *Didache, ed. cit.*, p. 15.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 18-23.

The earliest ecclesiastical writers were concerned more with apologetics than with catechesis. Several important figures, however, make explicit reference to catechesis or give indications of the manner in which they presented the faith to the unbelievers. St. Justin's *First Apology*[17] (*c.* 152) is the most representative work from the period immediately following the Apostles and the *Didache.* Although an apologist, Justin may be legitimately considered as reflecting in his *Apology* the method and the matter of the teaching given to pagans taking instructions.[18] Among the principal points of instruction for Justin are the condemnation of the idolatry of the pagans, emphasis on the dogma of creation, the unity of God, and the existence of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

Justin Martyr is emphatic in his regard for Baptism. Only after a person is taught the Christian faith, believes what he is taught, and promises that he can live accordingly can he be admitted to Baptism:

> Those who are convinced and believe what we say and teach is the truth, and pledge themselves to be able to live accordingly, are taught in prayer and fasting to ask God to forgive their past sins . . . . Then we lead them to a place where there is water, and they are regenerated.[19]

Although the dogmatic exposition of the *First Apology* is not the same basic method as the "two ways" of the *Didache,* the two works share an emphasis on the divinity of Christ as proved through the fulfillment of prophecy.[20]

The doctrinal approach of the apologists did not prevent them from seeking a practical relation of Christian teaching to real life.

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[17] St. Justin Martyr, *The First Apology,* Thomas B. Falls (trans.), "Fathers of the Church" VI (New York: Christian Heritage, 1948), pp. 33-111.

[18] G. Bareille, "Catéchèse," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* XX (1932), 1880.

[19] St. Justin Martyr, *op. cit.,* p. 99.

[20] Bareille, *loc. cit.*

The Epistle of Diognetus,[21] an early work difficult to date exactly, is a splendidly written apology presented by an unknown writer to a pagan of high rank. The *Epistle* reveals a development of doctrine which is methodical and lively:

> If this is the faith which you, too, desire, then you should, first of all, acquire a thorough knowledge of the Father . . . when you have acquired this knowledge . . . how intensely you will love Him who first loved you so. And once you love Him, you will be an imitator of His kindness.[22]

The use of Scripture in the *Epistle of Diognetus* and by the apologists in general is comparatively limited. They were aware that their audience was pagan and would not comprehend scriptural authority.

Among other witnesses to the care of the Church for those coming into the faith in this period are the writings of St. Cyprian and of Tertullian. Both writers make use of the narrative method in their instruction. Cyprian in his treatise *De idolorum vanitate*[23] (*c.* 225) follows basically the historical-narrative method endorsed so heartily today. This method leads to Christ through the telling of the history of the Jews and their downfall. In *De idolorum vanitate* the Old Testament foretelling of Christ is stressed along with Christ's miracles and prophecies, death, risen life and ascension. Johannes Hofinger, writing in 1957, asserted that modern catechists agree that the historical-narrative catechesis is the simplest, most adequate and most effective method of initiation into the Christian religion.[24]

Tertullian in *De baptismo*[25] (*c.* 200) provides us with knowledge of the use of the liturgy accompanying the instruction in the early third century. A long period of education which will provide good intellectual and moral training before the reception of Baptism is demanded by Tertullian.[26] Among the duties of catechumens he lists, in addition to formal instruction, various spiritual exercises, prayer, fasting, vigils, and confession of faults.[27]

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[21] *The Epistle to Diognetus,* James A. Kleist, S.J. (trans.), ACW n. 6, pp. 135-147.

[22] *Ibid.,* p. 144.

[23] St. Cyprian, *De idolorum vanitate.* PL 4, 583-604.

[24] Johannes Hofinger, S.J., *The Art of Teaching Christian Doctrine,* p. 24.

[25] Tertullian, *De baptismo* (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina I, 277-295).

The *Traditio apostolica*[28] (*c.* 215) of St. Hippolytus is generally regarded as one of the most illuminating single sources of evidence on the life of the early Christian Church. The liturgical elements of the catechumenate at Rome referred to by Hippolytus are significant. Hippolytus informs us that the sacrament of Baptism was dramatically anticipated. After fasting on Good Friday the catechumens were gathered together early on Holy Saturday for a session of prayer and exorcism. The entire night of Holy Saturday was devoted to listening to the readings of the Easter vigil and then in the morning the catechumens were admitted to Baptism.[29] The chief means after Baptism for continuing the education of Christians was the celebration of the liturgy in which the faithful participated comprehendingly, actively, and in common.[30]

A community where an attempt was made to maintain a vital spirit among the faithful existed at Alexandria, where there was established at a very early date a remarkable school given over to teaching the truths of the Christian religion. We find a generally more mature catechesis at Alexandria than elsewhere in the early Church. The tone of the catechesis was improved and developed by reason of necessity. The people who were instructed were almost entirely Alexandrian Greeks who were drawn from among the more educated and refined citizens of the city. A positive evaluation of Greek philosophy and learning was for Clement of Alexandria a pastoral necessity among his catechumens. Clement reveals his concern for competent catechists when he explains, "The earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof and anyone who seeks to help catechumens, especially if they are Greeks, must not shrink from scholarly study."[31]

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[26] John H. Miller, C.S.C., *Fundamentals of the Liturgy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides, 1959), p. 437.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] St. Hippolytus, *Treatise on the Apostolic Tradition,* trans. Gregory Dix (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 1-72.

[29] Miller, *op. cit.,* p. 439.

[30] Klemens Tilmann, "The Origin and Development of Modern Catechetical Methods," *Teaching All Nations,* ed. Johannes Hofinger, S.J., p. 83.

The writings of Clement, especially *The Educator* (*Paidagogos*),[32] appear to be largely a literary account of the instructions conducted at the catechetical school.[33] Perhaps the modern technique most emphasized was a considerable attempt to relate a profound understanding of supernatural truths to Christian daily life. Clement even points out how a Christian should eat and drink, sleep and dress, with whom converts should associate and other routine matters.

In Clement's writings, quotations from the Old Testament are frequent, especially from Ecclesiasticus and Proverbs, and also from the New Testament, particularly from the Epistles of St. Paul. While Clement was in charge, the school at Alexandria appears to have evolved from a mere catechetical institution to an important center for theological studies. Correspondingly, Clement's career as an instructor is marked by a transition from an earlier, simpler, catechetical pattern to a more complex theological one.[34]

Scripture was the principal font of a deeper understanding of the faith and the attainment of true *gnosis*, which was cultivated in those undertaking advanced studies at Alexandria. A profound regard was maintained for the Old and New Testaments, since the entire Bible contained the true *gnosis.*[35] For Clement, Christ Himself was both the teacher and the object of the *gnosis;* but Christ teaches us "through the prophets, and the gospel, and the blessed apostles."[36] Emphasis on Christ as the way of life was a primary consideration of the Munich movement which began in 1914 and fostered the modern catechetical renewal. This movement had as an original aim the transformation of the life of the catechumen, not merely by "instruction" but rather by an "initiation" of the whole man into the mystery of Christ.[37]

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[31] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, VI, 89; quoted in John Oulton and Henry Chadwick, *Alexandrian Christianity* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954), p. 18.

[32] Clement of Alexandria, *Christ The Educator*, trans. Simon B. Wood, "Fathers of the Church" XXIII (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1954), pp. 3-278.

[33] Simon B. Wood (trans.), *Christ The Educator*, "Fathers of the Church" XXIII, p. viii.

[34] Gerard S. Sloyan (ed.), *Shaping the Christian Message*, Essays in Religious Education (New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 7.

The important emphasis by the early Church on catechumens embracing a way of life rather than merely accumulating knowledge is clearly stressed by Clement. Christ, the supreme teacher, is described as, "an educator who does not simply follow behind, but who leads the way, for His aim is to improve the soul, not just to instruct it; to guide to a life of virtue, not merely to one of knowledge."[38]

Clement was forced in 202 to flee from Alexandria because of the persecution of Septimius Severus. Origen succeeded him as head of the school, which was attracting pupils of considerable learning. In the *Contra Celsum* Origen provides us with a glimpse of catechetical procedure. Origen relates that:

> Christians begin, as far as possible, by testing the dispositions of those who want to hear them. They instruct them in private and then, when their pupils . . . have shown that they are keeping their resolution to lead good lives, they admit them to the community.[39]

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[35] A. A. Stephenson, S.J., "St. Cyril of Jerusalem and the Alexandrian Heritage," *Theological Studies,* 15 (1954), 583.

[36] Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata,* VII, 95, trans. John Oulton and Henry Chadwick, *Alexandrian Christianity,* p. 155.

[37] Pierre Ranwez, S.J., "Typical Trends of the Contemporary Movement in Religious Training of Children," *Lumen Vitae,* 17 (1962), 16.

[38] Clement of Alexandria, *Christ The Educator,* trans. Simon B. Wood, "Fathers of the Church" XXIII, p. 4.

[39] Origen, *Contra Celsum,* 3, 51; quoted in Jean Danielou, *Origen* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 53.

The homilies of Origen indicate that the catechumens of Alexandria were present at the fore-part of the Mass, when they were instructed by the Old and New Testament readings and also by the sermon.[40] The liturgy thus became one of the chief means of educating the people. The Mass of the Catechumens had a catechetical effect through the reading of the word of God, the sermon, and the various forms of prayer. Origen had realized the integral role that Scripture must play in a balanced catechesis. There is clear evidence that there was a conscientious effort by both Clement and Origen to present a fully adequate catechesis. Alexandria in the third century is strong testimony to the devotedness of the early Church to the formulation of a teaching tradition which would successfully renovate the lives of converts.

The work of Clement and Origen seems to have influenced Cyril of Jerusalem whose series of twenty-four catechetical lectures are one of the remarkable accomplishments of Christian antiquity. Fr. A. A. Stephenson S.J. has shown that the lectures of Cyril contain something of the manner and ideas characteristic of the Alexandrian school.[41]

St. Cyril was bishop of Jerusalem in the second half of the fourth century. The lectures of Cyril were delivered probably in 348 or 350 and may have been among the first acts of Cyril as bishop. The lectures fall into two groups. The first comprises the *Procatechesis*[42] which was composed of an introductory address and eighteen catechetical lectures directed to the candidates for Baptism who were to receive the sacrament at the coming Easter. The second group consists of the last five instructions, called *Mystagogical Catecheses,*[43] which were addressed to the newly baptized during Easter week.

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[40] Danielou, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

[41] A. A. Stephenson, S.J., "St. Cyril of Jerusalem and the Alexandrian Heritage," *Theological Studies*, 15 (1954), 573-593.

[42] Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechetical Lectures* (*Procatechesis*), trans. William Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1955), pp. 64-192.

The first group contained three preliminary catecheses on Baptism, Penance, and forgiveness of sins and then fifteen catecheses which constituted a detailed and systematic survey of the Apostles' Creed. Prof. F. X. Arnold of the University of Tübingen has pointed out that for Cyril the consideration of the Apostles' Creed was not divided into twelve articles, which causes the overall view to be lost, but rather an emphasis was given to a tripartite division corresponding to the history of salvation: God and His creative work; Christ and His work of redemption; the Holy Spirit and His work in the Church.[44] In this kerygmatic division the lessons on the Creed are seen and presented in total relation to Christ, the center of the history of salvation.

As the final lecture on the Creed concludes, Cyril informs the candidates that, "If you will come into the holy place of the resurrection each day of Easter week after the liturgy . . . you will be instructed again in the reasons for each of the things that took place."[45] Cyril was proposing the mystagogical lectures which would be based on the liturgical ceremonies of the three sacraments, which had been administered in the course of the Easter vigil: Baptism, Confirmation and the Eucharist. These post-paschal addresses at Jerusalem were dramatically delivered in a courtyard around the Holy Sepulcher. The bishop spoke to them from the very place where Christ rose from the dead.

The systematic lectures of Cyril with their marked biblico-historical elements attempt to prove the faith point by point by an accumulation of texts from Sacred Scripture, especially from Old Testament prophecy. In the lectures there are more than 1,300 quotations of Scripture.[46] The stimulating use of the Bible as points of departure for the development of doctrine within the text, a technique mastered by Cyril, has recently been hailed as one of the significant accomplishments of the widely heralded *Munich Catechism.*[47]

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[43] Cyril of Jerusalem, *Lectures on the Christian Sacraments* (*Mystagogical Catecheses*), trans. R. Church (London: Macmillan, 1951).

[44] Prof. F. X. Arnold, "The Great Stages of Catechesis," (Unpublished notes for lectures during International Catechetical Year.), pp. 1-2.

[45] Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catechetical Lectures* (*Procatechesis*), trans. William Telfer, *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa,* p. 191.

Between the lectures of Cyril and the classic achievement of St. Augustine, mention must be made of the less significant but noteworthy catechetical works of the fourth century. *De mysteriis,*[48] written in 387 and attributed to St. Ambrose, consists of addresses to the newly baptized in Easter week. It is similar to the mystagogical catechesis of Cyril. Ambrose provides another example of a basic assumption of patristic catechesis, namely, that the Bible and the oral teaching based upon it is the font of all doctrine for Christians. Scriptural quotations are interspersed throughout the nine brief chapters of *De mysteriis.* Ambrose illustrates the doctrinal significance of Baptism from the Old and New Testaments. The rebirth of Baptism is seen in the account of the flood in Genesis:

> Noah, as the flood abated sent forth first a raven, which did not return; then he sent forth a dove which, we read, returned with an olive branch . . . the water is that in which the flesh is plunged . . . the wood is that whereon the Lord Jesus was nailed . . . the dove is that in whose shape the Holy Ghost descended . . . the raven is a figure of sin.[49]

The Eucharist is also treated in light of the Old Testament. Ambrose presents the Eucharist as prefigured in several psalms, the incident of Melchisedech, and in the manna and water miraculously supplied to Israel in the wilderness.[50] The intimate tone of *De*

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[46] A. A. Stephenson, S.J., "The Lenten Catechetical Syllabus in Fourth Century Jerusalem," *Theological Studies,* 15 (1954), 108.

[47] Johannes Hofinger, S.J., *Art of Teaching Christian Doctrine,* p. 139.

[48] St. Ambrose, *De mysteriis (On the Mysteries),* trans. T. Thompson (London: Macmillan, 1919), pp. 45-73.

[49] *Ibid.,* p. 49.

[50] *Ibid.,* pp. 63-66.

mysteriis indicates the heartfelt concern of the bishop for the spiritual welfare and practical understanding of the faithful.

The *Oratio catechetica magna*[51] of Gregory of Nyssa, usually dated somewhat prior to 385, is a lengthy work containing forty chapters and a prologue. The work was intended to provide for catechists a reasoned defense of the main doctrines of Christianity. Gregory employs a narrative method relating the history of Moses and appealing to the facts of the Gospel.

At Antioch between 388 and 392, Theodore of Mopsuestia gave a series of instructions entitled *Catechetical Homilies.*[52] They form a close counterpart to Cyril of Jerusalem's baptismal lectures. The liturgy figures quite prominently in the six post baptismal addresses.

While these less renowned ecclesiastical writers each made significant contributions to patristic catechetical literature, it remained for St. Augustine to provide a superb synthesis of the subject matter and methods of catechetical instruction in his *De catechizandis rudibus.*[53] This work is the highpoint of accomplishment in patristic catechetics.

A deacon at Carthage had asked Augustine how catechetical teaching might be made more attractive. St. Augustine was well acquainted with the state of instruction in the Church at the end of the fourth century. In addition to his natural interest in the catechesis of Northern Africa, Augustine had attended catechetical lectures both at Rome and Milan.[54] In his reply to the request Augustine outlined the principles for catechizing which were destined to remain standard until the time of the scholastics and which even today influence catechetics.[55]

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[51] St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio catechetica magna.* PG 45, 9-106.

[52] Theodore of Mopsuestia, *Catechetical Homilies,* trans. A. Mingana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).

[53] St. Augustine, *The First Catechetical Instruction,* trans. Joseph P. Christopher, ACW n. 2 (Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1946), pp. 13-87.

[54] Rudolph G. Bandas, *Catechetics in the New Testament* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1935), p. 119.

Written about 405, *De catechizandis rudibus* is divided into two parts. The first section describes in fifteen chapters the proper subject matter for catechesis, the motivations of the candidates and various methods of instruction. The second part contains two models of proper teaching, a longer treatment of ten chapters, and a masterfully written brief catechesis in two chapters.

The method of Augustine as set forth in *De catechizandis rudibus* is essentially narrative. Accordingly, this technique dictates the subject matter of the catechist. In the third chapter Augustine outlines the narrative approach:

> The narration is complete when the beginner is first instructed from the text: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth;* down to the present period of Church history . . . We ought to present all the matter in a general and comprehensive summary, choosing certain of the more remarkable facts that are heard with greater pleasure and constitute the cardinal points of history.[56]

For Augustine catechesis is a recounting of all the marvelous deeds of God. Because of the lack of time not all of these deeds may be treated and as a result the narrative must be limited to relating the most striking, to the *mirabiliora*.[57]

The method of Augustine, however, is not a narrative which is merely an historical account. Augustine makes it quite clear that the relating of the *mirabilia Dei* is not an end in itself. The facts of the story of salvation are intended to arouse love by telling what God has done for us.

Again the Old Testament narrative is emphasized as prefiguring the New:

[55] Domenico Grasso, "The Core of Missionary Preaching," *Teaching All Nations*, ed. Johannes Hofinger, S.J., p. 51.

[56] St. Augustine, *The First Catechetical Instruction*, trans. Joseph P. Christopher, ACW n. 2, p. 18.

[57] St. Augustine, *De catechizandis rudibus*. PL 40, 313.

> All divine scripture that was written before was written to foretell the coming of the Lord . . . in the Old Testament the New is concealed, and in the New the Old is revealed.[58]

And again in chapter twenty Augustine remarks:

> In that land of promise many things were done for a type of the Christ to come and of the Church; and these you will be able to learn gradually in the holy books.[59]

In the early chapters of *De catechizandis rudibus* Augustine set forth a number of principles to guide catechists in their work. Augustine so stressed the need to adapt religious instruction to the interests and capacities of those who are being taught that this may be regarded as a controlling principle in his catechesis. *De catechizandis rudibus* is also the first catechesis in which the pedagogical value of suggestive questions is brought out.[60] The question and answer method was used by Augustine, not to impart instruction, but to ascertain whether or not the candidate was following him. "We must by questioning him find out whether he understands."[61] The catechumen should not be confused by too much matter, but rather an attempt should be made to explain the central points clearly and concisely. The central theme of catechetical instruction should be love of God. Individual attention when possible is preferable. Augustine also strongly urged the catechists to maintain interest by cultivating cheerfulness. These principles have inspired almost all subsequent works on catechetics.

The modern reader is struck by the genuine affection of Augustine, a pillar of the Church, for the catechumens. The Bishop of Hippo sincerely welcomed them to the classes:

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[58] St. Augustine, *The First Catechetical Instruction,* trans. Joseph P. Christopher, ACW n. 2, p. 23.

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 67.

[60] *Ibid.,* p. 117.

[61] *Ibid.,* p. 43.

> Let us give thanks to God, brother; I congratulate you heartily and rejoice with you that amid the great and perilous storms of this world, you have sought some true and assured safety.[62]

Augustine was also intent on assuring that his catechumens perceived the full significance of the Christian message, "I am nearly always dissatisfied with my discourse . . . for I desire my hearer to understand all that I understand."[63] This spirit which in Augustine reflects a high regard for the individual and for all the truths of Christianity is contained, at least in theory, in the modern renewal:

> The chief aim of this kerygmatic renewal is to present the truth of our faith as an organic whole. Its core is the Good News of our redemption in Christ. Its fruit should be the grateful response of our love.[64]

Assisting in the response of love to the Christian message was the task of Augustine and of catechists in all ages.

Modern catechists are rediscovering the wisdom of the approach of the Fathers for eliciting the response of love to Christian instruction. The success of the catechetical renewal will, nevertheless, only be aided by a practical doctrinal instruction based on the Bible and made meaningful through the liturgy. The success may be assured, however, if the spirit of the Fathers for a Christ-like way of life is recaptured. The spirit which pervaded early Christian instruction, the spirit of St. Paul and Justin Martyr, of Clement and Origen, of Cyril and Augustine.

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[62] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[64] Johannes Hofinger, S.J. (ed.), *Teaching All Nations*, p. 387.

TERENCE J. McDONALD, O.P.

MARSILIUS OF PADUA ON CHURCH AND STATE

All men not deformed or otherwise impeded
naturally desire a sufficient life,
and avoid and flee
what is harmful thereto.
Defensor pacis

The relation between church and state was the dominant problem of medieval political thought. In the eleventh century the dispute between Pope Gregory VII and Henry IV caused the question to become a subject of heated debate for the first time.[1] This conflict led to the formulation of a political principle which was to develop in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This was the principle of the plenitude of power, which maintained that the pope was the supreme, divinely appointed ruler of both the church and the state. Using the distinction laid down in the fifth century by Pope Gelasius cencerning the two powers, the temporal and the spiritual and the primacy of the spiritual, Gregory VII understood "this primacy as involving that political preponderance of the papal power. . . ."[2] John of Salisbury in the twelfth century nourished the growth of this principle by clearly asserting the pope's power to intervene in temporal matters.[3] By the first part of the fourteenth century, the principle of the plenitude of power had reached full maturity, due largely to the pens of such political theorists as Aegidius of Rome and James of Viterbo. The conflicts between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair, and twenty years later between Pope John XXII and Ludwig of Bavaria provided fertile soil for its blossoming.

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[1] Ewart Lewis, *Medieval Political Ideas,* II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), p. 510.

In the first few years of that century John of Paris wrote a masterful work, *De potestate regia et papali*, opposing the extreme papalist position. In it he reiterated the traditional Gelasian distinction between the two powers, between the temporal and the spiritual, the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*. In general the other opponents of the papalists argued along the same line. The one great exception to this rule was Marsilius of Padua. Without explicitly denying the primacy of the spiritual, he removed all power both secular and spiritual from the papacy.

MARSILIUS: LIFE AND WORKS

Very few facts are known about the life of Marsilius. He was born between 1275 and 1280, receiving his education most likely at the University of Padua.[4] He was rector of the University of Paris probably from December, 1312 to March, 1313,[5] and was associated with the Averroist movement there.[6] It is not known when Marsilius began his major work, *Defensor pacis*, but it was completed on June 24, 1324. In 1326 while preparing to give a course in theology, he was forced to flee Paris when his authorship of the *Defensor pacis* was discovered. He took refuge at the court of Ludwig of Bavaria in Nuremberg and played an active part in the latter's invasion of Italy in 1327 to seize the imperial crown. Following Ludwig's forced exit from Italy, Marsilius spent the remainder of his life at the royal court in Bavaria, together with William of Ockham and other Franciscans. In 1342 he wrote *Defensor minor*, a brief summary of his major work. He died the same year.

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[2] John Courtney Murray, "Contemporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the Light of History," *Cross Currents*, 2 (1951-2), 16.

[3] Charles Howard Mc Ilwain, *The Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York: Macmillan, 1932), p. 229.

[4] Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua*, I: *Marsilius of Padua and Medieval Political Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), p. 20.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

The few facts of Marsilius's life are of slight importance in comparison with the fame of his major work:

> The impact of the *Defensor pacis* reverberated during the following centuries, both from hearsay description of its conclusions and from actual reading of it. It was a book at which solid men of the age shuddered. When popes, cardinals and writers simply concerned with preserving the social order wished to condemn heretics—Wycliff, Hus, Luther, among others—they charged them with having gotten their ideas from the "accursed Marsilius."[7]

The *Defensor* is divided into three discourses. The first is a general treatment of political theory, the second a study of political theory in the Christian state, and the third a summary of the conclusions of discourses one and two. In the first the general causes of civil strife are considered, in the second a particular cause, the plenitude of power. In all three discourses Marsilius has one purpose:

> It is my purpose, therefore, with God's help, to expose only this singular cause of strife [plenitude of power] . . . but this cause which Aristotle could not have known, and which no one after him who could know it has undertaken to investigate, we wish to unmask so that it may henceforth be readily excluded from all states or cities, and virtuous rulers and subjects live more securely in tranquillity.[8]

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[7] Alan Gewirth, *Marsilius of Padua,* II: *The Defensor pacis, ed. cit.*, p. xix.

[8] Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor pacis,* I, i, 7, trans. by Alan Gewirth, *ed. cit.*, p. 7.

Before treating Marsilius's theory of church and state we must examine his basic approach to political science. What principles of political thought does Marsilius use to depart from the medieval tradition and to confront the defenders of papal political power? We will discuss here two fundamental aspects of his thought which will help to make explicit his doctrine on church and state. The first is the overwhelming emphasis which he gives to the political means for preserving the state. The second is the tendency he has to treat politics as a natural science.[9]

EMPHASIS ON MEANS

Marsilius, like many of his predecessors, bases his thought on Aristotle's *Politics*. However, he differs from the other medieval Aristotelians in how he uses the *Politics*.[10] His predecessors focused their attention on those parts in Aristotle which propose to determine what is the absolutely best kind of government.[11] Marsilius bases his thought on the fifth book of the *Politics* in which Aristotle discusses "the causes of revolution in states . . . what means of destruction apply to particular states . . . what are the modes of preservation in states generally . . . by what means each state may be best preserved."[12]

This shift in emphasis causes Marsilius to re-orientate political philosophy completely. Traditionally, the basic questions in politics were of final causes: "Also, since means to an end are judged in relation to the end, the spiritual power . . . has the right to judge the temporal power. . . ."[13] Traditionally, political theorists emphasized that governments should attain their final end, the common benefit. Marsilius, on the other hand, centers his attention on the "efficient and conserving cause of all the aforesaid civil benefits."[14] Traditionally, the government was viewed as leading men to virtue. For Marsilius its primary function is to preserve the state:

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[9] Throughout this exposition of Marsilius's doctrine I rely on Gewirth's two volume work on Marsilius as my main source for two reasons: because this work has made use of all the sources available on Marsilius up to 1955, and because it contains the most penetrating and thorough analysis of the political thought of Marsilius that I have been able to find.

[10] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 33.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Aristotle, *Politics*, V, 1, 1301 a 19-25.

[13] James of Viterbo, *De regimine Christiano*, II, vii, trans. by Ewart Lewis, in Lewis, II, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

> But since among men thus assembled there arise disputes and quarrels which, if not regulated by a norm of justice, would cause men to fight and separate and thus finally would bring about the destruction of the state, there had to be established in this association a standard of justice and a guardian or maker thereof.[15]

In a word, whereas his predecessors' arguments concentrated on a necessary subordination in government, on "which power is under which" based on their comparative values and ends,[16] Marsilius emphasizes that the government is the "most necessary" part of the state, that without it "the civil community cannot endure, or endure for long. . . ."[17]

As we shall see Marsilius does not deny final cause in politics. Rather, he establishes his theory in such a way that the question is irrelevant. When the basic question in political philosophy is what are the political means by which the state can be best preserved and kept from destruction, the question of relative ends plays no part in that philosophy. Marsilius is thus able to separate politics completely from the moral and theological plane on which the papalists discussed it.[18]

POLITICS AS A NATURAL SCIENCE

The second aspect of Marsilius's political thought is clearly expressed in a statement he makes in the first Discourse:

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[14] *Defensor pacis,* I, xix, 3, p. 90.

[15] *Ibid.,* I, iv, 4, p. 13.

[16] Aegidius of Rome, *De ecclesiastica potestate,* I, v, trans. by Ewart Lewis, II, *op. cit.,* p. 578.

[17] *Defensor pacis,* I, xv, 6, p. 64.

[18] Gewirth, *op. cit.,* I, pp. 19-20.

> All men not deformed or otherwise impeded naturally desire a sufficient life, and avoid and flee what is harmful thereto. This has been acknowledged not only with regard to man but also with regard to every genus of animals.[19]

We will examine three key terms in this statement: "naturally," "desire," and "sufficient life."

When Aristotle, in the first book of the *Politics*, speaks of the state as being "natural," as being a "creation of nature," when he speaks of man as being "by nature" a political animal, he is using nature as a final cause in man as a rational creature: "The nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed we call its nature."[20] It is the nature of man *qua* man, as a rational creature, to live in society. When Marsilius speaks of "nature" and "natural" in man, he is referring to a biological efficient cause in man.[21] Thus, man's "natural" desire for a sufficient life is a desire which "has been acknowledged not only with regard to man but also with regard to every genus of animals."[22] "Whereas for the other Aristotelians reason is 'natural' to man *qua* man, for Marsilius the use of reason always means going 'beyond natural causes.' "[23]

Since nature refers to the biological part in man, his "natural desire" will be neither rational nor free. Rather, it will have a physical necessity about it. Marsilius's statement that all men "not deformed or otherwise impeded" naturally desire a sufficient life, reveals the kind of necessity attached to this desire. He will then argue a point in political theory concluding to its physical necessity "or else there would occur deformity in nature and art in most cases; the impossibility of which is assumed from natural science."[24] Again, using the terminology of Aristotle's natural philosophy,[25] he accuses the papacy of "impeding" the action of the government.[26]

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[19] *Defensor pacis*, I, iv, 2, p. 12.
[20] *Politics, ed. cit.*, I, 2, 1252 b 30-1253 a 2.
[21] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 55.
[22] *Defensor pacis*, I, iv, 2, p. 12.
[23] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, p. 55; see *Defensor pacis*, I, v, 3, p. 16.
[24] *Defensor pacis*, I, xiii, 2, p. 51.

The object or end of man's natural desire is the "sufficient life." For Aristotle, as for his medieval disciples, the content of this sufficient life was based on the specific nature of man. Thus a hierarchy of values, corresponding to the nutritive, sensitive, and rational parts of man, was established in which the intellectual virtues held the highest place. Marsilius's sufficient life, the object of man's biological desires, does not have such a lofty content. He declares that "civil happiness" is "the best of the objects of desire possible to men in this world, and the ultimate aim of human acts."[27] He does not exclude intellectual values:

> Those who live a civil life not only live, which beasts and slaves do, but they live well, having leisure for the liberal functions which derive from the virtues of both the theoretic and the practical soul.[28]

Instead, by mentioning both of them in the same breath, he equates the two. While his predecessors would value peace in the state because peace gives men this "leisure for the liberal functions," Marsilius extols the economic and social consequences of peace:

> . . . the mutual association of the citizens, their intercommunication of their functions with one another, their mutual aid and assistance, and in general the power, unimpeded from without, of exercising their proper and common functions, and also the participation in common benefits and burdens according to the measure appropriate to each . . . .[29]

HIS METHOD OF ARGUMENTATION

In the light of these basic philosophical assumptions, we can understand the peculiar method of argumentation which Marsilius uses in the *Defensor pacis*. He strongly emphasizes the kind of argument which should be used in political science. He establishes the purpose of his work in terms of method: it is "to unmask the sophism of this singular cause of wars."[30] His preoccupation with strictly political questions finds expression in his requiring univocal terms, ones which apply only to politics and not to theology as well. Hence, law is defined, not in relation to the natural law or the eternal law, but rather in terms of political, efficient causality; it is essentially a coercive command.[31] Abandoning Aritstotle's position on the contingency inherent in the moral sciences, Marsilius repeatedly "demonstrates" the "necessity" of his conclusions.[32] What enables him to propound these necessities is that he bases his doctrine on man's biological nature which is subject to the laws of natural science.[33]

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[25] *Physics,* II, 8, 199 b 15-26.
[26] *Defensor pacis,* I, xix, 4, p. 91.
[27] *Ibid.,* I, i, 7, p. 7.
[28] *Ibid.,* I, iv, 2, p. 12.
[29] *Ibid.,* I, xix, 2, p. 90.

This same method reveals itself in his polemical use of Scripture in the second Discourse. In opposition to the medieval view that the Scriptures and the *glossa* or commentaries on them constituted one living tradition, one source of revelation, Marsilius asks: "Why should anyone believe in human tradition, whether of the saint or the non-saint, rather than in the very clear statements of Christ."[34] This insistence on the superiority of Scripture over tradition corresponds to Marsilius's mode of argumentation in the first Discourse. He is interested only in certain and necessary arguments from Scripture and not in merely probable ones from the fathers and doctors of the Church.[35] Marsilius also requires a very literal interpretation of Scripture. He feels that it is the "wandering exposition of Scripture" of his opponents which has permitted them to uphold their false opinions.[36] This demand for a literal interpretation corresponds to his insistence on univocal terms and definitions in the first Discourse. "The literal is restrictive and exclusive; it prevents those assimiliations of divine and human, moral and political", which Marsilius so assiduously avoids in his exposition.[37]

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[30] *Ibid.*, I, i, 4, p. 5.

[31] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 47.

[32] In Discourse III, ii, he sets forth numerous "certain conclusions which follow necessarily" from what was said in Discourses I and II.

[33] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 50.

[34] *Defensor pacis*, II, xvi, p. 248.

[35] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 74.

HIS AVERROISM

The Paduan's biological approach to the nature of man as well as his preoccupation with separating the political from the theological reveal the Averroistic bent which is so frequently attributed to him. He has been credited with affecting a liaison between the Averroists of Paris and of Padua,[38] and his *Defensor pacis* has been described as being "as perfect an example of political Averroism as one could wish for."[39] In general Latin Averroists were characterized by their efforts at a "rigorous analysis and systematic understanding of the texts of Aristotle" even at the expense of contradicting the faith.[40] That there is a single separate intellect for all men and that the human will is not free were two conclusions which they drew from their investigations.

We can detect in the thought of Marsilius an application of these conclusions to the political sphere.[41] His statement, cited above, that the use of reason always means going beyond nature in man bears a strong resemblance to the Averroist teaching on the separated intellect. Further, Marsilius affirms that men have a natural desire for the sufficient life. It follows, then, that the faculty of desire in men, the will, pertains to their natural and not their rational side. Hence, with the other Averroists he maintains that the human will "is a part of the whole context of physico-biological nature and exhibits the same necessity."[42] Finally, his insistence that this same natural desire exists in all men not otherwise impeded gives to the human will a unicity which is analogous to the Averroist unicity of the human intellect.[43] We will have occasion later on to see another expression of the Averroism of Marsilius.

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[36] *Defensor pacis,* II, xxviii, 24, p. 400.

[37] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 77.

[38] M. M. Gorce, "Averroïsm," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclesiastiques,* V, 1075.

[39] Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 40. See Alexander Passerim D'Entreves, *The Medieval Contribution to Political Thought* (New York: Humanities Press, 1959), p. 48.

[40] Stuart MacClintock, "Heresy and Epithet," *Review of Metaphysics,* 8 (1954-5), 544-5.

[41] Cf. Gewirth, *op. cit.*, II, p. 441, where it is noted that "much further research must be undertaken in the political writings of the Averroists before it can be established what was the relation between their philosophical emphases and their specifically political doctrines."

We must now examine, in turn, Marsilius's theory of the state, the church, and finally, the relation between the two. In this consideration many of the aspects which make the *Defensor pacis* "one of the most interesting of all medieval treatises on pure politics" must be passed over.[44] Omitting an explicit treatment of whether his political thought is traditional or novel, absolutist or republican, democratic or monarchic, we will consider only those aspects of it which have a direct influence on the question of church and state.

THEORY OF STATE

We shall list three propositions in Marsilius's theory of state. The first is that the end of the state is the sufficient life. Borrowing from Aristotle,[45] he distinguishes within the state six parts whose functions are to fulfill various human needs requisite for the sufficient life.[46] Each part is defined according to its function. For example, the farmers fulfill the nutritional needs of the community,[47] the government moderates the "transient" acts of men as they affect the sufficient life of the present world,[48] the priesthood regulates the worship of God for the benefit of both the present and future life.[49] He points out the necessity of even a pagan priesthood in the state and then distinguishes it from the "true priesthood, that of the Christians."[50]

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[42] *Ibid.*, I, p. 57.
[43] *Ibid.*, I, pp. 209-10.
[44] McIlwain, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
[45] *Politics, ed. cit.*, VII, 8, 1328 b 2 ff.
[46] *Defensor pacis*, I, v, pp. 15-21.
[47] *Ibid.*, I, v, 5, p. 17.

It is important that each part be able to perform its function without interference. Indeed, peace is defined as the "good disposition of the city or state whereby each of its parts will be able perfectly to perform the operations belonging to it in accordance with reason and its establishment."[51] To insure peace it is necessary that one part regulate the others. This task belongs to the government since it falls under its function of moderating men's transient actions. The government, in turn, must be regulated by law. In this ordered and peaceful society men can attain their goal, a sufficient life.

However, instead of concentrating on this goal, Marsilius characteristically turns his attention to the political problems involved in attaining it. Resulting from this Marsilian approach to politics is his second proposition: political authority is defined as the possession of coercive power, and its primary function is the resolution of conflicts. The government's function of regulating transient acts "far from being merely a question of smooth and equable interaction . . . involves a precariousness and an imperativeness of the first magnitude."[52] It must function "at every hour or minute" controlling the quarrels and disputes of men.[53] For each person in society "is prone to pursue his own advantage and to avoid what is disadvantageous."[54] Strife and conflict occur whenever men are gathered together. The very fact that Marsilius calls strife and conflict "civil" action manifests how much a part of social living he considers them.[55]

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[48] *Ibid.*, I, v, 7, p. 17. By "transient" Marsilius means acts which affect other people. See Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 61, fn. 56.

[49] *Ibid.*, I, v, 10, pp. 18-9.

[50] *Ibid.*, I, v, 14, p. 20.

[51] *Ibid.*, I, ii, 3, p. 9.

[52] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, II, p. xxxv.

[53] *Defensor pacis*, I, xv, 13, p. 67.

[54] *Ibid.*, II, viii, 9, p. 112.

Referring to these civil contentions, he quotes the words of the Gospel according to St. Matthew (18:7): "It is *necessary* that scandals arise."[56] The necessity of conflict follows from his theory of natural desire. Not only do all men, in common, naturally desire the sufficient life, but also each one, individually, desires his own personal benefit.[57] Men's actions naturally tend to excess. Therefore,

> in order to moderate the excesses of the acts deriving from the locomotive powers through knowledge and desire . . . there was necessarily established in the state a part or office by which the excesses of such acts are corrected and reduced to equality or due proportion.[58]

This corrective duty of the government requires that it exercise coercive power. Throughout the *Defensor* coerciveness is emphasized as an essential aspect of political authority. Not only are the laws essentially coercive commands, but also they are valid even if they are unjust.[59] Likewise, the ruler[60] and the legislator[61] are such not because of their knowledge, prudence, or justice, but rather because of their possession of coercive power. Marsilius differentiates household, village and city-state not according to their respective goals but according to the different degrees of coerciveness they exercise.[62] The government, exercising coercive force over all the other parts of the state, is the efficient cause of peace.[63] Order in the state consists in the submission of the parts to the coercive force of the ruler.[64]

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[55] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 71.
[56] *Defensor pacis*, I, xv, 6, p. 64; emphasis mine.
[57] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 61.
[58] *Defensor pacis*, I, v, 7, p. 17.
[59] *Ibid.*, I, x, 5, p. 36.
[60] *Ibid.*, II, ii, 8, pp. 107-8.
[61] *Ibid.*, I, xii, 2, pp. 44-5.
[62] *Ibid.*, I, iii, 4, p. 10-11.
[63] *Ibid.*, I, xix, 3, p. 90.
[64] *Ibid.*, I, xv, 14, p. 67.

And more importantly, the unity of the state requires that this coercive force be exercised by only one governing power in the state.[65] Thus, the priesthood has no title whatsoever to authority in the state and must submit to the coercive power of the government in all political matters.

Fundamental to all these considerations is the solicitude of Marsilius for the preservation of the state. For if there did not exist a unitary authority exercising coercive power, the consequence would be "the destruction of the city or state. But this consequence is the evil most to be avoided."[66]

Yet the government exercising coercive authority is by no means supreme in the state. It is regulated, as we have seen, by laws. The laws, in turn, derive their authority from the legislator, "the primary and proper efficient cause of the law."[67] This legislator is none other than "the people or the whole body of the citizens, or the weightier part thereof."[68] Hence the third proposition of Marsilius: the ultimate seat of political power is the people. The people, as legislator in the state, make the laws, elect the government,[69] correct the ruler if need be,[70] and establish the various parts of the state including the priesthood.[71] For Marsilius the will of the people substitutes for the natural law of Cicero as the foundation of the moral values of the government.[72]

One reason for Marsilius's insistence on the rule of the people is his concern for their freedom. The people must make the laws because "each citizen must be free, and not undergo another's despotism."[73]

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[65] *Ibid.*, I, xvii, 3-5, pp. 81-3.
[66] *Ibid.*, I, xvii, 3, p. 81.
[67] *Ibid.*, I, xii, 3, p. 45.
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*, I, xv, 2, p. 61.
[70] *Ibid.*, I, xviii, 3, p. 88.
[71] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 9-12, pp. 259-63.
[72] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 173.
[73] *Defensor pacis*, I, xii, 6, p. 47.

However, perhaps the more fundamental explanation is that this conclusion is drawn from the basic principles of Marsilius's political philosophy which we discussed above: for the preservation of the state it is necessary that the whole people be the ultimate authority because any individual, including the ruler, will *naturally* and *necessarily* seek his own private benefit. On the other hand, the whole people will *naturally* and *necessarily* desire the common good, the sufficient life. Marsilius betrays himself by interpreting the hypothetical moral necessities of the *Politics* as physical necessities:[74]

> Hence too Aristotle says in the *Politics*, Book I, Chapter I: "there is in all men a natural impulse toward such a community," that is, the civil community. From this truth there necessarily follows another, which is presented in the *Politics*, Book IV, Chapter 10, namely, that "that part of the state which wishes the polity to endure must be weightier than the part which does not wish it." For nothing is desired by the same specific nature in most of its individual members and immediately at the same time as the thing's destruction, since such a desire would be futile. . . . Hence Aristotle says in the *Politics*, Book VII, Chapter 13: "Everyone in the country unites with the subjects in the desire to have a revolution," and then he adds: "It is impossible that there be so many persons in the government," that is, rebellious, or not caring to live a civil life, "that they are stronger than all the others," that is, than those who wish to carry on a political life. Why this is impossible is obvious; for it would mean that nature errs or is deficient for the most part.[75]

THEORY OF CHURCH

Marsilius's theory of the church has basic similarities and basic differences in relation to his theory of the state. He defines the church as "the whole body of the faithful, who believe in and invoke the name of Christ, and all parts of this whole body in every community, even the family."[76]

How is the church a "whole body"? It is not in the same way that the state is. The exercise of coercion in spiritual maters is useless because "those who are thus coerced would not be helped at all toward eternal salvation by such compulsion."[77] Therefore, the church has no need of the coercive authority which is so essential in the state. It follows from this that the church does not have the unity that the state has. The church is one only in the sense that the faith is one.[78] The preserving of this unity of faith, furthermore, does not belong to the hierarchy in the church or to "any other particular person or group."[79]

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[74] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 209.
[75] *Defensor pacis*, I, xiii, 2, p. 50.
[76] *Ibid.*, II, ii, 3, p. 103.

In what sense is the church "of the faithful"? It is of the faithful because they control the church. Just as the whole people are the ultimate authority in the state, so also the whole faithful are in the church. They exercise "the power of excommunication;"[80] they preside over "the determination or definition of questions about divine law;"[81] they control "the election and approval of any persons who are to be appointed to a holy order;"[82] and they "establish the headship of the church."[83]

The Marsilian church, then, has two aspects.[84] It is a political institution, much like the state, controlled by the whole faithful. But also, it is a group of individuals in which faith in Christ and not membership in a visible institution is the defining note. It lacks social unity because, for Marsilius, this phenomenon arises only out of the unification of coercive authority in the community. And in the community of the church coercive authority has no place.

One of the most significant aspects of Marsilius's doctrine is its de-emphasis on the role of the priesthood in the church. He divides the authority of the priesthood into essential and non-essential.

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[77] *Ibid.*, II, v, 6, p. 135.
[78] *Ibid.*, II, xxviii, 13, p. 383.
[79] *Ibid.*, II, xx, 4, p. 281.
[80] *Ibid.*, II, vi, 12, p. 148.
[81] *Ibid.*, II, xx, 4, p. 282.
[82] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 11, p. 260.
[83] *Ibid.*, II, xxii, 11, p. 306.
[84] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 264.

Essentially, all priests, bishops and popes have the very same authority, which they receive from God by way of their priestly character.[85] On the other hand, the non-essential power by which one priest is put over all the others does not come from God but from men.[86] The assigning of non-essential, pastoral authority to priests[87] and the appointing of the head of the church[88] pertains to the whole faithful. Further, Marsilius minimizes the essential role that the priest plays as a mediator between God and man. In the sacrament of penance, for example, it is God alone who forgives the sin "before all action on the part of the priest."[89] It is the office of the priest only "to show in the eyes of the church, whose sins God has retained or concealed."[90]

Thus, Marsilius's doctrine completely destroys the traditional hierarchial structure of the church.

THEORY OF CHURCH AND STATE

By treating separately Marsilius's theories of state and then of church, we have made an abstraction which is not entirely valid. We must not forget the historical context in which the *Defensor pacis* was written. In the fourteenth century in Europe every member of the state was, for all practical purposes, a member of the church as well. We can bring our discussion back into historical reality by quoting a single statement of Marsilius:

> I now wish to give a necessary proof that in perfect communities of believers, the election, assignment, and presentation of persons to be promoted to ecclesiastical orders pertains only to the *human legislator* or the multitude of the believers in that place over which the minister is to care.[91]

[85] *Defensor pacis*, II, xv, 4, p. 235.
[86] *Ibid.*, II, xv, 10, p. 240.
[87] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 8, p. 258-9.
[88] *Ibid.*, II, xxiii, 9, p. 318.
[89] *Ibid.*, II, vi, 6, p. 143.
[90] *Ibid.*, II, vi, 7, p. 145.
[91] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 9, p. 259; emphasis mine.

Therefore, the supreme authority in the state, the human legislator (the whole people) equals the supreme authority in the church, the faithful.

Marsilius approaches the basic problem of church and state, that is, the relation between their respective powers, in two ways. His approaches are simply applications of the political principles which he has used throughout the work. First, the preservation of the state requires that all power and authority belong exclusively to the government and that all the other parts of the state including the priesthood be subject to this authority. Furthermore, the priesthood can have no political authority because Christ expressly forbade it to his apostles and their successors.[92] Secondly, the faithful-people must have supreme authority in all social questions affecting them, both temporal and spiritual. This proposition follows from Marsilius's exaltation of the will of the people both in the state and in the church.

His theory, then, consists in a unification of all power, secular and religious, in the faithful-people. It would seem that he has set up a system that is just as inclusive and totalitarian as those of his opponents. Rule of the people is simply substituted for plenitude of power. However, not so simple an explanation can be given. There still remains the fundamental question: which will dominate, the religious or the secular concerns of the faithful?

Frequently Marsilius invokes the spiritual consequences of religious functions to prove a point. The whole body of citizens must elect and appoint priests in their office because "if a person who is promoted to the priesthood is morally vicious or ignorant, or in both ways deficient . . . then the people are faced with the danger of eternal death."[93] The authority to settle questions of Scripture must not be given to the pope because "the whole body of the faithful will lie in danger of a shipwreck with respect to the faith."[94] But even more frequently the secular consequences are cited.[95] The preservation of the state requires that the government exercise authority over the activity of the priests[96] and over the distribution of benefices.[97] Also, many particular secular consequences are advanced. Excommunication must be controlled by the people because of the social harms it can have for a person.[98] The people must control the election of priests because "vicious or ignorant" priests can seduce women in the confessional.[99]

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[92] *Ibid.*, II, iv, 13, p. 124-6.
[93] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 11, p. 261.
[94] *Ibid.*, II, xx, 7, p. 283.

But what of the religious consequences of secular functions? Marsilius is "very moderate" with respect to these.[100] To be sure he does not deny the superior value of the religious over the secular. If the two should oppose one another, the divine law must be obeyed rather than the human.[101] The gospel, no less than the priesthood, is essentially divine. He explicitly states that spiritual evils are more harmful than temporal ones.[102]

However, Marsilius passes over this question of values and concentrates on the political, institutional aspects of religious matters. The distinction between essential and non-essential, which Marilius applied to the priesthood, also applies to other religious questions. This is the same distinction which we saw him make in defining law and the office of ruler in the state. It also found expression in the two aspects of Marsilius's church. In everything, Marsilius separates the political (which means concentration on the efficient cause for preserving the state) from the non-political, and centers his attention on the former to the exclusion of the latter. Whereas for the papalists every temporal question had spiritual implications, for Marsilius every spiritual question has temporal implications.

[95] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 294.
[96] *Defensor pacis*, II, viii, 9, p. 161.
[97] *Ibid.*, II, xxi, 12, p. 295.
[98] *Ibid.*, II, vi, 12, p. 148.
[99] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 12, p. 262.
[100] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 295.
[101] *Defensor pacis*, II, v, 7, p. 137.
[102] *Ibid.*, II, xvii, 12, p. 262.

Thus, he can proceed from an admission of the superior values of the priesthood to an insistence upon the people's political authority over priests. Likewise, the gospel is indeed divine, but its divinity is distinct from the authority to determine precisely what it means. Divine law must be preferred to human law when they are in opposition, but the whole people which establishes the human law also interprets the divine law. The faithful must have this power both because of the temporal consequences involved and because the whole people is more trustworthy than any one part of the community.

In short, "the entire corporate political structure of the state is introduced into the church."[103] The only difference is that in the state coercive force is necessary, whereas in the church it is only optional: "We do not wish to say that it is inappropriate that heretics or those who are otherwise infidel be coerced, but that the authority for this, if it be lawful to do so, belongs only to the human legislator."[104]

There is a significant ambiguity in Marsilius's theory of church and state which perhaps best expresses his fundamental position on the question.[105] He emphasizes that priests must have no coercive power, that "by Christ's council and example they ought to refuse such rulership, especially in communities of the faithful, if it is offered to them or bestowed on them by someone having the authority to do so."[106] But he also insists that a priest or a bishop is not to have this power,

> unless it shall have been given to him by the human legislature, who always has the power to revoke this jurisdiction for a reasonable cause, the full determination of which is known to pertain to the same legislator.[107]

[103] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 297.
[104] *Defensor pacis,* II, v, 7, p. 136.
[105] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 297-300.
[106] *Defensor pacis,* II, iv, title of the chapter, p. 113.
[107] *Ibid.*, II, v, 9, p. 140.

A real opposition arises here between his interpretation of the teaching of Christ and the necessity of Marsilius's rational, political system. Acting consistently with his Averroist preference for reason over faith, Marsilius gives the nod to his own system. The human legislator must exercise "full determination." In the final analysis:

> The "state" of Discourse I of the *Defensor pacis*, while given all institutional authority over spiritual affairs in Discourse II, loses thereby none of its essential earthliness even while becoming a "church."[108]

The church-state of Marsilius is far more a state than a church.

CONCLUSION

The Marsilian approach to church and state completely revamped the question which had traditionally been a conflict between two different authorities, the *regnum* and the *sacerdotium*. Marsilius placed both powers, *regnum* and *sacerdotium*, under the faithful who were infallible both in the temporal and in the spiritual order. In addition, he made the government the exclusive agent of the people's will and gave it the power to exercise coercive control even within the church. Thus,

> the Marsilian system, viewed in its totality, provides the considerations which in modern times were to lead to the disestablished church and freedom of religion as well as to the established church and politically enforced religion.[109]

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[108] Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 301.

[109] It is worth noting in this respect that an abbreviated form of the *Defensor pacis* was used to support Henry VIII's control of the Church of England. Significantly, the parts left out were those concerning the peoples' control over the ruler. See Gewirth, *op. cit.*, I, p. 301, fn. 47.

AUGUSTINE T. RIPLINGER, O.P.

BLESSED JOHN DOMINICI AND THE RENAISSANCE

The teachings of the pagans
ought not to be studied
by Christians.
Lucula noctis

The role of secular learning in the Christian life is a problem as old as Christianity itself. From the time of St. Paul until our own day, there has always existed a certain school of thought which would prohibit all fellowship with pagan letters.[1] Yet, as E. K. Rand has observed, St. Paul himself, in quoting the Greek poets, "laid the foundation of Christian humanism."[2]

In the fourteenth century Italian Renaissance, the question of Christian humanism entered into a new phase. The Middle Ages had their classics. But these classics were but a small part of the rich treasures of Greek and Roman antiquity.[3] In the poets, orators and historians of ancient times—writers neglected in the decadence of later scholasticism—the new humanists felt that they had discovered a new concept of life very different from the medieval one.[4] The early humanists like Petrarch and Boccaccio were deeply religious men with no intention of destroying or replacing Christian values and culture. They sought instead to strengthen those values and that culture by the infusion of the new ideals of beauty, honor and virtue which they found epitomized in the pagan classics.[5] But there were other pious and learned men in that fourteenth century who viewed this new development with suspicion. They perceived in the re-awakened interest in classical antiquity a subtle threat to the very foundations of the Christian religion. To this latter group belongs the Dominican reformer Blessed John Dominici.

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[1] Edward K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1929), pp. 12-13.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

[3] Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,* rev. ed. by F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), I, 440.

BLESSED JOHN DOMINICI

John Dominici was born of a poor Florentine family about the year 1356.[6] Manual labor rather than study occupied his youth.[7] As a result, the superiors of the Dominican convent of Santa Maria

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[4] Richard C. Jebb, "The Classical Renaissance," *The Renaissance*, vol. I of the *Cambridge Modern History* (New York: Macmillan, 1903), pp. 537-538.

[5] Remi Coulon, O.P., ed., *Beati Johannis Dominici Lucula noctis*, Opera selecta scriptorum Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. I (Paris: Picard, 1908), pp. xi-xiii.

[6] Various dates are given for the birth of John Dominici. Edmund Hunt (*Johannis Dominici Lucula noctis*, no. 4 of the Publications in Medieval Studies, University of Notre Dame [Notre Dame, Ind.: University Press, 1940], p. xi) gives 1356. Augustin Rösler, (*Kardinal Johannes Dominicis Erziehungslehrer*, vol. IV of the Bibliotek der katholischen Pädagogik [Freiburg im Breis.: Herder, 1894]) prefers 1357. The anonymous author of the biography in *Année dominicaine* (Juin, rev. ed. [Lyon: Jevain, 1893], p. 233) gives 1350 as an approximate date. A. Touron, O.P. (*Histoire des hommes illustres de l'Ordre de saint Dominique*, vol. II [Paris: Babuty, 1745], p. 703) chooses 1357 but gives 1360 as an alternative mentioned by some authors.

[7] Joannes Caroli, *Vita Beati Joannis Dominici*, c. I, ActaSS, Jun. II, 402E. (This edition is cited throughout.)

Novella, to which Dominici sought admission at the age of eighteen, found him ignorant of the very first elements of learning expected of young children.[8] Despite their hesitation, however, the Dominicans at length agreed to admit him to the novitiate. Accordingly, John Dominici received the habit of a Friar Preacher about the year 1374,[9] the same year that witnessed the death of Petrarch, the founder of the classical revival.[10]

As a Dominican, John Dominici proved a zealous student. His keen mind and tenacious memory quickly dissolved any lingering doubts about his abilities. So remarkable was his power of memory that his earliest biographers assert that he never forgot anything he had once learned.[11] The abundant quotations which fill Dominici's *Lucula noctis* suggest that this claim was no idle boast.

We have it on the word of John Dominici himself that he learned grammar without the aid of a teacher.[12] St. Antoninus asserts that Dominici mastered logic, philosophy and theology in a remarkably short time and acquired a competence in canon law and mathematics as well.[13] Although the early biographers do not mention it, he apparently took his scientific studies at Paris, returning in 1382.[14] Five years later, he was assigned to Venice as lector in theology.

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[8] ". . . cum prima etiam elementa ignorare quae puerili solent excurrere" (*Ibid.*, c. 2, 502E).

[9] Again there is a problem of dating. Caroli gives the year 1378, but this is far too late according to the usual dating of Dominici's birth. Moreover, this late date does not correspond with a remark Dominici himself makes in the *Lucula noctis*, c. 24. 22. (N. B. All references are to the critical edition of E. Hunt.) There Dominici mentions that he had read the *Posterior Analytics* about thirty years before. Since the *Lucula noctis* was most probably written in 1405 (see Coulon, *op. cit.*, pp. lxxxii-lxxxiv), Dominici would then have read the *Posterior Analytics* about 1375, three years before entering the Order according to Caroli's chronology.

[10] Jebb, *op. cit.*, p. 538.

[11] St. Antoninus, "Elogium Beati Joannis Dominici," III *Historiarum*, tit. 23, c. 11, n. 3, ActaSS, Jun. II, 396C. (This edition cited throughout.) Caroli, *op. cit.*, 404D.

[12] *Lucula noctis*, c. 41. 213.

[13] Antoninus, *loc. cit.*

Something of Dominici's attitude toward secular learning during the period of his own studies is indicated by Caroli, his fifteenth century biographer:

> He judged that (he) should not long remain in these secular arts but that only those things should be learned which would suffice for his instruction. Hence he strove to bestow all his effort upon sacred letters. In these, however, he was supported by such desire and love, that all the subtleties of sacred letters, whatsoever their meaning, and also all the diverse opinions of the doctors he penetrated with his keen and brilliant understanding.[15]

A similar attitude guided Dominici's preaching. St. Antoninus says: "Rarely did he cite the poets or the philosophers or their opinions. The Sacred Page was the testimony for his doctrine."[16]

Although John Dominici entered the Dominican Order during the period of decline that followed the Black Death, he showed himself from the beginning a lover of perfect observance.[17] Thus he became one of the chief collaborators with Raymond of Capua in the reform of the Dominican Order. In 1390, Dominici was appointed vicar of the master general and was placed over the convent of St. Dominic at Venice. There he was to gather all the Italian friars desirous of returning to the full observance.[18] Among the various actions taken by him during the term of his vicariate, it is interesting to note Dominici's complaint to the master general that the young students in his obedience were seeking, against his will, permission to go on to higher studies at the universities of Paris and England. In his opinion, they could acquire what was necessary for their intellectual training in the convents of observance, where their religious spirit was sure to be protected.[19]

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[14] H. Dehove, "Dominici, Jean (le B.)," DTC, 4, 2, 1662; also Rösler, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[15] "In quibus tamen saeculi artibus haud diutius immorandum ratus, tantum haec attingenda exsistimans, quoad suo instituto satis efficerent; tandem ad sacras Litteras omnem operam suam conferre curavit. In his vero tanto desiderio atque amore ferebatur, ut omnes sacrum litterarum subtilitates, quosque illarum sensus, plurimas quoque ac varios Doctorum sententias, perspicaci ac claro ingenio penetraret" (Caroli, *op. cit.*, c. 3, 404C-D). This attitude should not be regarded as a sure sign of hostility to secular letters as a whole. In taking it, Dominici was only following in the tradition of the Dominican Order, which, although by no means hostile to secular letters, had as its object the study of sacred letters. See Apollonia Koperska, *Die Stellung der religiösen Orden zu den Profanwissenschaften im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert* (Freiburg, Switz.: University Press, 1914), pp. 108-128 and 178-200.

[16] "Rare allegebat Poetas vel Philosophos seu sententias eorum. Sacra pagina erat testimonium; suae doctrinae" (Antoninus, *op. cit.*, 396F).

[17] Caroli, *op. cit.*, c. 2, 404B.

Meanwhile, however, Dominici himself had acquired considerable reputation as a teacher and preacher. In 1403, the civil authorities at Florence petitioned Pope Boniface IX, as well as the master general of the Order, that Dominici be assigned to the Florentine *studium* as professor of Sacred Scripture. The petition was granted, and thus Dominici came into a position of considerable authority in the religious and intellectual world of Florence.[20] As we shall see, it was this authority that involved him in the controversy over the new classical learning.

Early in 1406, Dominici accompanied a Florentine delegation to Rome for the papal election. The new pope was Gregory XII, who raised Dominici to the College of Cardinals and made him archbishop of Ragusa. Dominici spent the rest of his life working for the end of the Great Schism and the evils that accompanied it.[21] He played an especially important role in the reunion council of 1415.[22] Four years later, at the age of sixty-three, he died while on a papal mission to Hungary.[23] His cult was officialy approved by decree of Gregory XVI, 1832.[24]

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[18] R. P. Mortier, O.P., *Histoire des maîtres généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs,* III (Paris: Picard, 1907), pp. 554-555.

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 576.

[20] *Ibid.,* IV (1909), p. 7.

[21] Hunt, *op. cit.,* p. xiii.

[22] See Touron, *op. cit.,* pp. 735-756.

THE LUCULA NOCTIS OF JOHN DOMINICI

John Dominici became involved in the controversy over the reading of the classics in the following way. Probably in January, 1405,[25] he received an appeal from a Florentine Camaldolese, Fra Giovanni de Samminiato by name.[26] Fra Giovanni had been attempting, though with little success, to persuade the humanist chancellor of Florence, Coluccio Salutati, to withdraw from the perilous study of the classics. Realizing eventually that he lacked the ability to press the attack with full vigor, the Camaldolese decided to enlist the aid of the more learned John Dominici. Accordingly, he forwarded to Dominici the last letter he had received from Salutati.[27] This letter was a summation of the whole humanist position.[28]

Coluccio Salutati was a man admirably suited to defend the classics. "His learning and religious devotion were such as to elicit the respect of all, rather than the heated arguments *ad hominem* so common in the early Renaissance disputes."[29] In his mind, there was no question about the primacy of religion and the Scriptures. As R. Coulon says:

> Faithful to the tradition of the Middle Ages, he really intends to preserve the Scriptures as the first foundation, but he asserts that alongside the religious aspirations of every soul—the first aspirations

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[23] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xiv.

[24] Rösler, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

[25] On the question of dating the events connected with the composition of the *Lucula noctis*, see Coulon, *op. cit.*, pp. lxxxii-lxxxiv.

[26] Dominici's fifteenth century biographer, Caroli, has confused the origins of the *Lucula noctis* by making it a reply to the *De fato et fortuna*, written by Coluccio Salutati. In reality, however, it is a reply to a letter written by Salutati to Fra Giovanni de Samminiato, who sent it on to Dominici. The publication of Salutati's letters has removed all doubt on the matter. See Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xi, nn. 15-16.

[27] See Coulon, *op. cit.*, pp. lii-lxxiii.

[28] Hunt, *op. cit.*, pp. x-xi.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. viii.

> to satisfy and the first to safeguard—there exist other aspirations of a different, inferior order, but whose demands are none the less legitimate.[30]

Such is the man to whom John Dominici addresses his *Lucula noctis.*

In true scholastic fashion, Dominici opens his *Lucula noctis* with a statement of the opposing position. From the letters of the Chancellor he gathers a formidable collection of twelve arguments favoring a Christian use of the classics. Salutati himself praises their exposition.[31] Against these twelve propositions, he ranges an equal number of counter-propositions condemning the use of the classics. Perhaps nothing better reveals his position than a point by point comparison of these propositions.

HUMANISTS	DOMINICI
1. The rulers of the state must be educated in secular learning, (c. 1).	1. Much of the teaching and example of the philosophers is injurious to the commonwealth, (cc. 18-19).
2. Secular learning contains truths which corroborate the the Faith, (c. 2).	2. The teachings of the philosophers are against the purity of the Faith, (cc. 20-21).
3. All truth is from God, and there is truth in the pagan liberal arts and philosophy, (c. 3).	3. Divine knowledge is utterly unlike human knowledge, (cc. 22-26).

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[30] "Fidèle à la tradition du Moyen Age, il entend bien conserver comme fondement première l'Ecriture, mais à côté des aspirations religieuses de toute âme, les premières à satisfaire comme les premières aussi à sauvegarder, il prétend qu'il existe d'autres aspirations, d'un ordre différent, inférieur, mais dont les exigences ne sont pas moins légitimes" (Coulon, *op. cit.*, p. xxxv).

[31] Salutati, *Epistolario,* IV, *lib.* XIV, *epist.* 24, quoted in Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xvi.

4. Profane letters are not forbidden by Divine or human law, (c. 4).	4. The science of the Gentiles is forbidden to the faithful by sacred letters, (cc. 27-28).
5. The sciences of the ancients are the *ancilla theologiae*, (c. 5).	5. Much use of the teachings of philosophers resists understanding of the Sacred Page, (cc. 29-31).
6. The most holy and useful men in the Church were men steeped in the classical tradition, (c. 6).	6. It is more useful for a Christian to till the soil than to attend to pagan letters, (cc. 32-33).
7. Grace does not destroy nature and hence does not exclude secular studies, (c. 7).	7. The perfection of Divine grace frees the mind of the Christian from reliance upon human teachings, (c. 34).
8. Secular studies are conducive to right living, (c. 8).	8. Human philosophy opposes virtue and morals, (c. 35).
9. Christians should know all things, but Scripture does not teach all things, (c. 9).	9. Sacred science alone is the holy philosophy which is more than sufficient to direct the human race in whatever needs to be done, (cc. 36-38).
10. It is a crime to prevent people from knowing and praising the greatest philosophers, (c. 11).	10. No non-Christian was a true philosopher, (cc. 39-43).
11. Secular learning is useful for preserving the Faith, (c. 11).	11. Inasmuch as in doubtful matters the safer course should be followed, the secular philosophers should be avoided as tending to doubt and error, (cc. 44-45).

12. In the books of the pagans are to be found many things which God has given for man's salvation, (c. 12).	12. Philosophy is full of idle vanities, especially about religion; to pay attention to these is a kind of infidelity, (cc. 46-47).[32]

The bulk of the *Lucula noctis* is devoted to the proof of Dominici's twelve counter-propositions. But before considering the arguments with which he advances them, it is particularly interesting to note his general thesis, for it is a neat summary of all his arguments.

> For the opposition side [the forbidding of secular studies], one great argument shines forth. A Christian ought to attend solely to those things which lead him to true beatitude or at least do not impede him. But *the study of the philosophers does not lead to true beatitude but for the most part impedes it.* Therefore the teachings of the pagans ought not to be studied by Christians.[33] (Italics added.)

In explaining the terms of this conclusion, Dominici is careful to point out that his prohibition of philosophy, although general, is not absolute.[34] Nor does it bind *ipso facto* under pain of mortal sin.[35] He insists, however, that it is at least a matter of counsel for all.[36]

In reading the *Lucula noctis,* it is important to keep in mind what Dominici understands by the word "philosophy." He uses the term in two very different senses. In one sense, the true sense, philosophy is simply the virtuous life: "to scorn sophistries, to flee poetry, to shun the world, and to direct its possessors solely to right living."[37] "Such philosophy, the Christian does not attack but rather honors, embraces and commends."[38] In the second sense, philosophy refers to the contents of secular letters: "what pagan or worldly men are generally believed to have discovered."[39] It is philosophy in this second sense which falls under Dominici's condemnation.

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[32] The statement of these propositions is based principally upon Hunt's list of the arguments in support of the classics (*op. cit.,* pp. xiv-xv) and Dominici's own summary of his arguments against the classics at the beginning of chapter 18.

[33] "Lucet ad oppositam partem unica ratio talis. Christianus quilibet illis solum debet intendere que ipsum ad veram beatitudinem ducunt aut saltem non impediunt. Sed philosophorum studium ad veram beatitudinem non perducit sed plerumque impedit. Igitur eorum dicta studeri non debent ab eis." (*Lucula,* c. 13. 1-6. This edition preserves the orthographical peculiarities of the manuscripts.)

[34] *Ibid.,* c. 17. 29-31.

[35] *Ibid.,* 68-71.

[36] *Ibid.,* 46-47.

Secular philosophy, according to a division borrowed from Augustine, has four parts: rational, moral, natural and divine. Rational philosophy includes logic and other liberal arts; moral philosophy embraces poetry and history as well as ethics. Natural philosophy is equivalent to physics and divine philosophy to metaphysics or theology.[40] Dominici does not subject all of these parts to the same condemnation.

He is most tolerant of the liberal arts. He readily conceeds that at least a portion of these is truly good and useful. "If these arts are separated from the rest of the dead body, then I would not hesitate to call them divine philosophy or doubt that they are useful for good living."[41] It is one thing, however, to study the arts and another thing to read pagan books.[42] The latter is unnecessary, for whatever is of value in the pagans has already been gathered by the Christian doctors.[43]

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[37] ". . . philosophiam diridere sophismata, poesiam fugere, spernere mundum, et sole ad bene vivendum suos dirigere possessores" (*Ibid.*, c. 19. 53-55).

[38] "Talem philosophiam Christianus non impugnat sed veneratur, amplectitur, et praedicat" (*Ibid.*, c. 19. 56-57).

[39] "Eam hic dico philosophiam seu seculares litteras voco, quam ethnici sive seculares homines ut communiter invenisse creduntur" (*Ibid.*, c. 16. 1-3).

[40] *Ibid.*, 3-19.

[41] ". . . si a cetero corpore mortifero fuerunt separati, quas non dubito tunc philosophiam appellare divinam et ad bene vivendum prodesse." (*Ibid.*, c. 35. 196-198. See also c. 15. 144-147 and c. 46. 442.)

[42] *Lucula*, c. 15. 144-149.

[43] *Ibid.*, c. 31. 105-120.

One must not, however, make too much of the arts. They are not, as some have supposed, required by theology. The expressions of Sacred Scripture are of divine origin and so are above the powers of human learning; Scripture is its own interpreter.[44] Use of philosophy in interpreting Scripture only obscures the spiritual sense contained therein.[45] There is also the danger that one will come to despise the simplicity of Scripture.[46]

Lest any danger arise from the study of these arts, the student should first be confirmed in faith[47] and charity[48] before beginning them. This means that "a knowledge of Scripture ought to precede the use of the arts, for without the divine philosophy, no man can be accounted wise."[49] Moreover, one must not remain too long in the study of the arts, but he should quickly move on to the higher science of religion, for the study of the arts is proper only to boys.[50]

What Dominici has said about the arts applies in part, at least, to the study of moral philosophy. Although he permits the study of ethics,[51] he is quick to point out the dangers found therein. The moral philosophy of the pagans, whatever truth it attained, is hopelessly inadequate. Their philosophy is full of errors,[52] both because they lacked a knowledge of the true good[53] and because they lacked virtue in their lives.[54]

Morality is indeed important, but it is not to be learned from the pagans. Only Sacred Scripture gives birth to that love which is the root and mother of all virtue.[55] Secular letters are totally foreign to the three things necessary for a good life, i.e., Catholic faith, ordered humility and burning charity.[56] "The traditions of the pagans not only do not contribute to good living but are even superfluous, harmful to the Faith and inimical to the entire structure and foundations of a good life."[57]

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[44] *Ibid.*, c. 30. 11-22.
[45] *Ibid.*, 114-116.
[46] *Ibid.*, c. 29. 79-109.
[47] *Ibid.*, c. 17. 29-31.
[48] *Ibid.*, c. 26. 80-88.
[49] ". . . sacre scripture peritia precedere debet usum artis loquendi. Nam sine hac nullus habendus est sapiens" (*Ibid.*, c. 36. 418-421).
[50] *Ibid.*, c. 16. 189-202.
[51] *Ibid.*, 180-184.
[52] *Ibid.*, c. 42. 173-202.
[53] *Ibid.*, c. 41. 142-198.
[54] *Ibid.*, c. 42. 24-176.

It is, however, natural philosophy and theology that bear the brunt of Dominici's attack. The following passage is an especially clear statement of his intentions regarding them:

> Natural philosophy, which does not recognize creation and eternity but rather attempts to prove the perpetuity of the world or at least supposes it (in which case I consider it only superficially contrary to the Faith), and theology, which, rebellious in its very appearance, runs contrary to the purity of the Faith both in meter and in prose, should not be read except by a few men well founded in the Faith, whose duty it is to oppose infidels and heretics.[58]

The reasoning behind this wholesale condemnation is twofold. In the first place, natural philosophy and theology are useless for the Christian. "God has no need for our deceiving embellishments. He has made known to whomever and through whomever He wills whatever He intends to be known about Himself; to add to this is to detract."[59] To argue that philosophy is useful because it can support the faith by rational argument is fallacious. "The Catholic faith is to be supported by divine authority alone."[60] To desire rational proofs for the truths of faith not only detracts from the dignity and usefulness of faith[61] but also reveals the weakness of one's faith.[62]

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[55] *Ibid.*, c. 25. 61-65.

[56] *Ibid.*, c. 35. 37-390.

[57] "Liquet ex dictis traditiones gentilium non solum ad bene vivendum non prodesse sed etiam supervacuas esse, obesse fidei, et bone vite fundamina et omnen fabricam oppugnare" (*Ibid.*, c. 43. 172-174).

[58] "Nam naturalis, que rerum creationem non novit et eternitatem sed perpetuitatem mundi aut probare nititur aut supponit (et per hoc est veritati contraria in superficie tantum, ut credo), et theologia, que metris currit vel prosa sinceritate fidei in suo vestimento rebellis, nequaquam sunt legende nisi a paucis in fide bene fundatis, quorum est infideles et hereticos expugnare" (*Ibid.*, c. 16. 123-145).

[59] "Non eget Deus lenociniis nostris. Ipse de se notum fecit per quos et quibus voluit quicquid sciri voluit; hiis addere detrahere est" (*Ibid.*, 143-145).

The second and more serious reason for condemning natural philosophy and theology is that they are full of dangerous errors, which threaten the Faith. Dominici gathers a long list of specific errors to document his charge; they concern such fundamental tenets of the Christian faith as the divine essence, the soul, beatitude, divine providence, etc.[63] For Dominici, such errors arise from the very nature of these disciplines. Natural philosophy and theology cannot avoid error because they are not illuminated by God.[64] Thus philosophy, which is the offspring of the Devil,[65] is the font of heresy in the Christian religion.[66]

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LUCULA NOCTIS

What are we to make of the case which Blessed John Dominici fashioned against a Christian use of the pagan classics? Are we to conclude that he is opposed to the intellectual life as a whole, or only to the humanists' version of the intellectual life? Or is it possible that in reality he is opposed only to the use of the classics by those who are insufficiently grounded in the Christian faith? These are the questions that have troubled the students of Dominici's work.

It is not difficult to exonerate Dominici of the charge of gross anti-intellectualism. His own life is the first witness against it. The *Lucula noctis,* moreover, is itself a witness against the charge. Despite his remarks about the dangers of learning and the great importance of a right will, he continually insists upon the value of the intellect and the intellectual life. His aim is not to discourage study but to restore the primacy of Sacred Scripture in that study.[67] Even then, he allows place for other studies alongside the Scriptures.

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[60] ". . . sola divina auctoritate est fides Catholica roboranda" (*Ibid.,* c. 22. 34-35).

[61] *Ibid.,* c. 22. 26-41.

[62] *Ibid.,* c. 23. 146-166.

[63] *Ibid.,* c. 22. 42-237, also c. 43. 89-119.

[64] *Ibid.,* c. 40. 148-149.

[65] *Ibid.,* c. 46. 150-194.

[66] *Ibid.,* c. 20. 106-153.

> True physics, which is a humble investigation of created things and a knowledge unrelated to higher things, true grammar, true rhetoric, true logic, true arithmetic, true geometry, true music, true astronomy, which does not subject free will to the movements of the stars, these indeed may be taught in the Church of God and may be heard in a serious and chaste manner by the faithful.[68]

It is not so easy, however, to discover the exact degree of Dominici's opposition to classical humanism. Coluccio Salutati, in his unfinished reply to the *Lucula noctis*, took a very sanguine view of Dominici's attitude. He says:

> I have seen your book, real *daylight* in fact, admitting no darkness . . . . I had written to Brother John of the Angels that, contrary to his belief, the study of secular letters was necessary for an understanding of the holy Doctors. You *were said* to believe the opposite of this, but in the first part of your discourse you developed my viewpoint with excellent arguments; and in the second part you agree that such studies are not to be denied to those already confirmed in the faith.[69]

At least one modern author concurs in this interpretation of Dominici's intentions. According to A. Rösler, Dominici's sole object in the *Lucula noctis* is the correction of an abuse in the education of youth.[70] This may well be the ostensible aim of the book. Dominici is most emphatic in his denunciations of an educational system in which "boys beseige Tully and Vergil, Homer, Aristotle, and Seneca seeking their bread and go away hungry, having fed on empty husks."[71] However, both R. Coulon and E. Hunt agree that "the tone of the entire work shows that Dominici really preferred no consort with the classics at all."[72]

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[67] See chap. 37 especially.

[68] "Vera physica, que est humilis rerum creatarum investigatio et cognitio ad altiora non relata, vera grammatica, vera rethorica, vera loyca, vera arismetica, vera geometria, vera musica, vera astrologia, que liberum arbitrium siderum motibus non supponit, utique doceri possunt in Ecclesia Dei et a fidelibus audire sobrie casteque" (*Ibid.*, c. 34. 449-454).

[69] Salutati, *Epistulario*, IV, *lib.* XIV, *epist.* 24, quoted in Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xvi. (The italicized words are given thus in Hunt.)

[70] Rösler, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.

Certainly the universal terms in which Dominici speaks of the uselessness and dangerousness of the pagan classics seems to bear out the conclusion of Hunt and Coulon. Dominici says explicitly that the works of the pagans are as dangerous to the old and wise as they are to the young and simple.[73] He compares the attempt to learn truth from the pagans to taking food from a leper,[74] drinking poison,[75] and having relations with a prostitute.[76] If he permits the reading of pagan classics, it is only to those "who, after having taken up fully the foundations of the Faith and the study of sacred letters, at times study secular letters really to extirpate the poison of their errors."[77] He by no means grants any general permission to all those firm in the faith, whatever be the reason for studying the pagans. Yet there is one very curious anomaly. When Dominici comes to suggesting a contemporary example of the true Christian philosopher he chooses, of all people, Petrarch, the father of Renaissance humanism.[78] And there is, finally, the undoubted fact that this text sparkles with classical allusions, quotations and rhetorical display reminiscent of the typical Renaissance style.

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[71] "Sed circumvalent hodie pueri Tullium et Virgilium, Homerum, Aristotilem, et Anneum, eorum panes querentes, receduntque famelici falsa cortice pasti." (*Lucula*, c. 15. 126-129. See also c. 13. 104-120; c. 15. 81-142; c. 18. 276-281; c. 34. 314-330; and c. 44. 137-310.)

[72] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xvi; also Coulon, *op. cit.*, p. 6, n. 1.

[73] *Lucula*, c. 39. 85-115.

[74] *Ibid.*, c. 35. 4-8.

[75] *Ibid.*, c. 22. 246-248.

[76] *Ibid.*, c. 27 *passim*.

[77] ". . . qui, post sacrum litterarum studia et fidei fundamenta plene suscepta realiter ad illorum errorum extirpandum venenum aliquando legunt" (*Ibid.*, c. 34. 311-314).

[78] *Ibid.*, c. 42. 215.

Strange to say, the ultimate effect of Blessed John Dominici's influence was not the curtailment but rather the encouragement of the Renaissance. His own spiritual sons, the Italian congregation of the Dominican reform, came to be numbered among the chief supporters of the Florentine humanists. The convent which he founded at Fiesole became the meeting place for the humanists of the day.[79] The library of St. Mark's in Florence came to possess one of the finest collections of classical manuscripts in all Italy.[80] Finally, St. Antoninus, the greatest of Blessed John Dominici's sons, became himself one of the greatest friends of humanism.[81]

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[79] Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. xii.

[80] Mortier, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 167.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 168.

AQUINAS POULSEN, O.P.

UTOPIA: A HUMANIST DOCUMENT

Though it is worthwhile to attain the end
merely for one man,
it is finer and more godlike
to attain it
for a nation or for city-states.
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

In European history, the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries witnessed a renaissance in learning, art and literature. From its flowering in Italy, it rapidly spread throughout the continent. In its desire to return to the classics of antiquity, to create spectacular architectual forms, to perfect new techniques with brush and paint, and to stress power and wealth, it catered in large measure to the temporal side of man's nature, gradually forgetting his relationship with the divine. It is no wonder, therefore, that parallel with the exuberance of rebirth there was at the same time a plea for reform.

At the time of *Utopia's* first publication in 1516, the Fifth General Council of the Lateran was still in session. Opening in 1512 under Pope Julius II, it adjourned in March of 1517 during the reign of Leo X, only a few months before Luther's theses were tacked to the

Wittenburg church door. The council had met to consider the following: certain heretical teachings which were then arising, including that of the Averroist Peter Pomponatius, who denied the immortality of the human soul; the correction of numerous and scandalous abuses in the lives of cardinals, bishops, secular clergy and religious; the achievement of political peace in Europe among Christian princes who were constantly at each other's throats (the papacy itself, especially during the pontificate of Julius II, was also embroiled in such affairs); and finally, the stimulation of Christian zeal for a crusade against the advancing Turks.[1] The pity of this council was that its decrees were not enforced.[2]

Thomas More (1478-1535) was a member of a group of humanists who are called by writers on this period "the London Reformers." Chief among these were More, Erasmus, John Colet, and Juan Luis Vives.[3] Contemporary and mutual friends, these humanists did not divorce Christianity from their writings. In the tradition of the early Christian apologists, they gleaned what was true and good from the pagans.[4] Education for these humanists was primarily aimed at the formation of the Christian character, stressing the ways in which man can contribute to his society.[5] Such training was to be not only the prerogative of men, but also of women who were now given a taste of the classics. The intellectually stimulating atmosphere which characterized More's home in Chelsea and such works of Erasmus as his *Institutio principis Christiani* and Vives' *De institutione feminae Christianae* reflect the humanist concern for education.

This, however, was not the only field touched by the pen of the English humanists. The writings of Colet and Erasmus show an attack upon the excessive subtleties which later scholastics of a nominalist tendency had introduced into theology. Also they deplored the unnecessary use of allegory by some of the medievalists in the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, preferring the Fathers and a more serious biblical research.[6] Warfare in Erasmus' *Praise of Folly* was pictured as an assault on man's rational nature. Here they opposed the current Machiavellian concept of the prince which made the will of the prince the sole criterion of law.[7]

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[1] H. J. Schroeder, O.P., *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1937), pp. 481, 483.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 486.

[3] Robert P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington, 1962), p. 3.

[4] E. L. Surtz, S.J., *The Praise of Wisdom* (Chicago: Loyola, 1957), p. 29.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

The *Utopia* of Thomas More is perhaps the best known product of this reform movement. Hence, a presentation of its thought will help to give a greater understanding of the trend. *Utopia* has been described as

> an act of humanistic faith in the ability of reason to construct an intellectually satisfying religion and morality upon which Christianity can build with minimal destruction of pre-existing elements.[8]

In it, More contrasts the heathen Utopian, who has only reason to guide him, with the Christian European, who, having revelation, should be greatly superior in virtue.[9]

Utopia is written in two parts. More composed Book II in 1515, while participating in an embassy to Flanders (part of present-day Belgium) in which he represented the businessmen of London.[10] W. E. Campbell, who, in 1931, began a reprint of More's English works, pictures this second book as the result of discussions between More and his associates which occurred as these negotiations dragged on for almost half a year. It would have been natural for these humanists to conjecture about an imaginary island where there were "no money dealings, no property and no long-delayed negotiations to bring about treaties that were seldom kept."[11] Having created his Utopia in Book II, More then composed Book I after his return to London. It serves as an introduction to the island kingdom of Utopia itself by satirizing "contemporary European royal follies."[12]

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[6] R. W. Chambers, *Thomas More* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1936), p. 75. Cf. Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[7] Surtz, *op. cit.*, p. 270. Cf. Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[8] Surtz, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

[9] Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[10] W. E. Campbell, *More's Utopia and His Social Teaching* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1930), p. 32.

Before considering the text of *Utopia,* it might be noted that More wrote this work in Latin, which was still an important literary language. When it first appeared in English in 1551,[13] it had gone through several Latin editions and also through translations into German, Italian, and French. Perhaps one reason for the delayed English translation was the increasing displeasure of the English crown against those who criticized its rule.

BOOK I

As the first book of *Utopia* opens, More is engaged in his ambassadorial mission to Flanders, residing in Antwerp. One day as he leaves church, he sees his friend Peter Giles, a town clerk, speaking with a stranger "well stricken in age, with a black sun-burned face, a long beard, and a cloak cast homely about his shoulders, whom by his favour and apparel forthwith I judged to be a mariner."[14] This sage of the seas, by name, Raphael Hythloday, is also a philosopher who, as a member of the expeditions of the discoveror Amerigo Vespucci and on travels of his own, had observed the customs, laws and governments of many distant lands. From his discourse in the picturesque atmosphere of More's garden, More and Giles readily perceive the vast experience of their guest. It is Giles whom More has as asking the important question: ". . . I wonder greatly why you get you not into some king's court. For I am sure there is no prince living, that would not be very glad . . . [for you] to instruct him with examples. . . ."[15]

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[12] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

[13] Quotations from *Utopia* in this paper are from this English translation made by Ralph Robinson; it appears in *Utopia and A Dialogue of Comfort,* Everyman's Library Series (London: Dent, 1951).

[14] *Utopia,* pp. 14-15.

It should be remembered when reading Book I, that More is actually asking himself whether he should enter the service of the English king, Henry VIII.[16] In More's opinion, the prince of a realm is a "perpetual well-spring"[17] showering over his subjects either good or bad. Does not one have the duty when given the opportunity, he asks himself, to help the prince to exercise his rule justly? Hythloday, however, retorts that

> the most part of all princes have more delight in warlike matters and feats of chivalry . . . than in the good feats of peace, and employ much more study how by right or by wrong to enlarge their dominions, than how well and peaceable to rule and govern that they have already.[18]

The only counselors such princes value are those who flatter them.

At this point Hythloday digresses into an account of the time he was in England and of an evening's dinner which he enjoyed at the table of John Morton, Cardinal Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Chancellor of England. More himself, in real life, had been placed in this same household about the age of twelve to learn the manners of a gentleman. Such a practice was not uncommon in England.[19] More's earliest biographer records Cardinal Morton as having said, "This child here waiting at the table . . . will prove a marvellous man."[20] When he was about fourteen, it was Cardinal Morton who sent young More to Oxford where he spent two years before beginning his law studies.

Two points were raised around the Cardinal's dinner table that night when Hythloday was present, which portray evils existing in England at that time. The first point is brought up by a certain lawyer who, although praising the rigorousness of English justice, is puzzled over the fact that thievery still abounds everywhere. To hang men for stealing, answers Hythloday, is too extreme and not a proper means to eliminate the vice. It would be better to remove the reasons why men steal, e.g., to punish landlords who charged excessive rents, or to discipline those noblemen and even abbots who hoarded great tracts of land for sheep grazing, leaving no land for agriculture. Hythloday sees no proportion between capital punishment and the theft of money. Moreover, it is only an encouragement for the thief to murder. Enforced labor in projects for the common good with the possibility of freedom seems the more reasonable punishment.[21]

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[16] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
[17] *Utopia*, p. 20.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 62.
[20] William Roper, *The Life of Sir Thomas More,* as printed in *Utopia,* Home Library Series (New York: Burt), p. 46.

Another scandal of the period were the monks and clergy who leveled excommunications and curses at anyone who criticized their abuses.[22] When a jester at the table suggested that beggars who were poor because of sickness or old age should be placed in religious houses, a friar at table said that he still had the mendicants to provide for. "Work" was the jestor's answer for "you be the greatest and veriest vagabonds that be."[23]

Returning to the main point of their discussion, More reminds Hythloday that Plato judged states to have attained peace and prosperity "either if philosophers be kings, or else if kings give themselves to the study of philosophy."[24] In response, Hythloday gives a lengthy criticism of the way in which the rulers of that period conducted themselves. More, in writing this section, was most likely thinking of Charles V of Spain and the Netherlands, Francis I of France, Henry VIII of England and his advisor Cardinal Wolsey, and even of the warlike Pope Julius II. Motivated by greed for land

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[21] *Utopia*, pp. 22-36.

[22] Surtz, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[23] *Utopia*, p. 37.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 39. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, V, 473 D, trans. Paul Shorey (London: William Heinemann, 1946), I, p. 509.

and power and yet imbued with the medieval concept of chivalry, these rulers did not hesitate to exploit their subjects for the money to perfect new modes of artillery, to pay for mercenary soldiers, and to support extended campaigns.[25]

If he should stand up in the courts of such men, Hythloday declares, and tell them of the Achorians, whose king wished to get control over another kingdom and who, having conquered it, could not control either of the countries, or of the Macarians, whose king is restricted to only so much gold and silver to prevent him from enriching himself at the expense of his subjects—would he not be met with deaf ears?[26] Princes and their favorite counsellors are more interested in raising the value of money when the king has to pay something, or in reducing its value when he is to be paid; in declaring war, and gathering funds for it and then playing the man of peace by negotiating a quick treaty; in resurrecting old and forgotten laws in order to collect fines; in insisting that the will of the prince is justice (Machiavellian); and in demanding huge sums to maintain the armies of the prince.[27] How would such rulers receive advice which considered these things evil? To this More is forced to reply:

> And to be plain with you, truly I cannot allow that such communication shall be used, or such counsel given, as you be sure shall never be regarded nor received. For how can so strange information be profitable, or how can they be beaten into their heads whose minds be already prevented with clean contrary persuasions?[28]

Although More grants that the royal courts of Europe would not go out of their way to hire philosophers as such to advise them on their policies, he does affirm that there is another type of philosophy which knows its "own stage" and which plays its part "accordingly with comeliness, uttering nothing out of due order and fashion."[29] The ways of governing justly cannot be pounded into the heads of those who are entirely opposed to one's way of thinking,

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[25] For a summary of the precarious relations which existed between European nations at this period and of the new methods of artillery which were being produced, see J. R. Hale, "International Relations in the West: Diplomacy and War," *The New Cambridge Modern History* (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1957), I, chap. 9.

[26] *Utopia,* pp. 41-42, 46.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 42-44.

[28] *Ibid.,* pp. 46-47.

> but you must with a crafty wile and a subtle train study and endeavor yourself . . . to handle the matter wittily and handsomely for the purpose; *and that which you cannot turn to good, so to order it that it be not very bad*. For it is not possible for all things to be well unless all men were good, which I think will not be yet this good many years.[30]

This is More's final decision, not only for Hythloday, but also for himself. After the writing of *Utopia* until his execution in 1535, More could be seen continuously in the service of Henry VIII. A good subject could not forsake the commonwealth even though he might prefer a life of scholarship to the intrigues of court life.[31]

More is well aware of the discouragement and dangers involved, and Hythloday is quick to point them out. One who follows More's advice would be seen as approving the questionable practices of the crown, incurring upon himself the blame for the evil deeds of others. Little opportunity would be granted such a man to perform good works among those who play down what is virtuous.[32] In this regard, Roper narrates an incident in the garden of More's home in which the king walked familiarly with More, having his arm around More's neck. Afterwards More told his son-in-law, "If my head would win him a castle in France . . . it should not fail to go."[33]

Book I closes with Hythloday's answer to the then prevalent problems of Europe. He counsels that private property should be eliminated. For a precedent upon which to build his argument, he cites the kingdom of Utopia where all things are held commonly with everyone having an abundance.[34] More, however, objects to this communistic system because it would make men slothful, taking away all initiative.[35] Wishing to give their guest the opportunity to present his case more fully, More and Giles enjoin Hythloday to tell them something of his Utopians.

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 48. Emphasis mine.

[31] Chambers, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

[32] *Utopia*, p. 49.

[33] Roper, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

BOOK II

In the verses printed at the end of *Utopia,* which may have been authored by Peter Giles, the island of Utopia is called a "philosophical city."[36] Here the Christian revelation has not yet penetrated. Using the irony and satire which is a mode of expression characteristic of the sixteenth century English humanists,[37] More shows Christian Europe how far she has fallen. For among his Utopians who are pagans, depending upon reason alone, many of Europe's abuses are not found.

The excellent nature of Utopia stems from King Utopus who conquered the barbaric people of the region one thousand seven hundred and sixty years previous to Hythloday's account. Under his direction the island kingdom was formed by cutting a channel between it and the mainland. In shape, Utopia resembles the new moon, being two hundred miles in breadth in its middle section and gradually tapering off at the two ends. Between these two ends, the sea runs in, making it readily accessible to all parts of the island. Hythloday gives the island's circumference at five hundred miles.[38] The terrain of the island is geometrically plotted out into fifty-four cities, no two of which are less than twenty-four miles apart.[39] Outside the limits of the cities, the Utopians have

[34] *Utopia,* p. 50.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 52
[36] *Ibid.,* p. 140. Cf. Chambers, *op. cit.,* p. 263.
[37] Adams, *op. cit.,* p. 36.
[38] *Utopia,* p. 55.
[39] *Ibid.,* p. 56.

their farms, which they take turns in maintaining. Land cultivation is a basic occupation in Utopia. As noted above, this reflects More's own distaste for the enclosure movement which was then gathering momentum in Europe and which was throwing many peasants upon the mercy of society.

When reading Hythloday's account of the cities, customs, and laws in Utopia, one is soon impressed with the fact that the notion of communal living is basic to the whole Utopian discussion.[40] Every activity of the Utopian citizen is directed to the common good. To exalt the notion of the common good is a natural and praiseworthy conclusion of reason.[41] Though this idea is painted in an extreme form in *Utopia*, it, nevertheless, marks off in bold relief the generosity of the Utopians from the selfishness of many Europeans.

The cities of Utopia are all the same in design; the chief of them is Amaurote since the council house for the island is there. Around each is a high wall and a ditch filled with brambles. Houses line the streets in connected rows, each with a garden in back. ". . . every tenth year they change their houses by lot."[42]

Basic to the governmental organization of Utopia is the family. Thirty families every year choose an official called a Syphogrant or Philarch as their representative. Every ten Philarchs are under a Tanibore or a chief Philarch. Having the power to elect the prince, the body of Philarchs choose from among four candidates presented by the people. The prince rules for the duration of his lifetime unless he be convicted of tyranny and deposed. Outside the councils of the Tanibores in which two different Syphogrants participate at each meeting, nothing is to be passed or discussed.[43]

"The chief and almost the only office of the Syphogrants is to see and take heed that no man sit idle, but that everyone apply

[40] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[41] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 2, 1094 b 8-10, *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 936.

[42] *Utopia*, pp. 59-61.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

his own craft with earnest diligence. . . ."[44] In Europe, Hythloday asserts, there are many classes of idle men and women: almost all women, priests and "religious" men, the landed noblemen and the large numbers whom these nobles have in their retinues, and the many beggers who walk Europe's streets. If these and all those who were engaged in unnecessary and frivolous activities were set to some task useful for the needs and pleasure of all, no one would be in want.[45] It is not like the administrators of Utopia to demand any work which is without purpose. When necessary tasks are completed, "the citizens should withdraw from the bodily service to the free liberty of the mind and garnishing of the same. For herein they suppose the felicity of this life to consist."[46]

Utopians seem to have few superfluous desires.[47] Absent from their leisure hours are taverns, dice games and hunting. To these they affix the label "foolish," or even "barbaric" in the case of hunting. They eat in common in huge halls, wear similar clothing, and scorn the possession of gold and silver. In many respects, the Utopian state resembles the monastic community. More himself did desire a reform of the then lax European monasteries.[48]

Morality in Utopia

Having given an account of the physical organization of Utopia, Hythloday then turns the attention of More and Giles to three important points: the Utopians' notion of morality, their ideas on warfare, and finally the role of religion on their island.

Utopians define virtue "to be life ordered according to the prescript of nature."[49] Human nature, they say, prescribes for each man "a joyful life, that is to say, pleasure, as the end of all our operations."[50]

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 69.
[47] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
[48] Chambers, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.
[49] *Utopia*, p. 85.
[50] *Ibid.*

One author has described the Utopian as having "a Stoic ethic and an Epicurean psychology," both of which form a unity in the Utopian because

> uncorrupted men will and do "by nature" (that is, by natural law of their being—human nature) actively prefer to live "according to reason" for the sake both of maximum personal happiness and for the common good of all.[51]

Pleasure, in which the Utopian finds his happiness does not include *any* type of pleasure but only that which is "good and honest,"[52] i.e., not harmful to man's nature. Pleasure they call "every motion and state of the body or mind wherein man hath naturally delectation."[53] The pleasure of the body is twofold: that which is sensibly felt and perceived, and that which "consisteth and resteth in the quiet and upright state of the body,"[54] i.e., in bodily health. But these pleasures of the body are secondary, providing a foundation upon which the higher pleasures of the mind are based, namely the performance of virtue and the intellectual satisfaction one receives from leading a good life.[55]

> . . . but they join unto the reasons of philosophy certain principles taken out of religion, without the which to the investigation of true felicity they think reason of itself weak and unperfect. . . . That the soul is immortal. . . . That to our virtues and good deeds rewards be appointed after this life, and to our evil deeds punishment.[56]

They believe this opinion of pleasure and virtue to be the best that man can arrive at by reason.[57]

Before moving to Hythloday's treatment of warfare in Utopia, the Utopian allowance for euthanasia and divorce must be accounted for. Both are permitted, but in restricted circumstances. If a citizen of Utopia suffers from some incurable disease (not simply from old age) which causes him much pain and which also makes him a heavy burden for those about him to bear, the priests and city officials counsel the man not to be unwilling to die, but, either by his own means or by the action of another, allow himself to be dispatched from this life. No one, however, is forced to kill himself against his will, nor do they hold in esteem anyone who ends his life on his own without the permission of the council.[58]

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[51] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[52] *Utopia*, p. 84.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 87.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 90.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

Utopians recognize that stable unions are necessary for society, and violators of the marriage act (i.e., by adultery or fornication, etc.) undergo severe bondage for their deeds, contrary to the practices of Europe where licentiousness is common and unpunished. Generally, marriage in Utopia is indissoluble. In certain instances, however, the bond is broken: by adultery or by the unbearable behavior of either party or by general agreement between both parties. Remarriage is sometimes and hesitatingly permitted by the council.[59] In both of these matters, Hythloday is speaking of a pagan society. Moreover, they are both more remote conclusions of the law of nature.[60] But to Europeans with the Christian revelation, the evil of these acts should be recognized.

Warfare in Utopia

"Contrary to the custom almost of all other nations, they count nothing so much against glory as glory gotten in war."[61] When Hythloday speaks of war in Utopia, he reveals the humanist sentiments of More. English humanism reflects certain characteristics of the Roman Stoics and of the early Christians. These groups had a profound realization of the unity of the human species. All men, in a sense, are brothers, and for men to kill each other is "fratricide."[62]

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[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 98-99.
[59] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.
[60] Surtz, *op. cit.*, pp. 91, 244.
[61] *Utopia*, p. 107.
[62] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

In the medieval notion of *Pax ecclesiae*, where the pope was pictured as having the plenitude of power, this idea of universal brotherhood was also present.[63]

War, however, is not intrinsically evil. In other words, there can be a just war. St. Augustine mentioned it.[64] During the sixteenth century, such famous theologians as Cajetan, Vitoria and Bañez were working on this very problem.[65] Hythloday lists five motives which would prompt the Utopians to engage in battle: to defend their own country, to help protect the lands of their friends from invasion, to relieve any nation from the yoke of tyranny, to avenge injuries committed against their friends if their aid is sought, and finally, Utopians will fight, if necessary, to occupy the underdeveloped land of another country if the Utopian population should exceed its own boundaries. They consider this last cause as the most just reason for war.[66] What were the motives behind the colonizers of More's day? Was their landgrabbing in accord with justice?

When a situation for war arises, the Utopians

> no less pity the base and common sort of their enemies' people, than they do their own, knowing that they be driven and enforced to war against their wills by the furious madness of their princes and heads.[67]

Because of their great dislike for bloodshed, they use methods which help to lessen it. An example of this would be their use of bribes in order that members of the enemy might deliver up their prince, thus leaving the opposition without a leader.[68] In war, where they use craft and deceit, and in every other situation, Utopians take pride in acting by reason.[69]

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[63] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[64] See, for example, *The City of God*, XIX, 7, trans. Wm. Chase Greene (London: William Heinemann, 1960), VI, p. 151. A just war is that which is fought if a nation is unjustly attacked.

[65] Adams, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[66] *Utopia*, pp. 107, 70.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 110.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[69] *Ibid.*

Religion in Utopia

Cognizant of the fact that religious bickering among the inhabitants of that land was the chief reason why he was able to conquer them, King Utopus from the first

> made a decree that it should be lawful for every man to favour and follow what religion he would, and that he might do the best he could to bring other to his opinion, so that he did it peaceably. . . .[70]

In Utopia, freedom of conscience and religious tolerance exist chiefly for the maintenance of peace within the country and the establishment of a unified front against those who invade from without.[71] One of More's chief objections against the Protestant Reformation was its cause of division in the Christian community in the face of the oncoming Turks. But the toleration of Utopus was also in the interest of religion itself. For in this state without divine revelation, he did not wish to suppress religions in order that "the truth of its own power would be at the last issue out and come to light."[72] He insisted, however, that all men hold to two truths which can be realized by all men, namely, the existence of a Supreme Being and the immortality of the human soul.[73]

Contrary to the vast number of clergy who roamed about Europe giving scandal to the faithful, the priests of Utopia are few in number and of great holiness. These men, who are chosen by the people for this office and then consecrated by the bishop, conduct the state worship on the first and last day of every month and year. "The common sacrifices [incense and candles] be so ordered that they be no derogation nor prejudice to any of the private sacrifices and religions."[74] Because of the holiness of these priests and by reason of their consecration, "if they commit any offence they be under no common judgment, but be left only to God and themselves."[75] Many of the higher clergy in More's time were political puppets of the prince. In the year of *Utopia's* publication (1516) a concordat was negotiated between Francis I of France and Pope Leo X, giving the king of France the right to appoint all the heads of dioceses and monasteries in his realm.[76]

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[70] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[71] Surtz, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[72] *Utopia*, p. 120.

[73] *Ibid.*; cf. St. Paul's Epistle to the Hebrews XI, 6.

[74] *Utopia*, p. 127.

> Among the Utopians there are two groups so earnestly bent and affectioned to religion, that they pass nothing for learning, nor give their minds to any knowledge of things. But idleness they utterly forsake and eschew, [in contrast to the monks and mendicants of More's time] thinking felicity after this life to be gotten and obtained by busy labors and good exercises.[77]

One of these groups abstains from marriage, flesh meat and all worldly pleasure. The other is not celibate, but engages in those pleasures which do not interfere with their labors. To the former, greater holiness is attributed, though if any perform these abstinences for motives other than religion, they are accounted the most foolish.[78]

CONCLUSION

Raphael Hythloday, after proposing to his listeners the religious practices of Utopia, closes his account by mentioning again the basic theme which runs throughout the second book: "Here, where nothing is private, the common affairs be earnestly looked upon."[79] But it is chiefly this very point which More at the end of *Utopia* disagrees with, for by it

> all nobility, magnificence, worship, honour, and majesty, the true ornaments and honours, as the common opinion is, of a commonwealth, utterly be overthrown and destroyed. . . .[80]

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[76] Surtz, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
[77] *Utopia*, p. 123.
[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.
[79] *Ibid.*, p. 130.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

The word "utopia" has come to signify an ideal state. But this was not More's meaning for it.[81] The very names used by More in this work (in some cases these are adaptions from the Greek) infer the nonentity of the place: "Utopia" means "nowhere"; "Hythloday" means "an expert in nonsense"; "Amaurote" stands for "a spectral city."[82] *Utopia* is rather the vehicle of an exceptional humanist of sixteenth century England, through which a finger of criticism is pointed at the evils of his day. It is a plea for reform rather than a proposal of a way of life to which Christian Europe should absolutely conform itself.[83] Yet even so, More can say in his last sentence, "so must I needs confess and grant that many things be in the Utopian weal-public which in our cities I may rather wish for than hope for."[84]

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[81] E. E. Reynolds, *St. Thomas More* (New York: Image Books, 1958), p. 92.

[82] Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 115-116.

[83] Some authors, such as Karl Kautsky in his *Thomas More and His Utopia* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1959), picture More as a forerunner of modern socialism with the Utopian state as "a goal which humanity should strive to attain." p. 170. This, however, does not appear to be the case, as we have tried to show.

[84] *Utopia*, p. 135.

QUENTIN BARNETT, O.P.

FRANCISCO DE VITORIA: PORTRAIT OF A REFORMER

The office and function of a theologian
is so broad that no argument, no question,
no aid should seem foreign
to the theological profession.
De potestate civili

To most sightseers in our nation's capital, the mural in the foyer of the United States Justice building and the bust in the beautiful Pan-American Union headquarters—both bearing the inscription, "Francisco de Vitoria, Founder of International Law"—have little or no significance. But to members of the Dominican Order and to many students of jurisprudence these are fitting tributes to the sixteenth century Spanish Friar who fathered our modern concept of international law. The "law of nations" had indeed been discussed by earlier philosophers, jurists and theologians abstractly and inadequately, but "through Francisco de Vitoria, it became a science—the science of the rules of social conduct . . . universal and embracing all peoples of all continents."[1]

[1] James Brown Scott, *The Catholic Conception of International Law* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1934), p. 60.

Vitoria,[2] however, was a man of many talents. A great number of books and articles have been written to explain the principles and theories for which he is internationally acclaimed.[3] But these works generally pass over the man himself, his saintly life, his erudition, his widespread influence and prestige. This article, then, attempts to place Vitoria in a broader historical setting, and to consider him not just as a jurist, but also as a humanist, philosopher, theologian, pedagogue and reformer.

* * *

In the latter half of the fifteenth century, Western Europe began a period of transition which was to involve every aspect of human life. The steady progress of humanism in the Renaissance, the growth of popular piety, the invention of the printing press, the victory of Spain over the Moors, and most significantly the discovery of the New World with its consequent colonization and world involvement—these are just a few of the events which preceded the religious, political and cultural revolutions of the sixteenth century.

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[2] Also spelled Victoria and Vittoria, but the spelling I have used (Vitoria) is the more common.

[3] The two works of Vitoria which are now generally recognized as the foundation of modern international law—*De indis* and *De jure belli*—have been published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington, D.C. in an edition which contains: an introduction by the eminent Ernest Nys, an English translation of the text, a critical edition of the text, and a photostatic copy of the edition of 1696; see Ernest Nys (ed.), *Francisci de Victoria: De Indis et De Jure Belli Relectiones* (in The Classics of International Law Series, ed. James Brown Scott [Washington: Gibson Brothers, 1917]). All future references to this work will be signified by Nys (introduction) or Vitoria (translation of text).

The following are excellent studies explaining Vitoria's concept of international law: Books—i) J. B. Scott, see *supra,* n. 1; ii) John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations* (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1935); iii) Honorio Muñoz, O.P., *Vitoria and the Conquest of America* (Manila, P.I.: University of Santo Tomás Press, 1938). Articles—i) Jose Manual de Aguilar, O.P., "The Law of Nations and the Salamanca School of Theology," *Thomist,* 9 (1946), 186-221; ii) Nicolaus Pfeiffer, "Doctrinae iuris internationalis iuxta Franciscum de Victoria, O.P., celeberrimum studiorum D. Thomae saeculo XVI restauratorum," *Xenia thomistica* (Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1925), t. III, 391-431; iii) Justus M. Vander Kroef, "Francisco de Vitoria and the Nature of Colonial Policy," *Catholic Historical Review,* 35 (1949-1950), 129-162; iv) *La Ciencia Tomista,* 72 (1947)—the whole volume is devoted to Vitoria, in commemoration of the fourth cententary of his death.

It was at this time, in a Spain soon to emerge as the most powerful nation in the world, that Francisco de Vitoria was born. The year of his birth cannot be fixed with certainty; Quetif and Echard set the date at 1480, but Vitoria's most reliable biographer, Luis Getino, O.P., has discovered evidence which proves that he must have been born "no earlier than 1483 and no later than 1486."[4]

His parents, Cantabrian by race, lived in Vitoria, the principal city of Alava in Old Castile. While Francisco was still quite young, they moved to Burgos, where he began his education—an education evidently influenced by humanism, for the famous Juan Vives testified that Vitoria attained the best classical learning from his early youth.[5] His older brother, Diego, entered the Dominican Order about 1500, and was later to gain such a reputation for his eloquence that he was made official preacher at the court of King Charles V.[6]

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[4] "El año en que nació Francisco de Vitoria no es posible fijarlo con certeza . . . . Con los datos que hoy tenemos habrá que afirmar que Vitoria no nació antes de 1483 ni después de 1486." Luis G. Alonso Getino, O.P., *El Maestro Fr. Francisco de Vitoria* (2nd ed.; Madrid: Imprenta Catolica, 1930), pp. 12-14. Cf. Quetif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Paris: apud Ballard et Simart, 1721), t. II, p. 129.

[5] ". . . bonas litteras attigit feliciter iam inde a puero." Juan Luis Vives, "Letter to Erasmus, 13 June 1527," in *Opus epistolarum des. Erasmi Roterdami*, ed. P.S. Allen (Oxonii: In Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1928), vol. VII, p. 84.

[6] "La réputation qu'il s'étroit faite dans plusieurs Province d'Espagne, autant par la sainteté de sa Vie, que par la force de ses Discours, engagea l'Emperor Charles-Quint, à l'appeller à la Cour, et à vouloir l'avoir pour son Prédicateur ordinaire." A. Touron, O.P., *Histoire des hommes illustres de l'Ordre de saint Dominique* (Paris: Babutz & Quillau, 1747), vol. IV, p. 57.

Francisco followed Diego's example and received the habit of the Friars Preachers at the convent of San Pablo in Burgos. Because of his exceptional ability and promise, he was sent to the University of Paris in 1506 to continue his studies under the celebrated Peter Crockaert (Petrus de Bruxellis). At one time Crockaert had been a Nominalist and student of John Major, but he entered the Dominican Order in 1503 and was soon to become the most distinguished representative of Saint Thomas in Paris. He combined a sound judgment with an elegant style, and communicated to his disciple, Vitoria, a taste for literary form. Crockaert wrote one of the very earliest commentaries on the *Summa* of St. Thomas—a part of which, the *Secunda Secundae,* Vitoria edited in 1512.[7]

The General Chapter of the Order of Preachers, held at Genoa in 1513, commissioned Vitoria as a bachelor in theology under Crockaert. Two years later this was confirmed by the General Chapter of Naples and he was assigned to lecture *cursorie* on the *Sentences* in the school for externs (that is, those Dominicans not belonging to the Province of France) at the University.[8] Because he went to Paris as a Dominican, it is certain that Vitoria was a professor at Saint-Jacques—and very unlikely that he also taught at the college of the Sorbonne, as some contend.[9] He received the licentiate and was made Master of theology on March 24, 1521.[10] By this time, however, Vitoria's reputation had passed beyond the Pyrenees, and in 1523 he was recalled to Spain and appointed Master and Lector Primarius at the college of St. Gregory in Valladoid.

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[7] "Den Anfang dürfte der frühere Nominalist, spätere Dominikaner und Realist Peter Crockart von Brüssel, einer der gelehrtesten Männer seiner Zeit, der Lehrer des Franz von Vittoria, gemacht haben, der 1509 die Summa theologiae des hl. Thomas zu erklären begann." A. Michelitsch, *Kommentatoren zur Summa Theologiae des Hl. Thomas von Aquin,* in *Thomistenschriften,* vol. II (Graz, 1924), p. 2. Thus Crockaert's commentary was antedated only by those of Cardinal Cajetan (begun in 1507) and possibly Conrad Kölin (published *c.* 1512): cf. pp. 4, 12, 146.

[8] "Conventui Parisiensi assignamus ad legendum sententias . . . pro anno secundo 1516 in magnis scholis in loco extraneis debito fr. Franciscum de Victoria provinciae Hispaniae." *Acta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Praedicatorum,* ed. Benedictus Maria Reichert, O.P. (Romae: In domo generalitia, 1901), vol. IV, pp. 148-149.

[9] For example, see Allen, *op. cit.,* p. 254. The difficulty seems to arise from two errors: (1) the misunderstanding of a statement from Quetif-Echard (". . . ex actis facultatis habemus de ultima Sorbonica . . . licentiae

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE HUMANIST MOVEMENT

While at Paris, Vitoria was, of course, assigned to the convent of Saint-Jacques. Victor Le Clerc has noted that from the time the Dominicans had acquired Saint-Jacques in 1221, up to the French Revolution of 1789, it had been the center of numerous and varied controversies.[11] The "Jacobins" of the 16th century were no exception, for the convent was definitely split in its attitude toward the humanist movement. The students tended to sympathize with many of the humanist ideals, whereas the professors, for the most part, resented the movement as an affront to the traditional method they held sacred.

To be sure, the attacks of the humanists on the University were fierce. Erasmus said of Paris:

> Are there any brains more imbecile than those of the theologasters? I know of nothing more barbarous than their speech, more coarse than their understanding, more thorny than their teaching, more violent than their discussions.[12]

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suae locum sextum obtinuisse," *op. cit.*, p. 129). The acts of the faculty of the Sorbonne would naturally record such an important event at the University, but it would be a mistake to infer from this that Vitoria studied, taught, or received his degree from the Sorbonne; cf. Getino, *op. cit.*, pp. 43, 45-46. (2) The modern tendency to overemphasize the position of the Sorbonne in the Middle Ages. The Sorbonne was nothing more than one of a number of colleges which constituted the University of Paris and at that time was, in fact, much less prominent than Saint-Jacques.

[10] Touron, *op. cit.*, p. 59. The "licentiate" simply signified a permission (from *licet*) to receive the degree of Master in Sacred Theology.

[11] Victor Le Clerc, *Histoire littéraire de la France au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1865), vol. I, pp. 101 ff.; cited by Nys, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[12] Quoted by Nys, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

Equally caustic in his criticism was Juan Vives, who had acquired his hatred of scholasticism when he was a student of John Dullaert at the college of Beauvais. The initial objection of these and other humanists was the "barbarism" of scholastic Latinity and terminology; it was not long, however, before doctrine was included in the reprobation of literary form. Thus the humanists inferred that men incapable of writing were equally incapable of thinking.

Admittedly, scholasticism was corrupted: mere phrases took the place of ideas in discussions; purely formal subjects were studied without application or connection with actuality; sophistry became commonplace in the *disputationes;* science consisted in endless disputes on words and about words. A major cause of this decadence —and one which has too often been overlooked—was the fact that the Nominalism of Ockham was rampant at the University of Paris. If everything except substance and quality is reduced to mere *words,* it is little wonder that the thought of many of the scholastics was divorced from reality.

Such was the situation during Vitoria's seventeen years in Paris. From the very beginning, he was driven to a work of reform—a work of purging scholasticism of its defects, especially the shortcomings of Nominalism. That Vitoria was deeply influenced by humanism is evidenced by his accomplishments later in life. In his treatises on the rights of the Indians in America, Vitoria incorporated both classical Latin and humanitarian principles—not to the extent of defending the absolute pacificism of humanism; nonetheless he could not escape its influence.

Furthermore, many humanists exhibited a great respect for Vitoria. When a campaign of denunciation against Erasmus was started in Spain, the Dutchman wrote to Vitoria for aid. In the letter, Erasmus stated that the conspiracy against him was initiated by the Dominicans and later given new life by the Franciscans of Salamanca. Among its leaders was the prior of the Dominican convent at

Burgos—none other than Vitoria's own brother, Diego! Erasmus begged Vitoria to intercede with, and even countermand his brother.[13]

It may seem odd, and extremely bold of Erasmus to ask Vitoria to oppose his own brother. There is nothing to indicate that Vitoria had ever met the famous Humanist. However, they had a mutual friend in Juan Vives, with whom Vitoria was in close contact from 1509-1514, when they were both studying in Paris. Vives had written to Erasmus in June of 1527 about Vitoria, "a man of great reputation and trustworthiness among his colleagues, who more than once has defended your cause before the theologians at Paris . . . who admires and honors you."[14]

It is quite difficult to ascertain Vitoria's exact sentiments toward Erasmus because these letters are the extent of our knowledge about their relationship—and obviously Vives tended to exaggerate. Vitoria could not but admire the literary genius of Erasmus, for he himself was a lover of the classics, but he was also very cautious not to overlook the imprudence and unstable theological tendencies of humanism. We can be certain, however, that Vitoria appreciated the good which Erasmus hoped to achieve.[15]

VITORIA AT SALAMANCA

In 1526, when Vitoria had completed his third year as Regent of St. Gregory's in Valladoid, his superiors named him as a candidate for the *prima* chair in theology at the University of Salamanca—a position which was left vacant with the death of Pedro de Leon. The manner of electing a Master for this coveted chair was unique. The candidates entered into competition with one another, lecturing on an appointed subject for a certain length of time—five weeks at the most. The judges were the students themselves, who attended all the lectures and then cast their vote, each student having as many votes as the number of courses he was studying. The students of Salamanca were quite capable of this task: they knew what they needed and who could best give it to them. Their interest and excitement were so intense that the time of election was marked by violent contests, sometimes even leading to bloodshed.[16]

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[13] "Et primus impetus factus est in aula Caesaris per Dominicanos. Rursus Salamancae per Franciscanos vitae, ut habentur probatioris renouatus . . . extitit Petrus Victorienses Dominicanus, qui Burgis praesidens suo sodalitio concionatorem agit, tuus, ut audio, germanus . . . speroque futurum vt fratrem ad saniora consilia revoces." *Epistola* n. 1909, dated 29 November 1527, in Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-256. It is by this passage that Allen and others have confirmed that Vitoria (Francisco) was the recipient of this letter.

[14] ". . . homo maximi nominis ac fidei apud suos, quique non semel causam tuam defendit frequenti theologorum collegio Lutetiae . . . admiratur te ac adoret." *Epistola* n. 1836, *ibid.*, p. 84.

[15] See Getino, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-106; Muñoz, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33.

Competing with Vitoria for the chair was a famous Portuguese theologian, Maestro Margallo, who had taught at Salamanca for a number of years, whereas Vitoria was relatively unknown to the students. Nevertheless, the Spaniard's erudition and eloquent style captivated the students and he was unanimously chosen as their Master. Vitoria was installed with great solemnity on September 21, 1526.[17]

The scholastic method itself, at Salamanca, was fundamentally the same as it had been in the 13th century. The *vesperas* professor (or Bachelor) met with the students for two hours in the afternoon, during which time he read the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard and answered questions pertaining to the text. The following morning, the *prima* professor (Master) would lecture *ex cathedra* on what was read the day before. The subject matter of these *lectiones* was limited to one or two major topics, but by the end of the year, the students had received a quite thorough presentation. In addition, the Master was to deliver a *publicum* or special lecture at least once a year. This was called a *relectio* and was a restatement or reconsideration of the doctrine set forth at the regular lectures. It

[16] Getino, *ibid.*, p. 63.

[17] Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

is these *relectiones* of Vitoria, which occasioned great solemnity and were attended by scholars from all over Spain, that we possess today.

Loyalty to the basic format of the scholastic method notwithstanding, the University of Salamanca was plagued by the same faults which Vitoria had witnessed at Paris. In addition, the wars of Spain in Europe and her colonial conquests in America were denuding the University of students. Many young men considered the art of fighting more noble than that of learning. The new university which Cardinal Ximinez de Cisneros founded at Alcalá had recruited renowned Spaniards from Paris and thus threatened to replace Salamanca as the center of learning in Spain. Theology at Salamanca took second place in importance to civil and canon law; the faculty, even in theology, was dominated by the followers of Ockham and Scotus, who had greatly diminished the prestige of the Dominicans.

Undaunted by these obstacles, Vitoria began to make changes almost immediately after he received this position of authority. He instituted new scholarships and financial aids for students and invited other religious orders to form studentates at Salamanca. He succeeded in obtaining the independence of the University from papal and imperial interference. Encouraged by this success in the field of administration, Vitoria set out on his great work of reviving the true spirit of scholastic theology.

First of all, he had to deal with the criticisms of the humanists—criticisms which he thought were wholly justified in many respects. Vitoria impressed upon his students the necessity of using pure, clear, and at least correct language; by his own example, he transmitted an appreciation and love of classical Latin.[18] But at the same time, he was adamant in emphasizing that the work of the philologist is introductory to that of the philosopher and theologian.

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[18] See Muñoz, *op. cit.*, p. 30. A Belgian who attended Vitoria's lectures around 1532 wrote: "Dictu mirum quam scribat nervose, quam apte partiatur, quam colligat acute, et tamen omnia jucunditatis plena." Nicolaus Clenardus, *Epistolarum Libri Duo* (Antverpiae: Chr. Plantinus, 1566), p. 133; cited by Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

In order to counteract the abuses of the *disputationes* and to effect a return to the real scholasticism of the thirteenth century, Vitoria stimulated interest by using modern examples and expounding problems of current interest in his lectures. At the annual *relectio,* he presented a beautiful synthesis of the principles and conclusions discussed during the year, and then proceeded to demonstrate their worth by application to problems of outstanding political importance. He recognized that abstract, theoretical principles must be utilized in the practical order. Thus in 1528 Vitoria considered in his *relectio* the question of civil authority—whether it resides in the people, in the prince, in the state as such, or was delegated by the Pope (*De potestate civili*); in 1531, the validity of the marriage of King Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon (*De matrimonio*); in 1532, the power of the pope in regard to temporal affairs (*De potestate ecclesiae*); in 1539, the rights of the Indians and the legitimate titles for Spain's colonization of the New World (*De indis*). He solved these and many other controversies not only by applying the principles of philosophy and theology, but by "supporting the conclusions of theology with choice citations from the Fathers and with the facts of ecclesiastical history."[19]

Vitoria introduced the method of dictation at Salamanca—demanding that his students write down his lectures. This was not an innovation as far as scholasticism and the Dominican Order were concerned, but it was unprecedented in the universities of Spain. Furthermore, he replaced the *Sentences,* which had been the official text for over three centuries, with the *Summa* of St. Thomas. This transition had been accomplished in a number of universities throughout Europe,[20] but Salamanca had been hesitant—until the arrival of Vitoria. Thus he was enabled to teach theology as he knew it should be taught—as a *science*—in the natural, orderly, scientific method of which St. Thomas was the master.

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[19] ". . . il aimait à corroborer les conclusions de la théologie par d'heureuses citations des Pères, par des faits de l'histoire ecclésiastique." R. P. Mortier, O.P., *Histoire des Maitres Généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs* (Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1911), t. V, p. 380.

VITORIA'S INFLUENCE ON SPAIN

What Vitoria accomplished at Salamanca must be attributed to his own genius; he did not simply transport to Spain the doctrine which he received at Paris. The illustrious Dominican, Domingo Bañez, has aptly written that Vitoria "acquired his learning in Paris, but he far surpassed his masters."[21] Needless to say, he did not inherit his tremendous enthusiasm from Paris. Considering only the basic criticisms levelled against the masters of Paris by Erasmus, Vives, Ramus, and others, we cannot hold that Vitoria acquired his spirit of research, innovation and progress from his teachers—with the possible exception of Peter Crockaert. Nor did he receive support from the masters and doctors at Salamanca, for there was opposition to his every new proposal. But Vitoria realized that the strength and vitality of any reform movement was in youth, and thus he concentrated his efforts on the students.

Without a doubt, very few teachers have had students comparable to those of Francisco de Vitoria. Mortier has written:

> It is truly an extraordinary thing . . . this assemblage of Doctors, of whom we do not know which to admire most. . . . Spain had never before given so many incomparable Masters to the Order of Saint Dominic, and never has since.[22]

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[20] The statutes of most universities (e.g., Leipzig, Fribourg) allowed the *Summa* to be taught on an equal basis with the *Sentences*, but Vitoria's achievement at Salamanca was complete—Aquinas was THE *auctor*.

[21] Quoted by Nys, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[22] "Et c'est vraiment chose extraordinaire que cette réunion de Docteurs, dont on ne sait lequel admirer le plus. Jamais l'Espagne n'avait donné à l'Ordre de Saint-Dominique, et jamais elle ne donna depuis, autant de Maîtres incomparables." Mortier, *op. cit.*, p. 385-6.

Melchior Cano, in dedicating his classical *De locis theologicis* to his master, claimed that Spain received Vitoria "as a singular gift of God,"[23] and he begged his readers to believe that Vitoria was infinitely greater than a student's words of praise could express.[24] Bañez divided Spanish theology into two epochs: before Vitoria and after Vitoria, stating that he assumed the role of a "second Socrates" in revitalizing theology at Salamanca and throughout Spain.[25] Bartolome de Medina likewise waxed eloquent on the extensive knowledge and influence of Vitoria:

> . . . he is said to be the reformer of sacred theology—indeed all Spaniards should say this—because he taught them the true method of theology . . . . he examined all the opinions of the scholastics with incredible diligence so that if some were found to contradict or oppose in any way the doctrine of St. Thomas, he endeavored with the greatest care and effort to pluck out and destroy! He who was imbued with a knowledge of dialectics, philosophy, Holy Scripture and the sacred sciences, utilized all these as aids to augment, enrich, and make more illustrious the doctrine of St. Thomas. For in that time, [his learning] flowed forth as from a spring of water.[26]

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[23] "Fratrem Franciscum Vitoria, lector optime, eum quem summum theologiae praeceptorem Hispania Dei singulari munere accepit . . ." Melchioris Cani, *Opera theologica* (Roma: Libreria Editrice Della "Vera Roma" di E. Filiziani, 1900), vol. III, *De locis theologicis,* lib. XII, *Prooemium.*

[24] "Huius enim clarissimi viri eruditionem memoriae prodimus, atque ei, etsi nequaquam parem illius ingenio. Quamquam postula ab iis, qui haec in manus sument, ut maius quiddam de magistro meo, quam quantum a me exprimi potest, suspicientur." *Ibid.*

[25] ". . . Novimus etiam ex narratione patrum, in scholis Salmantina imo in tota Hispania ab hinc annos sexaginta minus peritos fuisse scholasticos Theologos, donec gloriosae memoriae F. Franciscus de Victoria, qui fuit nostri ordinis insignis magister, scholasticam doctrinam viva voce, velut alter Socrates suis lectionibus in cathedra Sacrae Theologiae huius Salmaticensis Academiae primaria in methodum perspicuam et eruditione plenam ad intelligentiam D. Thom. reduxit atque illustravit." Dominico Bañez, *Commentaria in Secundam Secundae* (Venetiis: apud Franciscum Zilettum, 1586), q. 1, a. 7.

[26] ". . . sacrae theologiae restaurator dicitus, cui debent Hispaniae, quod veram Theologiae methodum illas docuerit . . . . Hic est qui omnia

The spirit of reform spread to other centers of learning and to other fields of activity. The universities of Alcalá and Coimbra began revamping their curricula. A spiritual reform of the religious orders also took place and even in this, Salamanca provided the impetus. Jean du Feynier, Master General of the Dominicans from 1532 to 1538, made a visitation of Spain and upon returning home, reported to his council that the convent at Salamanca was "the mother and source of all the brethren, the glory of Spain."[27] But the real source was Vitoria, for the reform was initially and fundamentally theological and Vitoria was, above all else, a theologian.

VITORIA'S INFLUENCE ON THE CHURCH

Spain, however, was well suited, relatively speaking, for the revival of learning. She had not felt the ferment and violence of the Protestant Reformation. She had not digressed to the point of radicalism through the seductive influence of the humanist renaissance. But conditions were not so favorable in the rest of Europe.

Pope Paul III had foreseen that an ecumenical council was the only cure for the festering wounds of the Church. He summoned the Council on June 2, 1536, but constant and complex difficulties arose. The Pope published as many as six bulls convoking afresh

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scholasticorum placita incredibili diligentia perlustravit, ut si quae inveniret contra D. Thomae doctrinam pugnare, eique quodammodo adversari, summa cura et ope adniteretur convellere et destruere. Sed etiam ipse est qui varia doctrinarum supellectile ornatus, dialecticae, philosophiae, sacrae scripturae et scientiae sanctorum cognitione instructus, omnia haec subsidia sibi comparavit, ut D. Thomae doctrinam augeret, locupletaret, illustrioremque redderet. In illius enim aevo emanaverunt putei aquarum . . . ." Bartolome de Medina, *Commentaria in I-II,* quoted by Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.,* p. 129.

[27] ". . . decrevimus conventui nostro Salmantino, qui mater et nutrix est omnium fere Fratrum, et gloria vestrae Provinciae . . ." *Bullarium Ordinis FF. Praedicatorum,* V, p. 570; see Beltrán de Heredia, O.P., *Historia de la Reforma de la Provincia de España* (Rome: Santa Sabina, 1939), p. 163.

the ecumenical assembly but it was not until 1545 that it actually convened at Trent. Twice the council was suspended; twice it resumed its sessions. The real work did not begin until 1560—twenty-four years after it had first been called.

On April 9, 1537, Vitoria was invited by the Pope to take part in the labors of the council as a special *peritus.* He was forced to decline, however, on the plea of persistent ill-health. Nonetheless, two of his students, Melchior Cano and Domingo Soto, were present at its history-making deliberations. Vitoria had provided a beautiful example of how reform should be undertaken: it must come from within, by a rejuvenation of the institutions already existing. The emphasis which the Council of Trent placed on scholasticism shows the definite influence of the Spanish Dominicans. Observing the contributions and numbers of Spaniards at Trent, one is forced to agree with Father Getino that it was "as Spanish as it was ecumenical."[28]

Had Vitoria himself attended the Council of Trent, we can be certain of his position on one of the key problems discussed there: the temporal power of the pope. Vitoria explicitly taught that the pope is "not civil or temporal lord of the whole world in the proper sense of the words 'lordship' and 'civil power'."[29] In proving this, he stated that since Christ did not possess temporal power over the world, and the pope's power is derived from Christ and not original, therefore the pope does not have this power. Vitoria denied that the popes had directly received from God any power over temporal matters—a rather bold view in that day; furthermore, he asserted that the direct power which they did receive from Christ pertained immediately to things spiritual: "The pope has temporal power only insofar as it is in subservience to matters spiritual, that is, insofar as it is necessary for the administration of spiritual affairs."[30]

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[28] Quoted by Kevin E. Fitzgerald, O.F.M., "The Reform Movement of Cardinal Francisco Ximinez de Cisneros," *Interest,* I (1961), p. 18; for an extensive study, see Venancio D. Carro, O.P., *Los Dominicanos y el Concilio De Trento* (Salamanca, 1948).

[29] Vitoria, *De indis, ed. cit.,* p. 135.

This teaching is none other than that of the "indirect power" of the pope—which was later to be elaborated by Robert Bellarmine. Indeed, it was because of this opinion that Pope Sixtus V, in 1590, placed Vitoria, along with Bellarmine, on the Index. However, a week later, before the Index could be published, Sixtus was dead. His successor, Urban VII, who reigned for but twelve days, had the names of Vitoria and Bellarmine immediately removed from the strange company with whom they had been listed.[31]

Vitoria was often consulted by the Emperor, Charles V, and there is some evidence that the prince actually attended his lectures at Salamanca.[32] In 1530, Charles sought his opinion on the validity of the arguments of Henry VIII, who was attempting to procure an annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon. The Emperor was concerned about the annulment not only because of its political implications, but also because Catherine was his aunt. The request occasioned Vitoria's *De matrimonio*, in which he treated the whole question in general terms and then declared that in the case of Henry and Catherine, the marriage was valid.

VITORIA'S INFLUENCE ON THE WORLD

Charles also asked Vitoria's advice on Indian affairs, which were becoming increasingly controversial between missionaries and members of his court. Many theologians, the most prominent of whom was Juan Sepulveda, supported the crown's conquest of the New World, but in general they advocated the exhaustion of peaceful means before resorting to force. Vitoria was well informed on the issues for he had remained in correspondence with two of his former

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[31] James Broderick, S.J., *The Life and Works of Blessed Robert Bellarmine* (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1928), vol. I, p. 276.

[32] Pfeiffer, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

pupils, Alonso de Veracruz and Domingo de Salazar, who were missionaries in the West Indies. Furthermore, the champion of the Indians' rights, Bartolomeo de Las Casas, had conferred with Vitoria on his frequent trips back to Spain.

Vitoria took up the rights of the oppressed Indians and the validity of Spain's desire to declare war in his *De indis* and *De jure belli.* He first established the legal status of the Indians, declaring that they possessed the same human rights as Spaniards, in spite of differences in intellectual capacity, religion, manners and customs. Next he boldly disproved the titles under which Spain claimed the New World, and proposed several legitimate titles for her colonization.[33]

In establishing these titles, Vitoria also explicated the principles for which he is now acknowledged as the "Father of International Law." He applied the traditional concept of *jus gentium* to nations as such instead of merely to individuals, so that it became truly "law among nations"—international law; he used the words *nationes* and *gentes* interchangeably, synonymously; he emphasized that *jus gentium* is rooted in the natural law not only as to the basic principles of human conduct, but also as to the principles of natural law governing custom (*consuetudo*) and agreement (*pactum*).[34] From a passage in *De potestate civili,* Vitoria's intention is made unquestionably clear:

> The law of nations has not only the force of a pact and agreement among men, but also the force of law; for the world as a whole, being in a way one single state, has the power to create laws that are just and fitting for all persons, as are those of the law of nations . . . . moreover, in the more important matters, such as the inviolability of ambassadors, it is not permissable for one country to refuse to be bound by the law of nations for it was established *by the authority of the entire world.*[35]

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[33] Vitoria, *De indis, ed cit.,* pp. 151ff.

[34] *Ibid.*; see Kurt Von Schuschnigg, *International Law* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1959), pp. 24-26.

[35] Vitoria, *De potestate civili,* sec. 21; cited by Scott, *op. cit.,* p. 59. Emphasis mine.

Such precision was not what Charles V had in mind when he asked Vitoria's views. The *relectiones* had, in theory, destroyed Spain's hopes of exploiting the Indians and their rich lands. Charles was incensed, and wrote the Prior of the Salamanca convent, complaining against the "excessive liberty taken by the theologian Vitoria in problems of such delicacy affecting the greatness of the empire."[36] This protest, however, only prompted Vitoria to go deeper into the matter.

As could be expected even in our day, Vitoria was strongly criticized for going beyond the domain of theology. But he was simply following the recommendations of the Dominican Constitutions, to which he had vowed his obedience, to show "how from the principles and doctrine of St. Thomas, contemporary problems can be solved."[37] In regard to the Indian controversy, he had stated that

> it is not for jurists to settle this question—at least not for jurists alone—for since the barbarians in question . . . were not subject to human law, it is not by human but by divine law that questions concerning them are to be determined. Now jurists are not skilled enough in the divine law to be able by themselves to settle questions of this sort . . . as the issue concerns the forum of conscience, its settlement belongs to the priests, that is, to the Church.[38]

Again, he wrote that "the office and function of a theologian is so broad that no argument, no question, no aid should seem foreign to the theological profession."[39]

In this lies the greatness of Vitoria. He impressed a new character on theology; he embellished and enlarged its scope; he united solidity of doctrine to an attractive literary style; he provided the method which theology was to follow in order to win back its place of honor; he implanted new life, fresh energies, noble ideas and a spirit of enthusiasm that remained for many generations of students at Salamanca. Not in vain is he considered the "Father" of the most glorious period of Spain's intellectual output.

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[36] Quoted by Nys, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

[37] ". . . doceatur quomodo ex principiis et doctrina S. Thomae huius temporis problemata solvi possunt." *Constitutiones Fratrum S. Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Romae: apud Domum Generalitiam, 1954), n. 665, par. II.

[38] *De indis, ed. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

[39] "Officium ac munus theologi tam late patet, ut nullum argumentum, nulla disputatio, nullus locus alienus videatur a theologica professione et instituto." Vitoria, *De potestate civili,* prolog.

M. HUMBERT EUSSEN, O.P.

GALILEO'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

I hold that there exists
nothing in external bodies but
size, shape, quantity, and motion.
Il Saggiatore

"The Downfall of Aristotle," a canonized phrase among some historians,[1] was heralded by Galileo's most original contributions—his telescopic discoveries and mechanical laws. Although both were to foster the scientific revolution, Galileo's most important contribution was more fundamental. His originality and fame are expressed in two titles which he coveted. In a letter to Cosmo II de Medici, Galileo requested that the prince honor him with the title of "ducal mathematician and philosopher."[2] This fusion of mathematician and philosopher in Galileo gave birth to a unique approach to nature and contributed to the origins of modern science.

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[1] See Charles Singer, *A Short History of Scientific Ideas* to 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 218-287.

[2] Galileo Galilei, "Letters on Sunspots," *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo,* ed. Stillman Drake (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1957), p. 64.

As a philosopher of nature, Galileo had a twofold purpose: to understand and explain physical phenomena, and to supplant Aristotle's natural science with a mathematical analysis of nature.[3] Galileo found the traditional natural philosophy an inaccurate account of nature, and therefore, he demanded that the physical world be reduced to mathematics. This function of mathematics would not only "save appearances," but also demonstrate nature's operations.

> Galileo never considered his mathematical description of nature to be a mere accounting for the known facts, a mere "saving of appearances"; it was for him the only true *demonstration* of the way nature acts. By "demonstration" Galileo understood a true, necessary and proper (*propter quid*) explanation, as described in the *Posterior Analytics*. In other words, Galileo considered a strictly natural science of nature to be incapable of offering such an explanation for natural events.[4]

In the *Posterior Analytics,* Aristotle states that we attain unqualified scientific knowledge, which Galileo sought, ". . . when we think we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and further, that the fact could not be other than it is."[5] Such perfect knowledge about natural things means to discover the principles, conditions, and elements. The method one must employ begins with the most general and proceeds to the less known and particular. Starting with sense perception, one advances from effect to cause.[6] Galileo, indeed understood Aristotle's method for he explains it in his writings.

[3] A. C. Crombie, *Medieval and Early Modern Science,* II (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), p. 143.

[4] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959), p. 84.

[5] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics,* I, 1, 71 a 8-12, trans. G. R. G. Mure, ed. Richard McKeon, *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 111.

[6] Aristotle, *Physics,* I, 1, 184 a 25, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, ed. Richard McKeon, *ed. cit.,* p. 218.

> I think it certain that he [Aristotle] first obtained it by means of the senses, experiments, and observations, to assure himself as much as possible of his conclusions. Afterwards he sought means to make them demonstrable. This is what is done for the most part in the demonstrative sciences; this comes about because when the conclusion is true, one may by making use of analytical methods hit upon some proposition which is already demonstrated, or arrive at some axiomatic principle.[7]

Galileo differs from Aristotle in that he reduces the physical world to a mathematical model and he holds that only what can be reduced to mathematics is real.

This article, in part, will consider Galileo's reason for asserting the physical world to be mathematical. We must analyze his complete philosophical approach to nature, i.e., reconstruct nature from his principles, and then determine why Galileo insists that his explanation is a proper explanation of nature.

The modern scientific method is essentially Galilean and therefore mathematical. It is very useful technique to save the facts, but one that leaves some question as to what the interpretation of the conclusion should be. By studying the historical foundation of modern science, namely, Galileo's method, perhaps we can better understand the problem which affects the scientist of today.

GALILEO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Galileo's conception of the universe is based on what he considers knowable and unknowable, what has objective existence and what is a product of the imagination. The objective in nature is absolute, immutable and mathematical. This is the object of our knowledge. The perfection of this knowledge Galileo finds to be of the same nature and of equal perfection in both the human and divine mind.

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[7] Galileo Galilei, "The First Day," *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems*, trans. Stillman Drake (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1953), p. 51. Henceforth we will use the abbreviation *Dialogue* for this translation.

He states that our knowledge intensively is as perfect as God's because the mind finds "success in understanding necessity" and therefore the greatest certainty. If we comprehend necessity, we have discovered the mathematical, which is nature. For Galileo, the search for understanding the cosmos ends here.[8]

Whereas the mathematical world is rigid and absolute, Galileo attributes to the sensible world—the world we experience through sensation—relativity, fluctuation, subjectivity. To discover the reality of nature is to understand figure, size, position, motion and number.[9] These are the primary qualities and ultimate compositions of the physical world. The secondary qualities generate opinions and, not infrequently, are contradictory.[10] To reduce all matter to measure, as we will see, Galileo resorts to atomism, which attributes to bodies a complete quantitative uniformity. With atomism, qualities, e.g., hot and cold, are explained by atoms acting on the senses.

> On the other hand, I find no need to apprehend it [a corporeal substance] as accompanied by such conditions as whiteness or redness, bitterness or sweetness, sonorousness or silence, well smelling or ill-smelling. If the senses had not informed us of these qualities, language and imagination alone could never have arrived at them. Therefore I hold that taste, colours, smells and the like exist only in the being that feels, which being removed, these qualities themselves vanish. Having special names for them we would persuade ourselves that these have real and veritable existence. But I hold that there exists nothing in external bodies for exciting tastes, smells, and sounds, but size, shape, quantity, and motion. If, therefore, the organs of sense, ears, tongues, and noses were removed, I believe that shape, quantity, and motion would remain, but there would be no more smells, tastes, and sounds. Thus apart from the living creature, I take these to be mere words.[11]

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[8] Giorgio de Santillana, "The Role of Art," *Critical Problems in the History of Science,* ed. Marshall Clagett (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1959), p. 42.

[9] Galileo Galilei, *Il Saggiatore,* q. 48; quoted by S. Singer, *op. cit.,* p. 246.

[10] For example, see "The Third Day," *Dialogue,* p. 280 ff.

[11] Galileo Galilei, *Il Saggiatore, loc. cit.*

Galileo means that the only objectively existing and essential properties are those which "excite in us these tastes, these odours, and these sounds."[12] He is not concerned with how primary qualities are known, i.e., he does not consider that the knowledge of quantities demands qualities. His doctrine seems to be quite the opposite—primary qualities cause subjective secondary qualities. Galileo eliminates qualitative differences from the physical world. But why is there such regularity in sense experience?

Galileo has no difficulty in answering this question. Nature is governed by necessity, through laws which never vary. In a letter to the Grand Duchess Christina, he writes:

> Nature . . . is inexorable and immutable; she never transgresses the laws imposed upon her or cares a whit whether her abstruse reasons and methods of operations are understandable to men. For that reason it appears that nothing physical which sense-experience sets before our eyes, or which necessary demonstrations prove to us, ought to be called into question . . .[13]

Above Galileo denied the existence of secondary qualities; this he seems to contradict here. However, he explains that, because there is necessity in nature, we cannot call into question what we experience through the senses. The inviolability of nature demands that we trust sense experience. Galileo's whole method begins with sense experience and proceeds by abstraction or intuition of those qualities which can be reduced to mathematical terms. Mathematics, then, continues on its own to demonstrate apart from any reference to the senses.[14] Although not all demonstrations can be proven experimentally, it is preferable to verify conclusions by experiments.

[12] Galileo Galilei, *Opere IV*, 336 ff; quoted by Edwin A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science*, 2nd ed. rev. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), p. 78.

[13] Galileo Galilei, "Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina," *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo, ed. cit.*, pp. 182-183.

[14] See Edwin Burtt, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

Humbert Eussen

GALILEO'S CONCEPT OF CAUSES

I

Galileo had abandoned the physical-causal approach to nature for a mathematical approach abstracting from physicl causes. To his mind, it was impossible to find natures or essences.

> For in our speculating we either seek to penetrate the true and internal essence of natural substances, or content ourselves with a knowledge of some of their properties . . . . In the same way I know no more about the true essence of earth or fire than about those of the moon or the sun for that knowledge is withheld from us until we reach the state of blessedness.But if what we wish to fix in our minds is the apprehension of some properties of things, then it seems to me that we need not despair of our ability to acquire this respecting distant bodies just as well as those close at hand.[15]

In a kinematic understanding, phenomena or observed regularities are only classified by a name. When studying the quantitative aspects of things, one can be indifferent to qualities; only mathematical statistics are of value. Galileo, denying objective existence to sense qualities, teaches that man, because of repeated experiences, names and eventually attributes existence to sense qualities. In the much quoted passage about gravity, he gives an example of his nominalism. The Aristotelian, Simplicio, states that the cause of a falling body is gravity, but immediately Salviato, Galileo's spokesman, replies:

> You are wrong, Simplicio; what you ought to say is that everyone knows what is called "gravity." What I am asking you for is not the name of the thing, but its essence, of which essence you know not a bit more than you know about the essence of whatever moves the stars around. I except the name which has been attached to it and which has been made a familiar household word by the continual experience that we have of it daily. But we do not really understand what principle or what force it is that moves stones downward, any more than we understand what moves them upward after they leave the thrower's hand, or what moves the moon around. We have merely, as I said, assigned to the first the more specific and definite name "gravity" . . .[16]

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[15] Galileo Galilei, "Letters on Sunspots," *ed. cit.*, p. 124.
[16] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 234.

However, this is not nominalism in the strict sense. Galileo does not deny the existence of universals in the physical world but he considers a search for them futile. Galileo eliminates a proper natural science by substituting mathematics as the true account of nature.[17]

II

Galileo, as a mathematician and philosopher, analyzes nature according to one principle: *nature is mathematical.*

> Philosophy is written in that vast book which stands forever open before our eyes, I mean the universe; but it cannot be read until we have learnt the language and become familiar with the characters in which it is written. It is written in a mathematical language, and the letters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without which means it is humanly impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth.[18]

After abandoning the search for essential natures, Galileo substitutes mathematical configurations in their place. Mathematical forms, which are more than exemplary causes are the structure of nature. Galileo does not distinguish between material bodies and the mathematical figures. They are identified. As A. C. Crombie notes: "Galileo denied the Platonic ontological distinction between geometrical figures and material bodies; so far as he saw, the physical world was geometry realized."[19] Therefore, the mathematical forms are not extrinsic patterns which nature imitates; rather, they are intrinsic structures of nature.

Mathematical structures, identified with physical existence, presuppose existing matter and not a potential principle to be actualized by a form. Matter must be uniform bodies lacking composition i.e., completely immutable, and differing from each other only in shape, size, motion, or rest. For Galileo, matter, in itself, is not the support of secondary qualities and change, but is inalterable, exact, and patterned to the elementary bodies themselves.[20] The elementary bodies undergo no intrinsic change, but merely change place to form a new body or unit.

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[17] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[18] Galileo Galilei, *Il Saggiatore;* quoted by Edwin Burtt, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[19] A. C. Crombie, *Medieval and Early Modern Science*, II, *ed. cit.*, p. 182.

The pattern of composition of these atoms constitutes the "essence" of a body. This basic structure we cannot know "until we reach the state of blessedness." Change, then can be sufficiently explained by an accidental, mechanical, and purely extrinsic change.

> If I fancy myself a body under one aspect, and by another very different, I cannot think it impossible but that it may happen by a simple transposition of parts without corrupting or engendering anything new . . .[21]

The varied secondary qualities that arise from a rearrangement of elementary bodies are only subjective sensations which the new product effects on the senses. Galileo repeats the atomism of Democritus.

> I propose for separating and resolving the whole of infinity at a single stroke . . . I think they [the Peripatetics] would be contented to admit that a continuous quantity is built up out of absolutely indivisible atoms, especially since this method, perhaps more than any other, enables us to avoid many intrinsic labyrinths, such as cohesion in solids . . . and the question of expansion and contraction, without forcing upon us the objectionable admission of empty spaces. Both of these can be avoided if we accept the above mentioned view of individual constituents.[22]

Indivisible units of matter conveniently explain contractions and rarefactions without admitting the impenetrability of matter or introducing empty spaces.[23] Therefore, matter is not a principle of "becoming," but a principle producing different effects and quantified variations by juxtaposition.

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[20] See Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue on the Great World Systems,* trans. Giorgio de Santillana (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1953), pp. 220-221, n. 76.

[21] "The First Day," *Dialogue,* p. 40.

[22] Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue Concerning Two New Sciences,* trans. Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1946), pp. 46-47. Henceforth this work will be referred to as *Two New Sciences.* It is interesting to observe here that Galileo, although he was trained in Aristotelianism at Padua, never understood the notion of potency. He resorted, rather, to atomism.

III

Galileo was rather explicit about the formal cause, geometrical patterns, and material cause, atoms, but he was obscure when he spoke of efficient causality in the physical world. In the case of gravity, as we saw above, "cause" is understood only as a name describing a given phenomenon. He also resorts to nominalism in the case of projectile motion. He assigns various names to the cause such as "impressed force," "assisting" or "abiding spirits" and "as the cause of infinite other motions we give Nature,"[24] but these terms have no meaning beyond names.

True to his mathematical conception of the physical world, Galileo, although he does not reject an efficient cause, does not want to be concerned with the problem, for already too many opinions have been given.[25]

Motion is given and he must explain how it accelerates, retards, changes direction, and stops. His principle is, therefore, that bodies are in their natural state when they are in motion. Although his ambition is to give a complete analysis, first he will carefully observe the operations of nature and then, perhaps, arrive at the primary causes.

If we are to understand what role efficient causality plays in Galileo's approach to nature, it is necessary to make some distinctions. Although there are many types of efficient causes—agents responsible for the effects produced—the distinction between efficient cause *in esse* and efficient cause *in fieri* suffices. The efficient cause *in esse* is the agent that constitutes a thing intrinsically. This cause is immediately a metaphysical question for Galileo; because of atomism

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[23] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

[24] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 234.

[25] *Two New Sciences*, p. 160.

God becomes the first efficient cause, a Mechanical Inventor, who set the physical world in motion.[26] Admittedly, this is a remote cause, but Galileo is not ready to discuss more proximate causes. Efficient causality *in fieri* is the subject of Galileo's studies. He distinguishes the agents of local motion (agents *in fieri*) into two kinds: 1) a primary cause, and 2) a secondary cause.

Galileo defines a primary cause as that fixed and constant cause which produces only one effect.[27] Of this type, Galileo simply says that inquiry into it ". . . is not really worthwhile."[28] He will not study this type of cause, but will only observe its effects. We can best describe this cause by saying it is universal or generic. Its effect does not depend on the intervention of forces; rather, it functions when there is no secondary cause acting upon a given body. For example, think of gravity, a name applied to a phenomenon; a body, which is falling, will continue in a straight line downward as long as no other force acts upon it. The effects of a primary cause proceed from matter itself, as we will see when considering motion.

A secondary cause Galileo defines as "that and no other is in the proper sense to be called a cause, at whose presence the effect always follows, and at whose removal the effects disappear."[29] This cause is specific or particular. Any alternation in motion proceeding from a primary cause is due to the addition of a new factor, a secondary cause. The effects of a secondary cause are not as determinable as those of a primary cause. Whereas uniformity is the property of a primary cause, a secondary cause is variable. A secondary cause may also bring about a change from one primary cause to another. For example, the course of a body may be dictated by inertia, a primary cause, but by the introduction of a secondary cause, such as resistance, another primary cause (namely gravity) may overcome inertia.

[26] Edwin Burtt, *op. cit.*, p. 90.
[27] "The Fourth Day," *Dialogue*, p. 445.
[28] *Two New Sciences*, p. 160.
[29] Galileo Galilei, *Opere IV*, 216; quoted by Edwin Burtt, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

With efficient causility and matter, consisting of elementary bodies, Galileo can only construct a mechanical world. Does this interplay of motions have any purpose or final cause? This question we must next investigate.

IV

With the physical world constituted of matter in motion, matter is absolutely uniform for all of nature and can only change place according to the laws of motion. Therefore, if we consider obedience to laws as final causality, Galileo has given a reason for nature's operations: motion acts on matter according to the laws laid down by the Creator. This perfect regularity causes consistent appearances and produces a perfectly ordered system.

Therefore, any discussion about final causality must be limited to a discussion of motion. Although we will study motion later, we can note here that motion is of two basic types: horizontal motion, and downward motion. Of the first Galileo explicitly states that it is infinite,[30] but concerning the second, he assumes a Platonic position:

> And I say that I believe that heavy things exist prior to the common center of gravity; hence it is not a center (which is nothing but an indivisible point and therefore incapable of acting) that attracts heavy materials to itself, but simply that these materials, cooperating naturally toward a juncture, would give rise to a common center, this being that around which parts of equal moments are arranged. From this I suppose that the large aggregation of heavy bodies being transferred to any place, the parts which are separated from the whole would follow, and if not impeded, they might penetrate wherever they might find parts less heavy than themselves. But upon arriving where they met with heavier material, they would descend no further.[31]

G. de Santillana, commenting on this passage, notes that Galileo is not completely disentangled from Aristotelianism and observed that Galileo is intuitively thinking of a gravitational field.[32] Aristotelian philosophy teaches that gravitation demands an intrinsic principle of spontaneous motion and a place in which a body finds its own fulfillment.[33] Galileo intends weight to be the first condition, but he leaves some ambiguity about the second. For him, the only necessity of a place is where matter congregates through a balance of forces. Matter collects if there is no one force greater than another when two bodies collide. Within a structure called "space," bodies collide with an equal force so that they "adhere" to each other and come to rest. Once this has taken place, the collection grows because it will interfere with the descent of other bodies. This does not explain *why* bodies descend.

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[30] *Two New Sciences*, p. 175.

[31] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, pp. 245-246.

[32] Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue on the Great World Systems*, trans. Giorgio de Santillana (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 261-262, n. 112.

Actually, Galileo has eliminated final causality from his study of nature. Only mechanical laws determine the order in nature. This rigid mechanical order he considers mathematically so that he is not interested in the structure of the phenomenon, but rather the necessary proportionality of quantities.

THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Galileo assures us that ". . . our discourses must relate to the sensible world and not to one on paper."[34] He does not intend to explain an arbitrary world. One could formulate an identification of nature and say that

> . . . nature . . . is the proper object of philosophy . . . and is accordingly excellently proportioned. . . . The constitution of the universe I believe may be set in first place among all natural things that can be known, for coming before all others in grandeur by reason of its universal content, it must also stand above them all in nobility as their rule and standard.[34]

To look for a more precise definition leads to rather ambiguous statements.

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[33] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Nature and Gravitation* (River Forest, Ill.: Albertus Magnus Lyceum, 1955), pp. 71-76.

[34] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 113.

[35] "Dedication," *Dialogue*, pp. 3-4.

Galileo has destroyed the distinction between natural, artificial, and violent. He uses the term "natural" when speaking of motion downward,[36] but he also asserts that motion upward by impetus is just as natural.[37] Galileo points out that to make a distinction is mere verbiage.[38]

> I know that you will not deny that the principle which moves heavy bodies downward is as natural and internal to these as is the principle which moves light ones upward is to those. Hence, I ask you to consider a ball of wood which, descending through the air from a great height and therefore moved by a natural principle, meets with deep water and continues its descent; without any external mover it submerges for a long stretch, and yet the downward motion through water is preternatural to it. Still, it depends upon a principle which is internal and not external to the ball. Thus you see how a movable body may be moved with contrary motions by the same internal principle.

Therefore, we may conclude that nature involves some internal principle responsible for motion. However, motion does not arise spontaneously from within a body; rather motion is gained through an external force or effected by weight. Galileo means that no motion does violence to a body because of principle that the natural state of bodies is motion.

There is no causal significance in the terms "violent" and "natural" as used by Galileo. Natural motion is accelerated motion downward, but the meaning of "natural" here is a classification. Violent motion is motion in any direction save downward.[39] Galileo seems to use the terms of the Schools, but gives them a new meaning. The terminology is Aristotelian, but Galileo's approach to nature is revolutionary. He reduced every observation to matter and motion. Although motion is an "internal principle" of bodies, matter and motion are two principles. Understanding their relation to each other, we can follow Galileo in his analysis of the universe.

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[36] *Two New Sciences*, p. 154.

[37] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 235.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[39] A. R. Hall, *The Scientific Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 88.

Matter

Since bodies are composed of "ultimate, indivisible, and infinitely small components"[40] called atoms, Galileo allows only those properties which can be quantified, because only these are *necessary* to physical things.

> Nevertheless I say, that indeed I feel myself impelled by the necessity, as soon as I conceive a piece of matter or corporeal substance, of conceiving that in its own nature it is bounded and figured in such and such a figure, that in relation to others it is large or small, that it is in this or that place, in this or that time, that it is in motion or remains at rest, that it touches another body, that it is single, few, or many; in short, by no imagination can a body be separated from such conditions.[41]

Galileo has found the language in which the book of nature is written by reducing matter to quantity.[42] The words these letters spell are number, size, shape, motion, and rest; only these can be measured and have objective existence.

Although all quantifying properties may be studied in the abstract, when studied in the concrete another factor must be considered, namely weight.

> I desire, before passing to any other subject, to call your attention to the fact that these forces, resistances, moments, figures, etc., may be considered either in the abstract, disassociated from matter, or in the concrete, associated with matter. Hence the properties which belong to figures that are merely geometrical and non-material must be modified when we fill these figures out with matter and therefore give them weight . . .[43]

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[40] *Two New Sciences,* pp. 40 and 154.

[41] Galileo Galilei, *Il Saggiatore,* q. 48; quoted by Edwin Burtt, *op. cit.,* p. 75.

[42] *Ibid.,* p. 64.

[43] *Two New Sciences,* pp. 108-109.

The addition of weight to mathematical nature bridges matter and motion. Because of weight, a body tends downward, and to this motion of descent, "we have . . . assigned the more specific and definite name "gravity."[44] This motion is most natural since it does not require an extrinsic force, but results from the body itself.

Motion

Since local motion is the condition for all change, the world becomes an interplay of mechanical forces producing different effects. Galileo divides local motion into three types: 1) uniform motion, 2) naturally accelerated motion, and 3) projectile motion.[45] These do not differ in quality, but only in quantitative measurements.

"Uniform motion . . . [is] one in which the distances traversed by the moving particle during equal intervals of time, are themselves equal."[46] This definition is the axiom to which other motions are compared. The relation between time and motion here is uniform, which Galileo conceives as two parallel continua.[47] Time receives its own objective existence and becomes a clock which measures motion. The real significance of uniform motion compared to time can only be understood by considering the other types of motion.

Naturally accelerated motion is the tendency of bodies downward because of weight. Galileo defines this motion: "a motion is said to be equally or uniformly accelerated when, starting from rest, its momentum (*celeritas momenta*) receives equal increments in equal times. . . ."[48] After giving this definition, Salviato continues:

> This definition established, the Author makes a single assumption, namely, the speeds acquired by one and the same body moving down planes of different inclinations are equal when the height of these planes are equal.

[44] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 234.

[45] *Two New Sciences*, p. 148.

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 140. Galileo illustrates time and motion as two parallel lines marked in proper proportion to each other.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-163.

This is Galileo's most original contribution to mathematical physics. To establish this definition (and assumption), he began by observing a stone now at rest, now falling with an increasing speed.[49] This motion is most simple for Galileo, because in it, he recognized an "intimate relationship between time and motion."[50] After considering the relation of time to motion, he immediately abstracts: "we conceive additions of speed as taking place without complications, i.e., without resistance resulting from friction, thus, we may *picture in our minds* a motion as uniformly and continuously accelerated."[51] Upon this, Galileo proceeds to formulate his definition.

The immediate jump from the experiment to the "picture in our mind" involves no difficulty for Galileo. He presumes this abstraction valid and true to complete reality because of "Ockham's razor": *frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora.*[52] According to Galileo's Platonic conception, the true operation of nature is that which acts with the greatest precision under mathematical necessity.

Later, he says that the uniform increase in acceleration can be demonstrated by rolling a ball down a polished surface, from which is deduced that the speed attained is the same as a free falling body, "all resistance and opposition having been removed."[53] This demonstration sufficiently proved that bodies accelerate uniformly,[54] that time and velocity are proportional,[55] and that the speed of descent is not dependent upon the substance of the body.[56] The speed of descent also, does not depend upon weight, a conclusion attributed to the legendary experiment from the tower of Pisa.[57] To arrive at these conclusions, Galileo removed all impediments and employed mathematical computation.

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[49] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 155.

[51] *Ibid.;* emphasis mine.

[52] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 123. "That is done in vain by many which is able to be done by less."

[53] *Two New Sciences*, p. 163.

[54] "The First Day," *Dialogue*, p. 21.

[55] *Two New Sciences*, p. 166.

[56] This conclusion can be readily drawn from Galileo's discussion on "The First Day," *Dialogue*, p. 24.

There is another factor that enters into the measurements of motion. This is mass. Motion results from mass, but this motion is accelerated motion downward. Mass, then, is another name for matter or a given quantity of matter;[58] it is not abstract matter, but concrete matter, i.e., matter with weight.[59] The internal resistance to motion is mass;[60] because of it, the momentum of a falling body is accelerated, but motion upward is retarded. Galileo considered the differences in weight to be counterbalanced by mass, and therefore, if there is no interference, all bodies would fall with equal acceleration.[61]

With the concept of mass, Galileo concluded that mass × velocity = momentum, or impetus.[62] However, impetus is not the cause of motion but simply an effect produced by a force. Galileo explains his formula by an experiment. Again reducing resistance as much as his crude experiments allowed he placed a ball on a polished inclined surface. He decreased the angle of the inclination by which

> . . . the impetus, ability, energy, or one might say, the momentum of descent of the moving body is diminished by the plane upon which it is supported . . . until finally on the horizontal plane

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[57] *Ibid.*, p. 223. Historians generally agree that Galileo did not perform this experiment. Simon Steven, in 1605, after dropping two lead balls of unequal weight from the leaning tower, concluded that weights of different size fall with equal velocity and thus proved Galileo correct. However, Giorgio Coresio and Vincenzo Renieri came to the opposite conclusion and proved that the velocity depends on the substance of the falling body, which is Aristotle's doctrine.

[58] Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue on the Great World Systems,* trans. Giorgio de Santillana, *ed. cit.*, p. 238.

[59] A. C. Crombie, "Galileo's Dialogues," *Dominican Studies,* III (1950), 125. See also, Galileo Galilei, *Dialogue on the Great World Systems,* trans. Giorgio de Santillana, *ed. cit.*, pp. 251-252, n. 106.

[60] A. C. Crombie, "Galileo's Dialogue," *art. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

[61] *Ibid.*

[62] "The Second Day," *Dialogue,* p. 214. This conclusion is drawn from Archimedes' law concerning the lever.

> the momentum vanished altogether; the body finds itself in a condition of indifference as to motion or rest, has no inherent tendency to move in any direction, and offers no resistance to being set in motion. For just as a heavy body or systems of bodies cannot of itself move upwards, or recede from the common center toward which all heavy things tend, so it is impossible for any body of its own to assume any motion other than one which carries it near the aforesaid common center. Hence, along the horizontal by which we understand a surface, every point of which is equidistant from this common center, the body will have no momentum whatever.[63]

Without any retardation or acceleration, horizontal motion would be infinite if the plane were infinite. This is the beginning of a definition of the law of inertia;[64] the problem is no longer to explain the cause of motion, but the change of motion. If we are to attribute any causality to impetus, it can merely be designated as a generic cause, which will produce infinite motion horizontally unless acted upon by another body.

> Furthermore we can remark that any velocity once imparted to a moving body will be rigidly maintained as long as the external causes of acceleration or retardation are removed, a condition which is found only on the horizontal planes; for in the case of planes which slope downwards there is already present a cause of acceleration, while on the planes sloping upward there is retardation; from this it follows that motion on a horizontal plane is perpetual; for if the velocity be uniform, it cannot be diminished or slackened, much less destroyed.[65]

Therefore; as long as there is no other force acting upon a body in motion, the body will continue in motion in the direction dictated by the projector. Stillman Drake points out that Galileo confined this principle of inertia to 1) rotating bodies, and 2) heavy bodies moving concentric with the earth.[66] When Galileo applies this principle to physical problems, he understands it to refer to bodies moving in a straight line and he neglects gravity in his computations.

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[63] *Two New Sciences,* p. 174.

[64] Stillman Drake, *op. cit.,* n. 8, p. 113.

[65] *Two New Sciences, loc. cit.*

[66] Stillman Drake, *loc. cit.*

There remains only one other kind of motion to be considered; this is projectile motion. It is a motion compounded of uniform motion and accelerated motion.[67] Galileo explains this type by the principle of inertia. Once a body is in motion, it will remain in motion if the horizontal plane is infinite. If the body can no longer be supported by the thrust forward, gravity will take over so that the pattern of the motion will describe a semi-parabola.[68] After going into some detail about projectile motion, Galileo concludes his tract on motion.

The category into which Galileo places all motion is *impetus*;[69] he considers motion as a fact that exists in bodies, and hence can say that motion is from an internal principle. Any change in motion results from an impact or force which is sufficient to overcome the mass × velocity of a body. Whether a body changes place or matter is rearranged within a body, both are due to a force. H. Weyl puts it very clearly.

> In the process of motion Galileo sees the dynamic intensity, the driving push, the impetus or momentum. Motion to him depends on the struggle of two tendencies, inertia and force, force that deflects the body from the path dictated by inertia. Mass is the dynamic coefficient according to which inertia resists the deflecting force.[70]

Galileo's basic and specific structure of nature depends, as we have seen, on the interplay of motions. C. Singer states that Galileo's science of mechanics was applicable to all visible and tangible objects, living and non-living.[71] Galileo reduced all nature to matter and motion. To mathematical-physics, it makes little difference what qualities a body manifests. For example, Galileo speaking of the flight of birds, mentions that the only difference between a bird and a

[67] *Two New Sciences*, p. 207.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

[69] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *Nature and Gravitation*, *ed. cit.*, p. 46.

[70] Herman Weyl, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science*, trans. Olaf Helmer (Princeton: University Press, 1949), p. 149.

[71] C. Singer, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

projectile is that one is moved by an external projector, while the other by an internal one.[72]

MATHEMATICS AND THE REAL WORLD

After Galileo had reduced nature to matter and motion, and admited only a mathematical conception of the world, we might well wonder what precise relationship mathematics has to the physical world. Is mathematics used only for convenience; for example, is matter said to be composed of atoms which are geometrically patterned merely to explain certain difficult problems, or is the relationship which Galileo intends real? With the Aristotelian Simplicio we might well object that the identification cannot be real and point out the great uncertainty which results from a strictly mathematical approach.[73] Galileo fails to answer the objection directly.

> I am not able to render the invisible world visible, nor do I think that you will ask this. But now that you mention gold, do not our senses tell us that metal can be immensely expanded? I do not know whether you have observed the method employed by those who are skilled in drawing wire . . .

As in the *Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems* where the same objection is raised,[74] Galileo answers with a geometrical demonstration. In the brief reply quoted above, Galileo fails to touch the real issue, namely, he does not take into consideration the limitations of a given quantity of gold. He proceeds with abstract quantity to demonstrate that gold can indeed be indefinitely expanded. By failing to distinguish between physical and mathematical quantity, the two become convertible; the limits of matter take on the unlimited mathematical ideal. Galileo explains this identity:[75]

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[72] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 186.
[73] *Two New Sciences*, pp. 50-51.
[74] "The Second Day," *Dialogue*, p. 203.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

> So that what happens in the concrete up to this point happens the same way in the abstract. It would be novel indeed if computations and ratios made in abstract numbers should not thereafter correspond to concrete gold and silver coins and merchandise. Do you know what does happen, Simplicio? Just as the computor who wants his calculations to deal with sugar, silk, and wool must discount the boxes, bales, and other packings, so the mathematical scientist (*filosofo geometra*), when he wants to recognize in the concrete the effects which he has proved in the abstract, but deduct the material hindrances, and if he is able to do so, I assure you that things are in no less agreement than arithmetical computations. The errors, then, lie not in abstractness or concreteness, and not in geometry or physics, but in a calculator who does not know how to make a true accounting.

Any calculating about the universe, therefore, is only approximate, and the degree of accuracy depends upon the method. Once a scientist has attained the proper way of approaching nature without intervention of secondary qualities, he can treat the world scientifically.[76] The basis for this assertion can be seen from Salviato's answer to Sagredo's delight in the rigid demonstration of mathematics. "The knowledge of a single fact acquired through a discovery of its mathematical causes prepares the mind to understand and ascertain other facts without need of recourse to experiment."[77]

This is part of Galileo's analytic method. After considering the facts of the phenomenon, he no longer depends on experiments to form hypotheses. Lastly, these hypotheses must be demonstrated.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that Galileo identified mathematics and physics, abstract and concrete quantity, so that his analysis of nature is mathematical realism. With mathematics, he sought to embrace all of nature and whatever could not be placed in a mathematical formula either was subjective or lacked existence altogether.[78] Besides

[76] *Two New Sciences*, p. 242.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 264.

[78] J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., *The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages, ed. cit.*, p. 84.

experimental verification, there was another way to make statements about existence.[79] Galileo believed this was mathematics.

Viewing the world as a mathematical structure, Galileo united mathematics and physics, thereby creating mathematical physics. Since proper principles alone explain the reason why a predicate necessarily belongs to a subject,[80] with Galileo's synthesis of mathematics and physics, a mathematical property necessarily belongs to nature. Therefore, Galileo did not recognize any proper natural principles and insisted that his mathematical approach to nature gave a proper (*propter quid*) explanation. But the mathematician, abstracting quantity from the physical world, idealizes it and gives it immutability.[81] Galileo gives us an example of this when he considers horizontal motion. He explains that it is infinite, but he leaves out one factor, which as far as experience proves, is an essential constituent in the study of motion. This is gravity; and because of it, *de facto* horizontal motion cannot be infinite.

We can say that mathematics helps us to understand nature, but we must realize that it cannot give a complete account of natural things; it deals with measurements of effects, quantities, which are only part of a dynamic universe. Although mathematics is of great value in the study and control of nature, the human mind is not satisfied until it understands reality as fully as possible. The human mind with its universal curiosity will not rest until it knows not just the effects of a phenomenon, but knows and understands the phenomenon itself. Such complete knowledge Galileo's natural philosophy cannot give.

[79] A. C. Crombie, "Galileo, Descartes and Metaphysics," *The Month*, V (1951), 356.

[80] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 7, 75 a 40 ff, *ed. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

[81] Aristotle explains this briefly when he states: "Now the mathematician, though he treats of these things [surfaces, volumes, lines and points of physical bodies], nevertheless does not treat them as limits of a physical body; nor does he consider the attributes of such bodies. That is why he separates them; for in thought they are separable from motion, and it makes no difference, nor does any falsity result, if they are separate." *Physics*, II, 2, 193 b 32-35, *ed. cit.*, pp. 121-122.

JEROME J. LANGFORD, O.P.

CAMPANELLA
ON
SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM

I must confess
I do not understand
how destruction of the authority of Holy Scripture
will result from the doctrines of Galileo.
On the contrary,
to inquire is to find riches.
Apologia pro Galileo

The seventeenth century was pre-eminently the century of scientific revolution. It witnessed the fall of the logical, ordered, and earth-centered Aristotelian cosmology, and the rise of a new conception of the universe and the laws which govern it. It is true that many doctrines which were basic to this new science came from earlier times and thinkers. But it was not until Galileo, Kepler, and Newton, that the revolutionary science was formulated and supported well enough to challenge and replace the traditional cosmology.

Partly due to its novelty, partly because of its sudden appearance as a worthy rival of the traditional system, the new science found a majority of intellectuals unprepared to meet and examine it with open minds. This reaction is hardly unique to the seventeenth century. Well-founded traditions seldom yield without a multitude of protests. When Galileo turned his telescope on the heavens in 1609 and published his findings a year later in his *Siderius nuntius,* the reaction was generally one of skeptical disbelief. When Galileo and Kepler denied many of the basic tenets of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic universe and came out in favor of the heliocentric Copernican astronomy, the feelings of the opposition progressed from annoyance to hostility. Many philosophers could not believe that the earth is not the center of the universe, but merely another planet revolving around the sun. Furthermore, they were far from willing to concede that the book of nature is written only in the language of mathematics. The fact that the proofs which Galileo and Kepler offered for the Copernican system were blatently undemonstrative should help us to understand that not all of the opposition which met the infant modern science came from inertial stupidity. As Professor E. A. Burtt has pointed out:

> It is safe to say that even had there been no religious scruples whatever against the Copernican astronomy, sensible men all over Europe, especially the most empirically minded, would have pronounced it a wild appeal to accept the premature fruits of an uncontrolled imagination, in preference to the solid inductions, built up gradually through the ages, of men's confirmed sense experience. In the strong stress on empiricism, so characteristic of present day philosophy, it is well to remind ourselves of this fact. Contemporary empiricists, had they lived in the sixteenth [or even the seventeenth] century, would have been the first to scoff out of court the new philosophy of the universe.[1]

Most theologians also opposed the new science. They saw that a heliocentric astronomy involved changes in man's basic outlook on the universe. From one point of view, it removed man from his privileged place at the center of God's creation. Furthermore, it seemed to be in direct contradiction to the words of Sacred Scripture.

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[1] E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), p. 38.

Protestant and Catholic theologians alike opposed it on that score.[2] Catholic theologians were especially sensitive in the areas of Scripture and authority; less than a century had passed since the Reformation. The general tendency of Catholic theologians was to see the astronomy and physics championed by Galileo as an attack on the cosmology which was unofficially, but traditionally accepted by the Church as being in accord with reason and revelation.

Perhaps the most notable exception to the conservatism of theologians and the suspicious attitude which they manifested with regard to the scientific and philosophical innovations, was the Dominican friar, Thomas Campanella. Campanella's ideas on science and its freedom have seldom been correctly understood. Not a few historians of science refer to Campanella in connection with the famous prohibition of Copernicus' *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium* by the Congregation of the Index in 1616 and the condemnation of Galileo by the Holy Office in 1633. They remark, in effect, that here was one cleric at least who rebelled against ecclesiastical authority and came out in favor of Galileo and scientific truth. This is true only with important qualifications. He did not rebel against ecclesiastical authority as such, but he did point out the limits of this authority with regard to scientific questions. And he declared for Galileo's right to speculate, but not for his scientific doctrines. We must place Campanella's true doctrine on the freedom of science in the delineating context of his life and times.

LIFE, WORKS, AND INFLUENCE

Giovanni Campanella was born on September 5, 1568 at Stilo in Calabria, Italy. Not much is known about his early life. But there can be no doubt that he was a very talented youth. By the time he was thirteen years old, he was a fluent author of pose and poetry and had read a number of the works of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. At the age of fourteen he joined the Dominican Order, receiving the name of Brother Thomas. After his novitiate training, he began his study of philosophy. His superiors, recognizing the mental ability of the young religious, sent him to several convents in Calabria to hear the best lecturers in the Province.

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[2] Martin Luther in his *Tischreden*, P. Melanchton in his *Initia doctrinae physicae*, and the Jesuit astronomer-theologian Christopher Clavius in his *Commentary on the Sphere of Sacrobosco* had all questioned how the new astronomy could be possible when it obviously contradicted the words of Sacred Scripture.

In the course of his education, probably at the age of nineteen or twenty, Thomas came across a work of the Italian philosopher, Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588). He was deeply impressed with Telesio's animistic philosophy and his rejection of the commonly-held Aristotelian natural philosophy. At an early stage of his intellectual development, and for various reasons, Campanella openly revolted against the dogmatic authority generally conceded to Aristotle. First of all, it seemed to him an insult to the faith that "we have begged our philosophy from the condemned Gentiles, as if we would make them our superiors."[3] He admitted that "St. Thomas, by creating an antidote from venom, expounded Aristotle for the benefit of the Catholic faith."[4] But a philosophy to be true, must be wholly Christian. In his monumental *Metaphysics,* as in most of his philosophical writings, Campanella frequently argued from theology, the Fathers, and Holy Scripture. True philosophy must be illuminated by faith. Only Gentiles and heretics have "presumed to circumscribe divine truth and to place the gleaming lamp of Scripture under the Aristotelian bushel."[5] Another reason for opposing Aristotle was the fact that the seventeenth-century Aristotelians had given up the observation of nature and busied themselves almost entirely with the citation and comparison of texts. They had given up philosophy in favor of philology. Aristotle would never have admitted such a procedure as philosophical, for it rendered philosophy stagnant and closed off the possibility of continual improvement. Aristotelian philosophy suffered because of these misguided adherents.

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[3] Campanella, *Apologia pro Galileo,* trans. Grant McColley, *Smith College Studies in History,* 22, n. 3-4 (April-July, 1937), p. 32. All subsequent references to the *Apologia* will be to this translation which I have adopted with several necessary modifications.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Campanella's opposition to everything Aristotelian made him highly suspect in the eyes of his contemporaries. Since about the fifteenth century, Aristotelian philosophy, Christianized by St. Thomas, had enjoyed an unofficial but quite positive acceptance by Catholic theologians.[6]

Campanella's first work, *Philosophia sensibus demonstrata,* published in 1590, was an appeal, basically Telesian, to re-establish philosophy on sense experience rather than on textual criticism. The idea of sense experience so captivated the Dominican that he thought that all bodies in the universe must be animated by sensitive souls:

> Campanella's natural philosophy, like that of Telesio, is animistic in character, for he thinks that the reciprocal action of things, and especially the mutual attraction of opposing forces would be inconceivable unless they were animated. In order to be able to work on one another they must feel one another.[7]

Even though he preserved his theological orthodoxy by noting that these sensitive souls were material and that only the intellectual soul of man was immaterial and created by God to participate in being for all eternity, this and other doctrines aggravated Aristotelians and theologians.

From October, 1592 until the end of 1594, Campanella studied at the University of Padua. It was here that he formed a lasting friendship with Galileo, who had recently been appointed to the chair of mathematics at that University. Friar Thomas felt that here was a kindred soul, a man who openly questioned the authority of Aristotle, and for that reason, had been forced to leave the University of Pisa in favor of Padua. Their views had this in common, they both advocated a direct study of nature. But while Galileo was a builder of the new science, Campanella was only its exaltor, its cheering prophet.

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[6] By accepting St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophical works, Catholic scholars were, implicitly at least, approving also of Aristotle. By the year 1430, the Dominican Hermann Korner could write: "Among all the modern Doctors, there is none whose doctrine is so eagerly read, whose books are so closely followed by teachers, and whose writings are so widespread in all the universities of the world as are those of St. Thomas." Cited by J. Berthier, *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas, Doctor Communis Ecclesiae* (Rome: 1914), p. 54.

[7] Harald Höffding, *A History of Modern Philosophy* (New York: Dover, 1955), I, p. 152.

Campanella's opposition to Aristotle, his defense of a new and somewhat occult concept of nature, together with some of the imaginative opinions which can be found throughout his writings, brought him to the attention of the Holy Office in 1595.[8] Two years later, he was informed that the charges against him had been examined and judged in his favor. But his troubles were only beginning. In August, 1599, a conspiracy to overthrow the Spanish government of Naples was discovered. The authorities believed that the Dominican Friar, then thirty years old, was responsible for the plot. On September 6, he was arrested in Calabria and brought to Naples for trial. He was charged with heresy as well as political rebellion, so that his trial was simultaneously ecclesiastical and secular.[9] It was claimed that he had predicted the fall of the Spanish government by astrology and that he was involved with the practice of magic. Campanella wrote in self defense:

> Now they have made me a rebel and a heretic, because I predict signs in the sun, moon and stars against the Aristotelian doctrine that the world is eternal. They, because they are Machiavellian at heart, interpret this "crime of rebellion" as a great movement and they think that every thought and undertaking is aimed at political domination, and they have cast me, like Jeremia, into the dungeon.[10]

The Spanish government wanted to sentence him to death for treason. He was tortured seven times, once for forty consecutive hours, in an effort to extract a confession. A contemporary wrote that despite the pain, "he did not utter one word unworthy of a man of his wisdom."[11] He did not confess and it is difficult to say whether or not he was guilty of treason or heresy. Some historians think that he had already conceived the political scheme which he was to develop in the *De civitate solis,* written some thirty years later. Campanella's utopian City of the Sun was to be a community ruled by philosopher-priests, though without hierarchy or monarchy. Goods would be held in common, professions based on individual ability, and remuneration according to each member's particular needs. Campanella wrote that:

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[8] Apparently some zealous ecclesiastic stole Campanella's manuscripts from him and forwarded them to the Holy Office. See Quetif-Echard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Paris: Lutetia, 1721), II, p. 505.

[9] See P. Mandonnet, art. "Campanella," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* II, 2, 1443.

[10] Campanella, cited by Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.,* 506.

> There dwell now seventy thousand men in the town of Naples; of these scarcely ten to fifteen thousand labor, and they are worn out by excessive, continuous, and daily work; while the rest take their ease, or fall into a state of apathy, envy, weakness, sensuality, and pleasure seeking. But in the City of the Sun, where menial services, arts, tasks, and occupations are shared among all men, no one need work more than a short four hours a day; the rest of the time can be used in the acquirement of knoweldge in pleasant ways, in discussions, reading, narrating, writing, walking, or in joyous exercise of the mind and body.[12]

The City of the Sun was probably nothing more than a poetic flight of his philosophical imagination. In his *Metaphysics* which was written during his imprisonment though not published until 1638, Campanella strongly advocated a universal theocracy with the Pope as the ruler of an all-Christian world. The contrast between the two social systems is too great to be ignored. Some authors attempt to reconcile the two systems by explaining that Campanella wanted to see a universal theocracy established so that he could then train missionaries in his doctrine of "natural" Catholicism and send them out to convert the world to the principles of the City of the Sun. Proponents of this explanation point out that Campanella thought that the millenium was immanent, because, according to his philosophi-

[11] Janius Nicius, cited by Quetif-Echard, *op. cit.*, 505.
[12] Campanella, *The City of the Sun*, cited by Höffding, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

cal beliefs, the sun, which was the center of heat and love would soon absorb the earth, the center of cold and hate. He felt that the City of the Sun would be the ideal social system for the millenium. At any rate, the precise nature of the plot against the Spanish rule in Naples, and Campanella's exact role in it remain unknown. The fact remains that he was found guilty of treason and sentenced to perpetual arrest in the Fortress of Naples.

Thomas continued to study and write while in prison. A number of his manuscripts were entrusted to a friend, Tobias Adam, and published in Frankfort, Germany. He was permitted to correspond with the leading intellectuals of his time and in this way he kept up with the latest trends in science and philosophy. Campanella had many high ranking admirers. Popes Clement VIII, Paul V, and Urban VIII all respected his talents, as did Cardinals deLuca and Gaetani. In 1626, Pope Urban VIII persuaded King Philip IV of Spain to grant Campanella his freedom after twenty-seven years of imprisonment. Campanella then went to Rome, but he was not completely free until the Holy Office gave him an official and complete pardon on April 6, 1629. He remained in Rome until 1634 when another Calabrian plot was discovered. Since it had been engineered by one of Campanella's disciples, the Pope advised him to escape to France to avoid another trial at the hands of the Spanish. King Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu welcomed him to France. Richelieu granted him a liberal pension and he lived the rest of his seventy one years studying and writing at the Dominican convent of St. Honoré in Paris. He died on May 21, 1639.

Campanella is regarded as one of the most important philosophers of the late Renaissance period. His doctrines, developed in some eighty-eight works, were somewhat novel though not fundamentally original. Much of his philosophy is little more than a strange combination of concepts culled from St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas, Zeno, Arabian and Jewish thinkers, and even from Aristotle. He possessed an encyclopedic memory and often cited, with astounding accuracy, passages which he had read years before.

Campanella's genius was largely undisciplined. He could not confine himself to forming a complete and logical system. His imagination was frequently captured by the mysteries of magic and astrology.[13] Still he contributed many important insights for which he deserves to be remembered. He is credited with contributing to Gassendi's concept of space, which in turn was a key element in the Newtonian synthesis.[14] Prior to Descartes, he demonstrated the absurdity of skepticism.[15] And it was Campanella who offered what turned out to be the correct method for solving the famous Galileo conflict, and, in fact, any other apparent discrepancy between Holy Scripture and science.

THE GALILEO CASE

To provide the context for Campanella's ideas on the relations between theology and science, we must recall, briefly, the main points of the Galileo case.[16] In 1609, Galileo turned his newly constructed telescope on the heavens and made several important discoveries. He saw that the moon was not a perfect sphere as had been thought, but was marred with mountains and craters. He discovered the satellites of Jupiter which enabled Copernicans to point out that if Jupiter could move around the earth without leaving behind its satellites, then the earth could move around the sun without losing its satellite, the moon. In 1610 Galileo recorded the phases of Venus. As E. J. Dijksterhuis comments:

> Galileo regarded his discoveries as being so many arguments in favor of the Copernican system. From an objective point of view, of course, they were not. There was not a single one that could not

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[13] See Lynn Thorndike, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), XII, pp. 291-301, and D. P. Walker, *Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella* (London: The Wartburg Institute, 1958).

[14] See Max Jammer, *Concepts of Space* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 32-33 and 91-92.

[15] See Campanella's *Metaphysics* (Paris: 1638), Part I, Bk. V.

[16] For a more detailed account of the Galileo affair, see my "The Condemnation of Galileo" in *Reality*, 8 (1960), 65-78.

> have been accounted for in the Ptolemaic system. They could indeed serve to demonstrate the baselessness of certain objections to the Copernican system . . . but they could not compel men to accept it.[17]

The university Aristotelians saw the system of their Master being challenged and they came forth in its defense. Aside from some rather inane objections to Galileo's discoveries, they did have several strong points in their favor. Aristotle himself had pointed out that if the earth moved, a stellar displacement or parallax would be observable. Since none had never been recorded, the evidence seemed to be against Copernicus. The laws of physics and the common sense experience of all mankind also seemed to rule out a moving earth. Perhaps the most potent, though non-scientific, objection to the new astronomy came from Sacred Scripture. Had not Josue ordered the sun to stand still? The Book of Ecclesiastes testified that "The sun also arises and the sun goes down, and hastens to the place where he arose; and there whirling about continually, goes toward the south and turns about into the north."[18] Psalm 18 stated that "The sun is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoices as a strong man to run a race. His going forth is from the end of the heavens, and his circuit unto the ends of it . . .[19] As Galileo campaigned for acceptance of the new astronomy, the opposition came to center on the Scriptural objection and the issue was brought into the realm of theology.

Traditional exegesis favored a strict literalist interpretation of the texts in question. The Protestant Reformation, with its accent on private interpretation under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, insured a sensitively conservative attitude toward Scripture on the part of Catholic theologians. As Galileo began to imply that he had demonstrated his theory, the theologians warned him to stay in the area of hypothesis and not to declare for the Copernican system as a fact. Cardinal Robert Bellarmine gave the unofficial, but quite definite, view of theologians on the matter in his *Letter to Foscarini.* Galileo answered in his *Letter to the Grand Duchess Christina.* The gist of these letters was that Bellarmine advocated keeping the strict literalist interpretation as the only possible interpretation unless and until the new opinion was scientifically demonstrated. Galileo, after first pointing out that Scripture does not teach science, bows to this principle and then *implies* that the Copernican theory already is backed by sufficient proof. Late in 1615 Galileo went to Rome and helped force the Church into taking an official stand on the new astronomy.

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[17] E. J. Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the World Picture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 382.

[18] Josue, 10:12-13; Ecclesiastes, 1:5-8.

[19] Psalm 18:6-8.

It was then that Cardinal Boniface Gaetani wrote to Campanella and asked his views on the matter. The fact that Gaetani wanted Campanella's opinion is significant. It shows that the issue was still undecided as far as some high officials in Rome were concerned. It also shows the respect which Campanella received as a theologian whose opinion was considered valuable.

APOLOGIA PRO GALILEO

Campanella answered Cardinal Gaetani's request by writing the *Apologia pro Galileo.* This document presents a clear analysis of the *theological* aspects of the dispute. It does not examine the scientific arguments, but concentrates on whether or not Galileo should be free to construct his new philosophy or whether he and his doctrine should be condemned in the name of Patristic tradition and Holy Scripture.

The *Apologia* consists of five chapters. In the first chapter, Campanella lists eleven of the arguments used by philosophers and theologians against Galileo. The first two are accusations that Galileo has introduced innovations which contradict Aristotelian philosophy and the unanimous opinion of the Fathers of the Church. Objections three to seven are Scriptural passages which seem to rule out a heliocentric astronomy. The eighth objection scores as unbelievable Galileo's doctrine that the heavens are corruptible. The next is that he has postulated a plurality of worlds, thereby endangering the dogma of the Redemption. Arguments ten and eleven *contra* Galileo claim that it is better to renounce novelties than to try to decide questions beyond our capabilities.

In chapter two, the Dominican records the arguments commonly cited in support of Galileo. Campanella points out that nearly seventy years had passed since Pope Paul III, to whom Copernicus dedicated his *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium,* approved the work. In those seventy years many great men such as Reinhold, Maestlin, Kepler, Gilbert, and Magini had accepted and advanced the Copernican theory. Thus if it is true that:

> Galileo has made no additions to the system advanced by Copernicus, and if the *De revolutionibus* does not adversely affect Catholic faith, neither does the work of Galileo.[20]

Another argument for Galileo is that:

> Because heaven is immobile, Holy Scripture names it the Firmament. The earth therefore must rotate, and the sun stand in the center of the world. As Copernicus and his followers prove and the followers of Ptolemy now admit, this system explains all phenomena and accords with all principles of mathematics.[21]

In this chapter, Campanella is merely reporting the arguments which support the view that the Copernican system should not be prohibited by the Church. Campanella was not personally convinced that the new astronomy was the true system of the universe. He does not try try to adduce scientific evidence in its support. His main purpose was to protect Galileo's right to philosophize freely. Campanella was especially interested in fostering this freedom because he wanted to see a truly Christian-authored philosophy develop. Should the works of Copernicus and Galileo, both Catholics, he prohibited in favor of the pagan Aristotle?

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[20] Campanella, *Apologia pro Galileo,* p. 9.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 13.

> Because knowledge should be Christian, they lack understanding who forbid and prohibit philosophy among the followers of Christ. They are similar to the Emperor Julian, who outlawed and interdicted all the sciences of the Christians.[22]

Chapter three lays down certain indispensable prerequisites for arriving at a solution of the problem. For anyone to be a judge in this matter, he must not only know Holy Scripture and the Fathers, but science as well. Campanella reminds whoever might judge the case that:

> Anyone who forbids Christians the study of philosophy and the search for knowledge, likewise forbids them to be Christians. The law of the Christians commends all knowledge to them because they need not fear what is false.[23]

He would also have any judge bear in mind that:

> . . . not all that is false is injurious to Scripture. It must directly or indirectly destroy the true meaning. In addition, if a theologian has advanced doctrines which apparently are equally or more opposed to Holy Scripture than are the theories of Galileo, he is neither condemned nor prohibited from making further inquiry. It is by such inquiry that he determines whether or not the doctrines which he has advanced are sound. He does not thereby impugn faith, but rather, opens truth to the soul.[24]

The Dominican Friar makes a point of noting that no philosopher or theologian had yet formulated a wholly satisfactory system of the universe, and thus:

> It is an essential part of the glory of the Christian religion that we permit [Galileo's] method of discovering new knowledge and of rectifying the old.[25]

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[22] *Ibid.*, p. 14.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

He is severely critical of anyone who would make his own unofficial interpretation of Scripture as authoritative as Scripture itself.

> I have shown that liberty of thought is more vigorous in Christian countries than it is in other nations. Now if this be true, whoever on his own proscribes limits and laws for human thought and thinks his action is in harmony with the dictates of Holy Scripture, he is not only irrational and dangerous, but irreligious and impious as well. And I say the same of anyone who teaches and accepts no interpretation but his own, and subjects Scripture to his beliefs or to those of some other writer. Such a practice exposes Holy Scripture to the jest of unbelievers and heretics.[26]

Using St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine as his authorities, he warns against too literalist an interpretation of the texts in question.

> In the preface to his *Tract Against the Errors of the Greeks,* St. Thomas states: 'I first assert that many Scriptural passages do not pertain to dogmas of faith, but rather to doctrines of philosophy. It does great violence to such passages to affirm or deny them as if they are dogmas.' . . . St. Augustine expresses a similar view in the first chapter of his *Commentary on Genesis*: 'It is greatly to be guarded against, and is pernicious and shameful for a Christian to speak of physical phenomena as if he were discussing Scripture.' . . . It therefore appears to me desirable that we understand that the spheres of philosophy and of our faith do not conflict, and that theories of philosophy are not to be defended as though they were dogmas of faith.[27]

And, Campanella cautions,

> If Galileo has demonstrated conclusively the things which he asserts, there will ensue among heretics no slight mockery of our Roman theology. This is particularly true since both the heliocentric hypothesis and the telescope have been received with avidity by many men in Germany, France, England, Poland, Denmark, and Sweden. If Galileo's hypothesis is false, it will not disturb theological doctrine, for not all that is untrue is contrary to faith. Indeed if everything false were contrary to faith, our discoveries of the errors made by some Saints when treating of natural philoso-

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[26] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

> phy would make them heretics. If Galileo's theory is unsound, it will not endure. I believe therefore that his type of philosophy should not be forbidden.[28]

In chapter four, Campanella replies to the objections against Galileo which were listed in chapter one. He points out that many Fathers and Doctors are agreed that Sacred Scripture does not supply sufficient evidence on which to construct or prohibit any cosmological system. When an inspired author makes a reference to some physical or astronomical phenomenon, he does not do so to furnish the elements of a scientific theory, but speaks *secundum apparentias*. The message of the Bible is religious, not scientific. Even if the sacred authors had somehow known that the earth moves, prudence would have demanded that they not propound it lest they render their readers incredulous At any rate, they went by what appeared to their senses. They were in no way making a scientific judgment on the reality of solar motion. It was not their message nor their intention to teach astronomy.

No Church Father, in interpreting these texts, held that the motion of the earth was a matter of faith. As a matter of fact, many Fathers give radically different interpretations to the texts in question. Thus, "Neither the Fathers nor the Scholastics definitely concluded that the earth stands still and the heavens are moved."[29] What unanimity there is among the Fathers on the motion of the sun comes not from the authority of Scripture or from their desire to consider it as a matter of faith, but is merely the opinion suggested by common sense experience, which has validity so long as science does not bring forth strong arguments to the contrary. Campanella goes on to cite many texts which seem to *favor* a moving earth. He does this to show the theologians in Rome that the Scriptures can be interpreted in support of both sides of the controversy.

In the fifth and final chapter, Campanella examines the arguments presented in favor of Galileo in chapter two. Campanella admits that in some of his writings he had tried to refute the arguments of Pytha-

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 36-37.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

goras and Copernicus. And he confesses that since Galileo's discoveries, he has had to change a number of his opinions. But he still has his reservations with regard to the new astronomy: "The hypothesis of Copernicus and Galileo is probable, not true [i.e., not demonstrated]."[30] In his *Metaphysics,* composed almost entirely during his imprisonment, the Dominican Friar held for a geocentric system. In an appendix to this work, he added, in 1626, an account of Galileo's discoveries and said that he did this so that if Galileo's doctrines were true, the Catholic faith would not be mocked as not even knowing them.[31] Also, Campanella had written to Galileo in 1610 to tell him that he was thrilled by the Florentine scientists's great discoveries. But he advised Galileo that, in his opinion, "Many Copernican doctrines will have to be changed by you."[32] Campanella very probably considered the Copernican system to be a solid theory backed by experimental evidence. But he did not come out in unqualified support of it. This was not because he feared the Church, but because he was not completely convinced that it was true. He concluded the *Apologia* by saying that:

> . . . it is unnecessary that the investigations of Galileo be suppressed, a misfortune which is about to occur. Our enemies will seize eagerly on this action and proclaim it abroad.[33]

CONCLUSION

The *Apologia* has its logical flaws, a subjective prejudice against everything Aristotelian, and several theological wanderings. But on the whole, it is an amazing document. It contains a workable solution for all apparent discrepancies between Scripture and science. Campanella holds that any scientific theory which directly or indirectly is opposed to a doctrine of faith, must be condemned. For example, a mechanistic conception of man which excludes an immortal soul could be condemned on the authority of Scripture. But any passage of Scripture whose meaning has not been infallibly defined by the Church or unanimously interpreted by the Fathers as a matter of faith, is open to more than one possible interpretation. Now it is true that a tradition of accepted exegesis and the common agreement of theologians can give a probable meaning to a text. But unless this interpretation is defined by the Church or is the unanimous exegesis of the Fathers who explicitly declare it to be a matter of faith, it remains a fallible, however probable, interpretation.

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. 70.

[31] Campanella, *Metaphysica,* Part III, Bk. XI, ch. 16, p. 71.

[32] *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei, Edizione Nazionale,* ed. A. Favaro (Florence: 1890-1909), XII, p. 21.

[33] Campanella, *Apologia pro Galileo*, p. 74-75.

Applying this to the case at hand, we can see how the theologians could and should have reconciled the new astronomy with the Sacred Scriptures. Since Scripture does not intend to teach science, it is not to be appealed to as establishing one astronomical system or forbidding another. Not one Father of the Church thought that the geocentric system was a matter of faith. That every word of the Scriptures is true is a matter of faith. But the Galileo issue was not a question of the truth of Scripture. The issue was what does Scripture mean in the passages where it seems to affirm that the sun moves and the earth sands still? Now a tradition of geocentric interpretation of the texts in question demanded respect but not the adherence of faith. It should have been considered as the more probable exegesis. The opposing interpretation would then have been possible but less probable. As proof for the Copernican hypothesis developed, the new interpretation, namely that Scripture was not affirming the geocentric system, would have grown in probability until it eventually became the more probable interpretation. In this way Scripture would not have to be reinterpreted to meet every new hypothesis, nor would science be forced to bow before an unjustified commitment of theologians to a text which was not meant to teach science.

The influence in Rome of Campanella's *Apologia* was negligible. Time was too short. An unfortunate decree was issued by the Congregation of the Index on March 5, 1616, prohibiting Copernicus' *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium,* and Galileo was given a private admonition from the Holy Office not to defend or teach his opinion since it was false and contrary to Holy Scripture. In 1633, Galileo was condemned as vehemently suspected of heresy for attempting to prove, in his *Dialogue on the Two Great Systems of the World,* that the earth moves. Many factors were involved, of course, but both of these unjust decisions could have been avoided if the theologians in Rome had listened to Campanella.

With the discovery of more scientific evidence in favor of a heliocentric universe, the prohibitions against Copernican writings were revoked. But the damage had already been done. For more than three hundred years, polemics have been written, as Campanella predicted they would be, denouncing the Church as the sworn enemy of science and progress.

Campanella respected the authority of the Church. He definitely held that the Church has a right and duty to judge whenever the interpretation of Scripture is in question. Even if the Bible does not teach science, it does teach theology. But he saw that Galileo's right to free speculation was being challenged on a faulty principle and, though he failed, he did what he could to warn the theologians against issuing an unjust prohibition. Campanella was perhaps the one man who defended the precise and correct solution to the first and most celebrated controversy between theology and modern science.

CLEMENT RISLEY, O.P.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF KARL MARX

To each according to his abilities,
to each one according to his needs.
Karl Marx

If we were to pick the most important event in the life of the founder of modern communism, Karl Marx, it would be his meeting with Pierre Proudhon, the French socialist, in Paris, 1843. This, indeed, was a turning point in Marx's exciting and history-making career, for now we have less and less of Marx the philosopher and more and more of Marx the political economist. It is true that Marx, along with other left-wing Hegelians such as Feuerbach and Moses Hess, had been moving toward radical socialism; but his role had formerly been one of a critical philosopher whose task it was to formulate a rational, radical critique of existing social conditions. He believed that this critique could be a real revolutionary force if it spread to the masses. By means of rational criticism he and his cohorts sought to eliminate the corrupting elements in society and so give history a rational orientation.[1]

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[1] Auguste Cornu, *The Origins of Marxian Thought* (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1957), pp. 80, 113.

Pierre Proudhon, however, was able to turn Marx's mind away from philosophy and ideas to the concrete conditions of human society and the existential man caught in its web. He was able to convert Marx the rationalist into Marx the existentialist (a fact which Jean Paul Sartre recognizes and for which he greatly admires Karl Marx). "Do not look for the evolution of the dialectic in the minds of men," Proudhon told him; "it is actually taking place in human society itself." Marx looked at society and, as with St. Paul, "immediately there fell from his eyes as it were scales, and he received his sight" (Acts 9:18). It is not man the thinker who is the center and driving force in human history, but man the *laborer,* changing the world and directing history by his concrete, practical activity. And man, *homo faber,* is meaningful only as he exists in society, as a member of an economic class. The social problem is a result of the clash between economic classes; therefore, says Marx, we must take it off the moral plane, where Feuerbach and Hess had left it (making it an ethical conflict between individualism and altruism), and transfer it to the socio-economic plane. The remedy, as Marx now saw it, was not a universal love among men but a radical change in society.[2]

Karl Marx then began to develop the fundamental dogma of Marxist socialism, the materialistic conception of history, or *historical materialism.* He was to devote all his time and energies to the work of substantiating this theory, and he would use it as the battle cry for the proletariat in their struggle to break the chains by which the capitalists enslaved them. To prove his theory, Marx constructed an economic doctrine which would bring to light the economic laws governing the course of history. Paradoxically enough, although this doctrine forms the theoretical foundation of a radical movement which was a hostile reaction to the existing social and economic system in western Europe and the philosophy which supported it, Marx's doctrine is itself a product of the earlier system from which it adopted some of its very laws and assumptions.

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[2] Cornu, *op. cit.,* p. 82.

THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF MARXIST SOCIALISM

The first half of the nineteenth century, which forms the background of modern socialism, saw a society in the midst of a new and stupendous revolution both in thought and in social, economic structure. This was the age of liberalism and the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution, beginning in England around the middle of the eighteenth century, was the climax of the tremendous commercial growth of the two previous centuries, and yet it broke asunder the old, established society and ushered in a new and, to a great extent, unwanted society—capitalist society. Characterizing this new society was a "market economy" which transformed the very structure of the old society. No longer was the market merely a place where goods were exchanged. It was now a mechanism for sustaining and maintaining an entire society.[3] The impersonal laws of the market system directed an economy hitherto controlled by custom or authority.[4] Whereas previously it had been duty or the whip of authority that directed men to their task, now it was the lure of economic gain. And as material wealth took on greater worth, the human person became less valuable, a commodity to be bargained for in the market. The "economic man" was born.

Capitalism also had its philosophy, economic liberalism. This doctrine of rugged individualism and the policy of *laissez-faire* in government was an outgrowth of the liberal tradition of John Locke and the French Revolution. Its father and greatest exponent was Adam Smith, author of *Wealth of Nations,* and its school was the so-called English school of "classical economics." Well-known representatives of this school include Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, and John Stuart Mill. These men claimed that the market was governed by laws as natural and fixed as those of physics, and that it was the task of economics to discover and formulate these objective, scientific laws working in the economy.[5] According to the nineteenth century liberals, the duty of government was not to tamper with these laws, but to let them run their natural course under a system of economic freedom (free competition) and to protect the liberty and property of its citizens. Only then can the goal of society be best realized. For them that goal was the acquisition of wealth.

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[3] Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Worldly Philosophers* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1953), p. 18.

[4] R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926), pp. 6-11.

This doctrine of pure economic freedom was followed almost to the letter by the English government between 1800 and 1860. The social consequences were deplorable: inhuman working conditions, long hours, meager wages, child labor, cruel discipline, unemployment, abominable slums, and so on. These miserable conditions were portrayed in some of the novels of Charles Dickens and by Marx himself in *Das Kapital.*[6]

In view of these inhuman conditions in society, conditions flowing from the abuses of the capitalist system, there arose a radical movement of socialists who felt that capitalism was not merely being abused, but was corrupt at its very core and should be extirpated. There have been socialists and systems of communism from the beginning of human history, but socialism as a modern movement began as a hostile reation to the raw capitalism of the Industirial Revolution. In contrast to the so-called "utopian" socialist who appealed to men's ideals and to their sense of morality, Karl Marx claimed to have a "scientific" socialism appealing to a scientific necessity present within society itself. Capitalism should not be destroyed because it is morally evil; it *will* be destroyed because it is only a stage in history which must necessarily give way to a higher stage, socialism, which is its antithesis.

THE THEORETICAL BASIS OF MARXIST SOCIALISM

There are two pillars which support the intellectual edifice of Karl Marx's system: one is metaphysical and the other economic.

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[5] Allen M. Sievers, *General Economics, An Introduction* (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott, 1952), pp. 260-62.

[6] Heilbroner, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-7.

The metaphysical and therefore more fundamental doctrine of Marx is his dialectical materialism and, more important for our purposes, its application to society—historical materialism. It was this great discovery, said Engels, that raised socialism to the rank of science.[7] For now socialism was no longer an ideal, but a necessity; no longer merely linked with men's hopes, it was now inseparably attached to the inexorable law of history.

The Marxian law of history is revealed in his economic interpretation of history. This is a form of historicism called Economic Determinism, and it is founded on Marx's materialistic conception of life and human activity. What governs and motivates men in their activity is the basic drive to satisfy their most elementary needs, which are economic. How man satisfies these needs in the production of the material conditions of life will determine the development of mankind and the course of history. At any one time in history, it is the existing mode of production and the concomitant productive relationships among men which explain all other social phenomena, whether philosophical, political, religious, or artistic.

The motive force in the process of history, which causes transformations in the economic structure of society and therefore in the whole of society, is the clash of social classes. To the mode of production at a given time there corresponds definite social relationships and a social organization adapted to these productive forces. A transformation in one necessarily entails a transformation in the order. But the development of the social organization is usually out of rhythm with the more rapidly developing economic organization. Productive forces expand and develop with the increasing demand for consumable goods, while productive, social relationships are held back by custom and tradition. So there comes a point when there is a contradiction between economic organization and social organization, and this takes the form of class struggles. This will result in a revolution whereby the old structure of society gives way to a new social organization adapted to fit the existing mode of production. History, says Marx, verifies this. The ancient period with its master-slave relationship gave way to the feudal period with its lord-serf class distinction; the feudal mode in time gave way to the capitalistic mode of production with its dual class structure of bourgeosie and proletariat; finally, capitalism must give way to socialism, wherein there is no class distinction.

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[7] Friedrich Engels, *Die Entwicklung des Sozialismus von der Utopie zur Wissenschaft* (1891), p. 26. Cited by Victor Cathrein, S.J., *Socialism* (New York: Benziger, 1904), p. 35.

The other leading doctrine of Marxist socialism—and according to Lenin,[8] that which makes up the chief contents of Marxism—is Marx's economic doctrine, i.e., his theory of surplus value. This teaching is inextricably bound up with his theory of history. It is the scientific foundation for his interpretation of history. In the preface to *Das Kapital,* Marx declares that the aim of this work is to bring to light "the economic law of motion of modern society." Again, Lenin says that the content of Marx's economic teaching is "the study of the production relationships in a given, historically determinate society, in their genesis, their development, and their decay."[9] In this theory of surplus value Marx thought that he had the scientific foundation for his condemnation of capitalism and the key to the explanation of history.

THE ECONOMIC TEACHING OF KARL MARX

According to the Marxian dialectic, the historical process which issued in capitalistic society was the break-up of the feudal order, beginning at the end of the fifteenth century and reaching its term in England approximately two centuries later. Its dissolution, says Marx, set free the necessary elements of capitalism: free labor, free land, free capital investment. The serfs and peasants were freed from the soil to became "sellers of themselves;" natural resources were opened for capitalistic exploitation; guild masters and merchants could turn their money into industrial capital as the shackles of feudal regulations and restrictions vanished.[10] The capitalistic accumulation was tremendously aided by colonial trade and the development of modern financial institutions, but the *social* key to this accumulation, says Marx, was the transformation of the mode of private property "which rests on the exploitations of the nominally free labor of others, i.e., on wages labor."[11] So there came to be constituted the capitalistic mode of production based on capitalistic private property. And now we must examine the inner law of this new socio-economic phenomenon and see why, according to Marx's theory, it is the law of capitalism's own self-destruction.

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[8] Nikolai Lenin, *The Teachings of Karl Marx* (1914), in *Readings in Economics,* ed. K. William Kapp and Lore L. Kapp (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1949), p. 268.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 273.

The Theory of Surplus Value

Theory of Value. The first question that Marx considers in *Das Kapital* is: How do we measure the value of a commodity, since "the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails presents itself as 'an immense accumulation of commodities'?"[12] To find his solution, Marx does not hesitate to enter the door of the school of his opponents, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the other classical economists, and to take one of their very own laws for his own: the famous *labor theory of value*, viz. that labor is the source of all economic value.

According to Marx's analysis, every commodity has a two-fold value: a *use-value*, and an *exchange-value*. "The utility of a thing makes it a use-value," i.e., its ability to satisfy human wants.[13] Use-value is based on the physical and chemical qualities of things, e.g., the digestibility of food or the durability of iron. Exchange-value is the power of a thing to command all other things in exchange for itself. Hence, "the exchange values of commodities must be capable of being expressed in terms of *something common* to them all, of which they represent a greater or less quantity."[14]

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[10] Karl Marx, *Capital*, I, chap. XX-XXIV, in *Masterworks of Economics*, ed. Leonard D. Abbot (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946), pp. 598-604. All further references to *Capital* will be to volume I and the page references will be to this edition, unless otherwise noted.

[11] *Ibid.*, chap. XXV, p. 612.

[12] *Ibid.*, chap. I, p. 459.

[13] *Ibid.*

Now this "something common" is, according to Marx, certainly not use-value: "as use-values, commodities are, above all, of different qualities, but as exchange-values they are merely different quantities, and consequently do not contain an atom of use-value."[15] If value in exchange is independent of use-value, what then is left in commodities by which we can compare them?—that of being products of *labor*. The constitutive value of things on the market is the human labor embodied in them. But not every product of human labor is a commodity having economic value, i.e., an exchange-value: "Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labor, creates, indeed, use-values, but not commodities. In order to produce the latter, he must not only produce use-values, but use-values for others, social use-values."[16] We must keep in mind that Marx is analyzing the determinants of value in a capitalist economy in which production is primarily for the market—to accumulate wealth—, and therefore real value is exchange-value. By "value", then, Marx means exchange-value.

Labor, then, is the source of all wealth, since it determines exchange-value. But are we to equate the labor of the idle or unskilled worker with that of the industrious or highly skilled worker? Obviously not, says Marx; just as we must abstract from the useful qualities of the products themselves, so also we must abstract from

> the useful character of the various kinds of labor embodied in them and the concrete forms of that labor; there is nothing left but what is common to them all; all are reduced to one and the same sort of labor, *human labor in the abstract*.[17]

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 460.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 461.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 463.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 461.

Marx made the further stipulation that labor, insofar as it is value-determining, must be "socially necessary" labor, i.e., the total quantity of labor *time* necessary to produce a certain commodity in a given state of society, under normal conditions of production, with a given social average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time. Therefore, we do not determine the value of yarn in terms of that which is produced on an outmoded hand-loom, but only in terms of that which is produced on the more efficient and time-saving power loom.

In relation to value determination, which is calculated in terms of time units of labor, Marx had to reduce all labor to "one and the same sort of labor," what he called "human labor pure and simple." *Unskilled* labor, then, is the standard to which all other different sorts of labor are reduced. Skilled labor is not qualitatively different but only quantitatively different from simple unskilled labor—it is "simple labor intensified."[18] Thus Marx conceived all kinds and degrees of occupational skill as being reducible to standard time units of unskilled labor. And this total quantity of labor, we must remember, is not only the labor employed at the final stage of the process, but also that employed at all stages of production, back through the production of the necessary raw materials, power and machinery, and the labor necessary to restore that part of the machinery worn out in producing the materials for the commodity.

Marx thus sums up his labor theory of value:

> A commodity has a value, because it is a crystallization of social labor. The greatness of its value, or its relative value, depends upon the greater or less amount of that social substance contained in it; that is to say, on the relative mass of labor necessary for its production. The relative values of commodities are, therefore, determined by the respective quantities or amounts of labor, worked up, realized fixed in them.[19]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

[19] Karl Marx, *Value, Price and Profit*, p. 31, cited by William N. Loucks and J. Weldon Hoot, *Comparative Economic Systems*, 4th ed. rev. (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 174.

Theory of Surplus-value. We now come to the key point in capitalism, the heart and soul of the whole system: the creation of surplus-value. In pre-capitalist periods, says Marx, commerce or the circulation of commodities was chiefly in the form of Commodity-Money-Commodity, i.e., selling in order to buy. But under capitalism the chief form of circulation is Money-Commodity-Money, i.e., buying in order to sell (dearer). Money that circulates in the latter form becomes capital. Thus consumption or the satisfaction of human wants is not the goal of the capitalist, but rather production for money capital.

The capitalist then who advances his money for the express purpose of making more money must find a way to get out of a commodity more than he put into it, since its value on the market is no more than the sum total of labor that is embodied in it (and which he had to pay for). But there is one commodity in the process of production that is a "source not only of value, but of more value than it has itself"—it not only is value, it also creates value.[20] This "commodity" is labor: labor is the source of capitalist profit. Like the value of other commodities, the exchange-value of labor power is determined by its content of socially necessary labor-time. Thus Marx says:

> Therefore the labor-time requisite for the production of labor power reduces itself to that necessary for the production of those means of subsistence; in other words, the value of labor power is the value of the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the laborer.[21]

Marx is consequently in full accord with Smith and Ricardo in his belief that under the economic laws of capitalism the worker can never raise himself above the subsistence level. This subsistence wage, however, is on a family rather than an individual basis, since the family is needed to perpetuate the appearance of labor power in the market. This wage also differs between grades of skill since the additional costs of education and training which go into the production of skilled labor power must be taken into account.

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[20] *Capital,* chap. VI, p. 505.

[21] *Capital,* pp. 189-190 in the Modern Library edition of Volume I, cited by Loucks and Hoot, *op. cit.,* pp. 183-84.

Once the capitalist has hired the worker for a subsistence wage (his exchange-value), he has full right to the worker's use-value, i.e., his actual daily expenditure in work—actual labor capacity.

> The *value* of the laboring power is determined by the quantity of labor necessary to maintain or reproduce it, but the *use* of that laboring power is only limited by the active energies and physical strength of the laborer.[22]
>
> The seller of labor-power, like the seller of any other commodity, realizes its exchange-value and parts with its use-value. He cannot take one without giving the other.[23]

The capitalist then is not violating the law of the exchange of commodities, nor is he acting contrary to the rights the capitalist system bestows upon him, when he receives from the worker a full day's work, even though the worker can produce in commodities the value of his wage in half that time. *Surplus-value* is precisely that amount which the laborer produces over and above the value of his wage. This Marx calls "unpaid labor." If the laborer is hired to work twelve hours a day, and he can replace his wages or the value of his labor-power in six hours, then there are six hours of unpaid labor which accrues to the capitalist-employer. By gaining this surplus-value, the capitalist can sell his products at their true value and still realize a profit.

Capital Accumulation. Once having obtained surplus-value the capitalist, insatiable in his desire for wealth, wants more; therefore he employs his surplus for further production in order to obtain greater amounts of surplus-value. In this way surplus-value is transformed into *capital*, namely "the sum total of all the means of production by private individuals and employed for the acquisition of surplus-value, i,e., for the exploitation of labor.[24] Marx distinguishes between *constant capital* which does not undergo any quantitative alteration of value—i.e., raw materials and instruments of labor, and *variable capital* or that part represented by labor which creates further value.[25] Hence, the profit will depend largely upon the proportion of variable capital at hand.

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[22] Marx, *Value, Price and Profit*, p. 41, cited by Loucks and Hoot, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

[23] *Capital*, p. 505.

The capitalist will use every means to squeeze the very most out of labor: lengthening the working day and employing night shifts; increasing worker-efficiency through improved cooperation of labor based upon the division and specialization of labor; introducing and improving machinery which not only further increases the productivity of labor, but also allows him to employ women and children. The employment of women and children depreciates even further the value of the father's labor capacity, since the subsistence wage for him and his family is now spread over the earnings of the entire family.[26]

The Industrial Reserve Army. Under conditions of fierce competition, the capitalist is forced to increase his output by installing new and better machinery—this makes labor more and more superfluous. The value of labor sinks even lower and the misery of the proletariat is in direct proportion to the accumulation and concentration of capital. As more laborers are superseded by machinery, an "industrial reserve army" is created which is at the disposal of capital: "a mass of human material always ready for exploitation."[27]

The End of Capitalism. But the end of capitalism is in sight: the expropriation of the capitalist is like the beast that turns on his master and devours him. It will be "accomplished by the action of the immanent laws of capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital."[28] Despite the increasing misery of the workers, the rate of profits realized by capitalist-employers falls, since more of the total capital consists in machinery (constant capital) and less in labor (variable capital). Labor, however, is the source of surplus-value and therefore of profit. (This is only one of the many "contradictions" inherent in the capitalist order.) Increased industrial output and the declining purchasing power of the workers caused "overproduction" and a surplus of goods on the market. Thus *business crises* ("depressions") arise, and they gradually become more and more severe. Competition among capitalists becomes cutthroat and this leads to the killing off of the smaller ones and the concentration and centralization of capital into fewer and fewer hands. "Capitalist imperialism" will arise in an effort of the capitalists to exploit foreign markets as outlets for their surpluses of commodities which the domestic market is unable to absorb. They will press the state—which they control—into an imperialistic war to create a market for wartime production. The great capitalist states themselves are at war in the struggle for world monopoly.[29]

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[24] Cathrein, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
[25] *Capital,* chap. VII, p. 509.
[26] Cf. *Capital,* chap. IX.
[27] *Ibid.*, chap. XIX, p. 588.
[28] *Ibid.*, chap. XXV, p. 613.

All the while, however, the ranks of the proletariat will be swelled, as the capitalists become richer and fewer. The middle class will be eliminated in the squeeze, and there will be nothing left but two opposing classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat—the exploiters and the exploited. Finally, says Marx, capitalism will reach such a stage of industrial and financial monopoly (the contradiction of its own law of competition), which is essentially destructive of productive forces,[30] that it will collapse under the weight of its own contradictions:

> Centralization of the means of production and socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalistic integument.[31]

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[29] Cf. Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism," *Handbook of Marxism,* compiled by E. Burns (Random House, 1935); Cf. Loucks and Hoot, *op. cit.,* pp. 218-20.

[30] Loucks and Hoot, *op. cit.,* p. 220.

[31] *Capital,* chap. XXV, p. 613.

A "revolution" will occur and the proletariat, prepared and organized under the leadership of the Communist party, will take over control of society:

> This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators and expropriated.[32]

The fate of capitalism is inevitable, since the very processes which the system engenders are the forces which seal its own destruction. According to the dialectic, capitalistic production will beget its own negation.

The Economics of Communism

When the proletariat has seized power and established its own state (the "dictatorship of the proletariat"), it will not be so much a question of erecting a new economy as grounding the old one on new social relationships—relationships which revolve around the question of *property*. This question of property is the central problem of communism.[33] The *Communist Manifesto* could sum up in a single sentence the economic structure of communistic society: "Abolition of private property." There will be no major changes in the industrial equipment or the technical processes of production under the communist regime, but there will be the all-important change of the transference of the collective means of production and the collective fruit of that production from the hands of the bourgeoisie into the hands of the social community. Social property will then lose its class characteristics.[34] Individual private property will not be abolished but re-established "on the basis of the social ownership of land and of the means of production produced by labor itself."[35]

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[32] *Ibid.*, p. 614.

[33] Père Ducattillon, O.P., "Communist and Catholic Doctrine," *Communism and Christians*, Père Ducattillon, O.P., *et. al.*, trans. by J. F. Scanlan (London: Paladin Press, 1938), p. 106.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[35] *Ibid.*

Why is property of such central importance to communism? Because, according to Marx, on it depends man's complete and harmonious integration into the world of reality. Man transforms and enters integrally into the world around him through his human activity which is not spiritual but practical, concrete *work*. This work is man's alienation or externalization of his substance and essence into the object he creates[36]; thus there is achieved the dynamic and living unity of mind and matter, of man and the outer world.[37] According to this point of view, man is more *homo faber* than *homo sapiens*. The products of a man's labor, therefore, are somehow part of his very essence; consequently, property is a part of the laborer and can belong only to him. Unless man repossesses what he has produced, he will have alienated his real substance, i.e., he will have alienated his labor, and it is labor which constitutes him in reality, in being.[38] Feuerbach had attributed to God and to religion the object of man's alienation of himself; Marx said that this alienation is only the expression of a deeper alienation of human nature on the economic level.[39]

In the capitalistic order of society the worker is compelled to drain his substance into commodities he will never possess but which are turned into capital to enslave him. This is the conspicuous evil of capitalism (although it has historical inevitability): the sacred bond between labor and property has been rent asunder—a bond which, for the communist, is more sacred than the marriage contract. It is a contradiction that someone should own something that is not the result of his own labor; yet the capitalist thrives on the labor of others. In other words, the inherent contradiction of capitalism is that it is simultaneously characterized by a social mode of production and private ownership of the means and fruits of production. Under communism, this contradiction would be resolved

[36] Cornu, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-7.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 115-16.
[38] Ducattillon, *op. cit.*, p. 109.
[39] Cornu, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-15.

in the new synthesis of socialized production and social, collective ownership of productive property or wealth.

In the communist economy there is also demanded social organization of the labor force, with the "equal obligation of all to work" since ownership is based on labor—speaking here of private ownership of consumable goods. Thus the *Communist Manifesto* speaks of the establishment of industrial armies. The Marxists claim that this will be on a free, cooperative, democratic basis, so that men will freely and willingly move to and fro, now with this job, now with that job, according as the demands of production require.

The third general feature of the communist economic system will be a common distribution of the fruits of production. Part of the social product will go for further production, part will be deducted for the needs of the community, and the rest will be distributed for mass consumption and will become private property. In the first phase of communism, that is, the period following the revolution, in which there will still be traces of capitalism left in society, distribution of goods will be according to the working-time done, according to one's contribution to the social working day. But in the second, perfect stage of communism, when all inequalities and divisions of labor will be eliminated, when "labor has ceased to be merely the means of sustaining life, but has become an urgent desire,"[40] then Marx's famous standard will be put into effect: "to each according to his abilities, to each one according to his need."

CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSION

To attempt to present a detailed and adequate evaluation of Marxist economic theory in the light of sound economic principles and empirical evidence is beyond the scope of this paper. This must be left to professional economists. Indeed, there are many evident loopholes and inaccuracies in Marx's analysis of capitalism: the obvious fallacy of the labor theory of value, which totally neglects the role that *demand* plays in the determination of economic value; his false and unrealistic *univocal* concept of labor which reduces all labor to simple, unskilled labor; his all-too-optimistic and again unrealistic attempt to devise an economic calculus in terms of labor-time (rivaled only by Jeremy Bentham's ethical calculus with which to measure moral conduct in terms of quantities of pleasure and pain); his failure to realize the important and necessary role of the capitalist-employer in modern industrial society; and so on. There are many books on Marx and Communism, either philosophical or economic, which adequately treat of these points. Most of these points, however, do not have a great deal of relevance in the present-day context of capitalism and Russian Communism. But there are some aspects of Marx's economic theory which are very significant for the modern non-Communist world.

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[40] *Capital,* quoted by Cathrein, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Karl Marx's analysis of capitalism, inaccurate as it may be, cannot be lightly tossed aside as unworthy of serious consideration. The fact is that not a few of Marx's predictions and conclusions have come true, at least partially, although not always for the reasons that Marx supposed. He foresaw in capitalism many inherent tendencies which history has verified, with certain modifications: the tendency for profits to fall with increased competition; the drive for increased efficiency in production through technological progress in order to counterbalance the above mentioned tendency; the occurrence of business cycles; unemployment; emergence of giant business enterprises and monopolies; excess production and oversaturated markets, and other economic phenomena. All of these are problems which continue to plague capitalist economies, and are of great concern to those who defend that system.[41] It remains somewhat of a dilemma how Marx could have drawn so many correct or enlightening conclusions from unsound theoretical analyses.[42]

But the most drastic of Marx's predictions was the inevitable collapse of capitalism altogether. This is another conclusion of Karl Marx that cannot be lightly brushed aside, although again, if it has to any degree been realized in history, we cannot accept the reason Marx would give: the inexorable law of the dialectic. Yet the fact is that capitalism, in the sense in which Marx and the classical English school of economics understood the term, has failed throughout the world. It has disappeared completely in Russia and Eastern Europe, although some of its techniques of production are still being used.[43] It reigned supreme in Western Europe until the First World War at which time it completely collapsed. It was briefly revived after the War, but again it brought only misery and disintegration. When the gold standard, the economic nexus of an integrated world system of capitalism, finally collapsed, the last remnant of the self-regulating market system was gone, and the death knell of market capitalism sounded.[44] Since this time we have witnessed a radical change in the social structure of Western European countries: Socialism, Communism, Fascism and Syndicalism.

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[41] Loucks and Hoot, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-46.
[42] *Ibid.*

It is doubtful whether market capitalism was ever regnant in the United States. But it certainly influenced our country around the turn of the century. Not until the United States went off the gold standard in 1933, in the midst of a serious depression, and began the New Deal did capitalism begin to lose its hold upon us.[45] Thus the whole world, since the First World War, has undergone what has been called the Great Transformation, a revolutionary rearrangement of social institutions.

What caused the downfall of capitalism in Europe? Simply speaking, the system broke down primarily for *social* reasons, i.e., laissez-faire government, encouragement of monopolies, and indifference to the poverty of the working class, were to a great extent replaced by a social consciousness.[46] Is this much different from what Marx predicted?

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[43] Heilbroner, *op. cit.*, p. 157.
[44] Sievers, *op. cit.*, pp. 295-96.
[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 296-97.
[46] Heilbroner, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58.

The social organization in these countries was not in harmony with the economic organization. The United States, on the other hand, has been more socially responsive to the problems and evils of pure capitalism, and she never became completely immersed in a self-regulating market capitalism. Thus she did not experience, after the almost world-wide collapse of this system, radical changes like British Socialism, Russian Communism, and German and Italian Fascism. There has been a certain continuity in the American economy, and it has survived every radical transformation precisely because it has become increasingly less capitalistic. Ours has always been a mixed economy, "a strange mixture of capitalistic and non-capitalistic elements,"[47] and never the victim of pure capitalism.

What Karl Marx could not see—and this is the clue to why a money-market-machine economy has worked out so much better in the United States than in Europe—was that his preconceived notions of a class of profit-seeking capitalists who despised and exploited the lower classes, of a state which was only the tool of the capitalists, and of a class of proletarians who were necessarily kept on a subsistence level of living—what he could not see was that these assumptions were not fixed and unalterable in the nature of things, as he supposed them to be.[48] His mistake was that he accepted as scientific the postulates formulated by Smith, Ricardo and the English capitalist school: that the goal of every nation is the accumulation of wealth by the exploitation of natural resources and the subordination of labor to capital; and that in a market economy the working class is necessarily reduced to a subsistence level. But these so-called "laws" were merely hypotheses or systematic postulates which—as happens in any science in which laws are advanced which are not supported by facts—have done much to hinder the advancement of social and economic science.[49] American society is living proof that labor and management can cooperate and work together for common ends; that government, even in a "capitalistic" society, can work for the interests of the working class as well as for those of big business (it was inconceivable to Marx that such a government would actually suppress monopolies and make anti-trust laws); and finally that the wage-earning class can improve its economic conditions through unions and other associations. Such a social consciousness was far beyond the narrow vision of Karl Marx.

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[47] Sievers, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

[48] Heilbroner, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-59.

[49] R. L. Bruckburger, O.P., *Image of America*, trans. C. G. Paulding and Virgilia Peterson (New York: Viking, 1959), pp. 135-36.

We might do well, as Father Bruckburger, O.P., suggests, to cease using the term "capitalism" in order to characterize the economy of the United States or that of any other Western country. What most people throughout the world understand by this term is the liberal notion of capitalism propounded by the classical English school and condemned by Marx. In this sense it is not applicable to any free country of the Western world. "The tragedy," says Heilbroner,

> is that for much of the world—and for all of the Communist world—the stereotypes with which Marx set his plot into motion, the grasping Manchester millowner and the untractable regime of 1848, are still taken as true likenesses of capitalism everywhere.[50]

But this "true likeness of capitalism," to which Heilbroner refers, is precisely that of the nineteenth century variety, and it is this capitalism that has proved a failure.

Furthermore, to speak of the present world-struggle in terms of a Marxist-capitalist conflict is to set up a basically false antithesis. It was capitalism that gave birth to Marxism, and the latter shares in the very nature of its progenitor—both stand condemned together. Sharing a materialistic view of life and human happiness, and considering man a mere cog in a big machine—a means to be used for economic ends, both systems deny the common man his natural right to private property. This is a strange paradox, indeed; for that which Marx thought to be the very evil of capitalism—its social institution of private property—is precisely what it lacked: capitalism denied the majority of men their natural right to private property by enslaving them in unjust conditions of labor, making it impossible for the working class to improve their condition of life and to secure property for themselves. Marx's solution offers a further contradiction: to correct the evil of private property he proposes to place all property in the hands of the communist society so that the proletariat owns everything. In actual fact, under this system they own nothing. Communism merely shifts the power and control of the capitalist into the hands of the communist bureaucracy. The State is now a giant Capitalist which has absorbed all the rights and freedoms of its citizens; human dignity has sunk to its lowest. Communism is but a berserk form of capitalism.

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[50] Heilbroner, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

Would that Karl Marx's world had heeded the advice of another champion of social reform, Pope Leo XIII. Pope Leo, expressing in his own person and teaching that deep human compassion of the Catholic Church for suffering and impoverished mankind, not only was well aware of the social injustices of his time, but also was able to free himself from the context of nineteenth century liberalism and materialism which gave rise to these evils—something Karl Marx was unable to do. Like his successors after him, Pope Leo put the whole social problem on a different plane. Neither the liberalists of the nineteenth century nor Karl Marx could find the answer to the social problem because they considered it essentially an economic problem: how to get the greatest wealth for the greatest amount of people. But in considering man for production's sake and not production for man's sake, they militated against the very nature and dignity of man. Pope Leo, in his great social encyclical *Rerum Novarum*—to be perpetuated and further developed in Pius XI's *Quadragesimo Anno* and John XXIII's *Mater et Magistra*—considered the problem a *moral* one: how can each individual best serve and be served in society so as to attain his ultimate end in a way which is not contrary to his intrinsic dignity as a person. As Pope John once remarked with regard to solving problems in the economic and social order:

> Whatever be the situation, we clearly affirm these problems should be posed and resolved in such a way that man does not have recourse to methods and means contrary to his dignity, which are proposed by those persons who think of man and his life solely in material terms.[51]

The Popes have repeatedly called for a new social order based on *social justice* for all men and classes, always insisting "that individual men are necessarily the foundation, cause, and end of all social institutions."[52] But such an order of social justice will never come about, they add, unless individuals and classes also assume their responsibilities and work for the common good of all.

In conclusion let us say that it is not enough to refute on paper the economic doctrine of Karl Marx nor merely to point out the evils of communism. We will overthrow this false ideology in a decisive manner, only if we are able to demonstrate to the world that an economy with a competitive market and private enterprise, in which the freedom of the individual and personal initiative and responsibility have a place, can flourish and work for the human happiness of all. Such a goal can be realized if only the free world will see in the Church's social teaching a true remedy for the social evils of our time.

[51] *Mater et Magistra*, Encyclical Letter of His Holiness Pope John XXIII on Christianity and Social Progress, May 15, 1961 (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference), p. 55.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 63.



Murillo

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IF ANY MAN WILL COME AFTER ME,
LET HIM DENY HIMSELF,
AND TAKE UP HIS CROSS DAILY,
AND FOLLOW ME.
—MATTHEW 16:24

EUGENE GERARD HALLORAN
OF THE
ORDER OF PREACHERS
APRIL 18, 1964
✠ —A PRIEST

PRAY FOR ME

GERARD HALLORAN, O.P.

ADOLESCENCE: PRELUDE TO MANHOOD

The well known rebelliousness of the adolescent
has an important relationship
to his search for identity.
It is his final bid for autonomy.
Gordon W. Allport

The scene is a common one: the cold atmosphere of juvenile court, the distraught parents listening to the judge as he sentences their son to the state reformatory. His crime? Armed robbery. Why did he do it, they ask themselves. He is barely sixteen years old. It was just a little more than two years ago that they watched him graduate from grammar school, and now their son stands convicted in court. How could this happen to us?—they ask themselves.

This is one of the most disturbing questions of our times. Much has been written by sociologists and psychologists on the causes of juvenile delinquency. They have come up with many answers:

broken homes, slums, lack of authority, the moral degeneration of modern society. These are causes and very important ones at that; but are they the proximate causes? When a young boy of sixteen enters a filling station and attempts a holdup does he do it because he happened to be born in a slum area? No, at least not directly. These are contributing causes, but they are not the proximate causes of his actions. For if they were direct causes, every boy born in a slum area, every boy from a broken home would find himself in juvenile court. And conversely, every boy born of a good family and having all the necessities of life, both material and spiritual, would be immune from the blight of delinquency. This obviously is not the case. There must be other causes; causes that touch the boy directly.

What, then, is the proximate cause of juvenile delinquency? This is a simple question and it has a simple answer: the proximate cause of juvenile delinquency is the juvenile himself. In order to see what makes Johnny act the way he does we must get inside him and see how he thinks and how he reasons. We must examine his set of values. We must understand all his fears, his anxieties, his hopes, his desires, and his delights. All of these things and only these things are the true causes of his actions.

We will here undertake to investigate the values, fears and anxieties which move adolescents to act the way they do. This is not to attempt the impossible, for although no two people react in the same way nor to the same degree to any given stimulus, there are certain areas in the life of every teen-ager which are common to all. It is these areas which we will investigate.

We will do so not by looking at the delinquent, the abnormal, but by looking at the thousands of high school students who are normal and healthy, for the delinquent was normal and healthy before he began to plan a holdup, or before he found himself the father of a child, or before he found himself a murderer because of drunken driving. In a certain limited sense, all teenagers have the same starting point. Where does the delinquent go astray? Let us look and see.

HIGH SCHOOL

During the month of September thousands of children throughout the country enter upon their high school career. As they leave the house on that September morning they are much the same children they were when they graduated from grammar school the previous June. They are still children. They still see things only in relation to themselves, for this is the infantile attitude. Seldom does anything concern them that is not either useful or pleasurable for them. They are attracted in a practical way only by an easily attainable good. Seldom do they concern themselves with working toward a good which is in the distant future or difficult to attain. We see this attitude in very small children and we see it also in these children as they set out on their first day of high school. Their world has been restricted to the family and just a few friends, but the moment they enter the halls of the high school the world suddenly springs open. It is as if they had been seeing the world through a keyhole and now the door has suddenly been thrown open. It is both terrifying and exciting to him as he beholds the manifold paths that lay before him. Which one shall he take? This is the problem that faces all teen-agers.

As soon as they set foot in the high school they cease to be the children they were and almost in a moment they become teen-agers, adolescents. A young man is called an adolescent not because of his number of years but because of his attitude, because of his frame of reference and because of his set of values. During the next four years the high school freshman will undergo a gradual physical and psychological change. This change will be gradual, but it will be a change that will be so forceful that it will influence his actions for the rest of his life.

If we are going to truly understand a teen-ager we must understand the changes that are going to take place within him. We must realize that during the next four years he is going to cease thinking like a child and begin to think like an adult.

Gerard Halloran

MATURITY

For a high school freshman the great influence prompting his actions is his desire for maturity, i.e., his self-definition as an autonomous individual. This desire will not be explicit. He will not say to himself, "I desire to be mature." It will, nevertheless, be this search and the demand for its recognition that will be a powerful guiding and motive power behind all of his actions.

When freshmen enter high school they are in a daze about many things. The one thing they know for sure is that they want to be like the seniors. And why? Because in their position as freshmen they look to the seniors and they see in them some quality, perhaps self-assurance, which they take for maturity. It is this desire for maturity that will cause them to do many things that appear, to the already mature minds of parents and teachers, to be illogical, irresponsible, and almost idiotic. To the mind of the teenager, who is the agent of these actions, they are not anything of the kind. To the young man in question they are completely mature actions.

The problem of maturity comes down to this: the adolescent knows that he wants to be mature, but he is hindered because he does not know what maturity is nor how to go about attaining it. This problem of finding maturity is not a problem that is confined to freshmen. It extends at least throughout the entire four years of high school and, we may add, some never succeed in finding true maturity.

Every high school student in some way attempts to find his own answer to this difficulty. Some think that maturity is to be found in physical strength. They find expression for their "maturity" by pushing their way through lines and imposing their wills on others. To use the traditional term we may call such a person the "school bully." This tendency to physical domination is due in some way to his desire for maturity. Either the boy has not yet awakened to the fact of maturity and is still motivated by his infantile attitude that places the self at the center of all his actions, or else his "don't get in my way, I'm tough" attitude is a true manifestation of his search for maturity. In his eyes he will have attained maturity if he can succeed in subjecting others to his own physical strength. What he does not realize is that this subjection is granted to him only through fear and in some cases through pity.

But such "bulliness" is just one attempt at finding maturity. There are others, and very often all the seemingly antisocial actions of adolescents are reducible to this central desire for maturity. We see this attempt at maturity again in those who think it "smart" to drink themselves out of their senses. We see it in those who gather around and talk of sex and relate stories of their sexual exploits. Very often these stories do not contain a shred of truth, but the narrators believe that in the eyes of the other boys they are painting a picture of maturity. The fact is that very often the listeners do think that the narrator is mature because none of them, neither the narrator nor the listeners, know what maturity is.

If we are to provide some safeguard for the adolescent against getting himself involved in really serious difficulties, it is our task to give him very definite knowledge of just what maturity is. We must show him above all that maturity does not consist in physical strength or in moral dissipation. We must show him that it consists in the manner of judgment, in the ability to make sacrifices (this is something that very few teen-agers are called upon to do), in the ability to place his own convenience and pleasure in subjection to the good of the society of which he is a member. We must show him that true maturity consists in the observance of law, moral and civil.

This desire for maturity is a very strong motive force in the lives of all teen-agers and we must understand it and make use of it, if we are to help these young men achieve true manhood.

HERO WORSHIP

We have already pointed out that the desire for maturity is the major factor in most teen-age actions. There are also two other areas that are closely allied to this desire: the tendency to hero worship and the need to belong to a gang. These are merely parts of the larger desire for maturity, for it is the desire for maturity that drives the teen-ager to indulge in hero worship and to form cliques.

Hero worship is a common and normal tendency in all teen-agers. We have noted earlier that when a freshman enters high school he immediately looks to the seniors, that is, he hero worships the seniors. He does this because inwardly he is unsettled. He is a child in a man's world. He is confronted with varying opinions as to how he should act. In short, he is immature and he needs a guide. He will not openly submit to the guiding authority of his parents, of his teachers, of priests, or of anyone in an official capacity because the one thing he will not part with is his newly acquired sense of independence. There is, then, only one road left open to him. He must find someone he can imitate, someone whom he feels is the kind of person he wishes to be, someone who can teach him to be a man, somone who is mature. This is the whole reason behind the tendency to hero worship.

It cannot be too strongly stressed that this tendency is good, for what else is the imitation of the saints? It is nothing other than hero worship. The Church places the saints on a pedestal for us to imitate because we are, in a very real sense, immature when it comes to attaining sanctity. We have our own ideas about sanctity just as the adolescent has his own ideas about maturity. The Church, in order to make sure that we proceed rightly, tells us: "Here is a man who has reached sanctity and this is the way he did it. Imitate him." Teen-age hero worship provides the same sort of guidance. This being the case hero worship in adolescence is not something that should be eliminated. It is an indispensable factor aiding the teen-ager to pass successfully through his adolescent years.

The danger inherent in hero worship is the selection of the hero. Normally and ideally the teen-ager ought to chose his father, for this is one of the functions of fatherhood, to be an example to his son. It is here, at the threshold of adolescence, that the father must take exemplary precedence in the life of his son, for it is now that the boy realizes that he is going to have to grow up. The difficulty is that when he looks to his father what will he find? Will he find a man he can admire? Will he find a man that has made sacrifices for his family? If he does find such a man he will be a very lucky boy. But what if he finds a man weak in temperance, a man who drinks excessively? What if he finds a man who is rarely at home, or a man who easily loses his temper with his family, or a man weak in prudence and fortitude? Then one of two things will happen. Either the boy will go beyond his father and find someone else to imitate or else he will be content with the example of his father.

It is on this point of hero worship that so many authors cite parents as causes of their children's delinquency because it is precisely in regard to this point that parents become partakers in the actions of their children. If the son is content with the weak moral example of his father, he may see nothing wrong in excessive drinking or in taking undue liberties with a girl or in disregarding all moral and civil law.

It is here also that the moral degeneration of modern society enters the picture. This too is a cause of juvenile delinquency simply because it seriously hinders the adolescent's chances of finding a worthy hero and causes him to imitate unworthy examples. But in our modern society the young person has little to choose from. If publicity is any indication, the modern hero is the movie star noted for his sexual conquests or the tough guy who bullies his way to the top of his field. Even the criminal has been glorified in our newspapers and movies, etc. Almost never does society place a man on a pedestal because of his virtue!

Thus we come to the second means of helping adolescents avoid the dangers of their age. We must place before them a true, living picture of manly maturity. Examples of prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice. Teen-agers must have living examples of virtue and personal courage from which they can draw their heroes.

Parents and counselors, however, cannot present virtue to them in strict terms if they expect any response. Teen-agers put on a great external show of being independent, but inwardly they want some set rules for attaining maturity even though they will never admit this. They will accept nothing if parents and teachers merely put virtue out as being the right thing to do. Parents and teachers must show them by their daily example that this—the way of virtue—is the way to be truly mature, to be truly and fully a man.

TEEN-AGE CLIQUES

The second area which can be considered as part of the central desire for maturity is the tendency and need of all teen-agers to form cliques. This again is a very healthy attitude. Although externally the teen-ager appears to be independent, self-reliant and grown up, internally he is none of these things. Inwardly he is just beginning to break through his infantile frame of reference. This break-through is something very terrifying in the mind of the teen-ager. When he succeeds in breaking with his infantile attitude, it is as if he were alone on a great desert and he does not know which way to turn. As a result, he seeks security in association with boys of his own age who are faced with the same problem and who think in the same way as he does. This is a very good thing and it is an excellent way of maturing. It is by this association that he is able to form close friendships and to learn to give to others instead of taking for himself.

Through membership in a group the teen-ager is better able to attain confidence in himself and in his own judgment. When a boy makes a mistake, he will hear about it from his companions. We might note here that this open criticism of each other is a property that is peculiar to boys. A group of girls will wait until the offender is absent before they begin to criticise. Not so with boys. They have no qualms about confronting an offender with his faults face to face.

This tendency to form cliques is beneficial to adolescent development because it fosters confidence and furnishes security. The adolescent is seeking maturity and he needs all the help he can get. By close association with boys of his own age and environment his search is facilitated.

If we may digress, we may note that it is because of the teen-agers' need to associate with members of their own sex that the Catholic Church does not favor the co-educational system in high schools. The Church disfavors this system simply because it throws boys and girls together before they are ready for such close association. The young men have not yet discovered and adopted the proper rules of conduct which should guide their lives. They have not yet established themselves firmly in their own minds. They are, to a large extent, still slaves to every passing pleasure. They are at present engaged in trying to find out how to be men, and during this time young men should associate mainly with members of their own sex.

This is not to say that all meetings between the sexes is wrong or to be discouraged. There is nothing wrong with occasional dating, etc. In fact, if a high school student showed a reluctance in this regard, such a case might be worth closer investigation. What the Church holds in disfavor is the constant and unrelenting association between boys and girls. If young men are placed in a teen-age society in which there is constant association between the sexes, his task of finding a manly maturity is going to be made that much more difficult.

The disfavor with the co-educational system arises also from the teen-age tendency to hero worship. The young man must have some *man* whom he can imitate. When he is thrown into a mixed society there is a very strong possibility that he will emerge as a mixture of a man and a woman. This is not exaggerated. It is seen quite often in cases where the father of the family is deceased. The boy then picks up the manner of thinking and acting of his mother.

There is, then, real value in being a member of a closely knit group. It enables the boy to become a man, to think and act as a man before he is placed in the frequent companionship of girls.

Parents, on the other hand, must see to it that their children form good friendships. Parental supervision of their son's selection of companions is not something old-fashioned. It is a duty that parents must take seriously, for the influence of companions is a very great motive power for all teen-agers.

The teen-ager's set of values will be dictated in large measure by the group to which he belongs. We do not have to look any further for proof of this than the numerous "fads" that are part of adolescence. The teen-ager has a very definite need to belong to his particular group, and in order to protect this need he will go along with the common will even though it may be distasteful to him. He is forced to wear certain types of clothing, certain haircuts etc., only because the group demands it. This is the harmless part. The true danger comes in when the group begins to dictate the principles of moral conduct. Here too the adolescent is very likely to follow the group simply because he does not want to lose face. "Everybody else is doing it" is a statement that is familiar to all parents. Very often the fact that "everybody else is doing it" is the sole motive of action.

Even though the forming of cliques is good in itself, the activities and thinking of the group must be watched by diligent and tactful parents.

INDEPENDENCE

The most marked and observable of all teen-age attitudes is a complete sense of independence. During their grammar school days they were almost completely sheltered. They were told what to do, how to do it, and when to do it. But when they enter high school everything changes. A high school career is equivocated with independence. Thus, immediately, they begin to resent any infringement on that newly found independence. This is why parents are shocked by what seemingly is a change which has taken place over night, and that is precisely what has happened. They are shocked because suddenly their son is no longer the docile, obedient little boy that he was. Now he balks at their commands and advice. If this rebellion is not understood, it can lead to real trouble within the family.

The fact of the matter is that the young man has not suddenly become malicious in his attitude toward authority. He does not really hate authority as such. All he resents is the invasion of authority into his realm of independence. In a limited sense this is not bad. The cause of this resentment is the realization that he has capabilities. He has discovered that he has an intelligence and will, that he himself can make plans and decisions. He realizes that he is worth something as an individual.

This rebellious attitude against authority must, of course, be controlled. But it must not be crushed. Parents and teachers should realize that the teen-ager now wants to step out on his own. He wants to make some decisions by himself. He wants to decide for himself what is right and what is wrong, and he will strongly oppose anyone telling him that this or that *must* be done. This is why we have made a point of saying we must exemplify virtue to teen-agers, not merely tell them what virtue is and why it is obligatory. They will not accept it in these terms because in their minds it infringes on their independence. It is because of this strong sense of independence that we must present a picture of virtue, of maturity, by our own example and by appealing to their desire for maturity, rather than by dogmatic formulations.

It is in this area of independence that many parents fail. They fail because they do not recognize this need of their children to be independent and to exercise their own will and intelligence. Parents become accustomed to dictating every small detail during the childhood years, and frequently this dictatorial guidance is carried over into the adolescent years. Many parents by force of habit overprotect their teen-age children. This is done in good will, for they want to protect them against making foolish mistakes. By doing so they are not always helping their children. Rather they may be doing them real injury by preventing them from learning how to make prudent decisions and how to formulate right principles. If this overprotection becomes something constant, even though the child rebels in the beginning, he will sooner or later give up. He will then come to depend on the judgment of his parents for every one of his actions. When this occurs he will have become pusillanimous. He will soon reach the point where he will be afraid to make a decision of his own.

How can we use their desire for independence to help our teen-agers attain maturity? Simply by letting them make mistakes. If parents become aware that their son is planning to embark on some plan of action which they know to be faulty, it will not harm the boy if they do not correct him, *as long as the consequences are not serious.* It is not a mark against the parents if their son makes a small mistake. If adolescents are not allowed to make mistakes, they will not learn, for mistakes give rise to experience and experience to true knowledge. Prudence and wisdom, marks of true maturity, come by way of experience, by trial and error. Therefore, let the teen-ager decide for himself as much as is possible. Let him make mistakes!

The role of parents in the guidance of teen-agers is entirely different from their role in the guidance of children. In regard to teen-agers parents are in the middle. They are merely supervisors, letting the teen-ager go his own way and make his own decisions as far as possible. They should step in only when they see that some particular decision or course of action is going to have serious consequences. If it becomes necessary for them to intervene, they must do so with tact if they are to make their point sound reasonable to the teen-ager. There will be, however, some instances where strict authority and discipline will be the only answer. If this be the case, then this is the course which must be followed.

If parents do not recognize this fact and if they persist in dictating every detail in the lives of their sons, it will be these same sons who, although they have by necessity become complacent to the commands of their parents, will go outside the home and there, free from the domination of their parents, exercise their independence. This expression of independence will not be moderated by right judgment. It will be a malicious exercise of their own will. It will be these young men who will attempt a holdup or who will create public disturbances.

It will be these who will be found in front of the judge in juvenile court. Why? Because, in their own minds, they must prove to themselves that they can make a decision and carry it through. If they are not allowed to do this in the home and under supervision, they will do it outside the home and without the experience of how to do it. Because this desire for independence has been suppressed in the home, it will become that much more violent outside the home, and their actions will be directed against all visible signs of authority.

Teen-age independence must be given in much the same way as food is given to a baby. At first there is nothing but the mother's milk, but as the baby becomes stronger he is given soft food. Finally, he is given solid food. So it must be with teen-agers. When they are yet children, they are totally dependent on their parents. When they reach adolescence, they must be given the soft food of a limited independence so that when they have reached the late teens, they can be given full independence with the knowledge that this independence will be beneficial for them and not harmful. No parent would dream of keeping their baby on a milk diet for several years. So also they must not deny some independence to their teen-age sons. In short, teen-agers must not be subjected to too much parental domination, but at the same time, they must not be free from parental supervision.

TEEN-AGERS AND SEX

We have said earlier that the teen-ager will undergo a gradual but violent change during his adolescent years. The physical and psychological change that takes place at puberty is the most violent change that a male will ever experience within his body. At puberty the organs become fully developed. The glandular system begins to secrete various hormones into the blood stream. The body begins to grow at an amazing rate, and the young man begins to take on the characteristics of manhood.

What force does all this physical commotion bring to bear on the teen-ager in the realm of sex? The teen-ager, having undergone all these changes, now stands physically capable of begetting children, and this new power has dynamic consequences. His senses, internal and external, are alive to sexual stimuli. He now experiences a real physical desire for things of the flesh. If adolescents were faced merely with the physical aspect of sex, the preservation of chastity would be difficult enough. But this is only half of the picture, for in addition to the physical sexual attraction, they also have to deal with the psychological and social aspects of sex.

Our main desire here is to investigate the manner in which adolescents face this problem of sex in their lives. In this investigation we will see all of our previous discussion come to bear on the problem of sex.

Let us take a look at a normal teen-ager who has become aware of this new power which has developed in his body. The first difficulty he must face is a psychological one which we normally call "fear", "uncertainty", or even "anxiety". We must realize that the adolescent is standing at a crossroad. He is now faced with adult temptations, but he only has his childhood experiences to guide him through these temptations. All temptations, for the most part, are overcome by experience. It is by experience that we become adept at standing up to the temptation or at avoiding it. The adolescent is at a very definite disadvantage because he has no experience to draw upon. During his childhood years he has never experienced anything which corresponds to the strength of the temptations he now faces. The proportion between the temptation and his ability to overcome it is unequal, psychologically speaking.

The first need of teen-agers is balanced instruction in matters of sex. Sometimes parents and teachers tend to avoid all mention of sex because they fear that the adolescent will become over-curious. This is faulty reasoning. The adolescent already knows that sex exists. It is physically present to him in his own body. What he needs now is a mature discussion of the problems he faces and some practical advice on how to deal with the desires that are present in his mind and body. If parents and teachers do not present themselves as willing to discuss these matters, the teen-ager will be forced to find his information elsewhere. This can be dangerous, for very often they will end up learning all the intricacies of sex from some "friend" who will present it in a very alluring fashion and as a good to be had here and now.

In the realm of social pressure we must once again return to our previous discussion of teen-age cliques. We have already said that the tendency to group together is good in itself. It becomes dangerous only when the group begins to dictate the morality of its members. This very often happens in regard to sexual matters. Even though the teen-ager may know that a particular action is sinful, nevertheless he may be driven to perform that act simply because the clique demands it. "Everyone else does it and if I don't do it I will be laughed at and shut out from the gang." This is the reasoning of many teen-agers who get themselves involved in serious sexual problems. This social pressure of his peers stands foremost among all social pressures, for it is the most persuasive in the mind of the adolescent. He has a real need to belong to the group and he will very seldom jeopardize that need. Again, the vigilance of parents over the friendships of their teen-age sons must be stressed.

Although many other social pressures are brought to bear on this difficulty with sex, we can but mention them and then pass on. We might first mention again the perverting influence of magazines, movies and television. Many of these present sexual misconduct as something commonplace and normal.

The social pressure that is brought to bear by parents themselves is perhaps the most insidious. Very often parents force their adolescent children into a dating situation before he is ready for it and before he even wants it. Their excuse is that they do not want their children "left out". This parental urging has even begun to be exerted on children of the sixth, seventh and eighth grades. The utter stupidity of such a situation is obvious. The children do not really enjoy themselves, and they become mere extensions of the parental ego.

Lastly we must consider the motives for purity among adolescents. What enables some teen-agers to face up to the physical, psychological and social aspects of impure temptations and to reject them?

First and foremost among all motives is a knowledge and love of their religion and all that this implies. A teen-ager who takes God and the love of God seriously is not going to endanger his relationship with God by succumbing easily to sexual temptations. He may not be able to understand fully the vehemence of his temptations, but if he is imbued with a deep love of God he will attempt to fight anything that is going to injure that love. And if through weakness he does fall into some sin, he will not become complacent in it, but will rise up and fight all the harder in the future.

This love of God, however, is not something that can be given to a young man the moment he enters his adolescent years. It is something that must have been cultivated from his earliest infancy. It must be nourished by the constant example of his parents and family.

There is no stronger safeguard against sexual temptations than a supernatural motive, because the sexual drive is one of the strongest of all natural drives. If it is to be controlled, it can most easily be controlled by a power higher than itself. This higher power is also a drive, the supernatural love of God, i.e., the dynamic motive power of sanctifying grace.

On the natural level there are many motives impelling the teen-ager toward continence. Just as membership in a gang can work toward evil, it can also work toward good, if the morals of the gang are the morals of Christianity.

The desire for maturity can be a very great motive for purity if the adolescent has been shown that purity is an essential part of maturity.

Example, knowledge, and a healthy fear can all contribute to the purity of the teen-ager, but if these motives are used alone without combining them with a supernatural motive, the purity of the teen-ager will be in constant danger.

Sex is not an easy thing for adolescents to face. It has many ramifications, only a few of which we have treated here. If we wish to protect our teen-agers from becoming involved in and slaves to sexual passions, then we must be vigilant. We must be understanding. We must be helpful. We must be truthful. Above all we must give them a spirit of love and sacrifice. We must portray the mastery of sexual instinct as a mark of maturity. Purity must be made attractive to the adolescent, and this can only be done through the supernatural motive of religion and the natural motive of their desire for maturity.

CONCLUSION

To say that the adolescent is a complicated organism would be a gross understatement, and to try to predict how any single teen-ager will act in any given situation is almost to attempt the impossible. We have seen the general areas of teen-age conflicts, but in addition to these there is a whole multitude of individual difficulties which must also be taken into account—personality, heredity, environment, to mention just a few.

What we have tried to do is to take the fact of delinquency and to push it back to its more immediate and proximate causes. We have not denied the conclusions of modern sociologists and psychologists that the causes of delinquency are such things as broken homes, slums, etc. What we have done is to show that these causes are only contributing factors when compared to the basic psychological difficulties facing the modern adolescent.

When teen-agers leave home on that September morning they enter a period of their lives where there will be many difficulties —difficulties that might lead to juvenile court. Most of these difficulties will be reducible to the areas which we have considered. Whether or not the teen-ager finds himself in juvenile court will depend in large part on how he as developed in these areas.

WILLIAM T. KRAMLINGER, O.P.

RUDOLF BULTMANN IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT

God's action is hidden from every eye
except the eye of faith.
Rudolf Bultmann

Ever since his essay, "New Testament and Mythology," in 1941, Rudolf Bultmann has profoundly stirred Protestant theology. Catholics have felt themselves to be basically unaffected by his problem of "demythologizing" the Bible. Yet, for the sake of theological depth and an appreciation of the mind of brother Christians, there is a need for Catholic scholars to investigate and criticize Bultmann's thought.[1] With that general purpose in mind, we wish here to do two things: first to review some of the Catholic criticism of Bultmann available to the English-speaking world, and secondly, to meditate on some of Bultmann's problems and principles with an eye for counterparts and perhaps even solutions in traditional Catholic theology.

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[1] Cf. G. Miegge, *Gospel and Myth* (Richmond: John Knox, 1960), p. 138f.

REVIEW OF CATHOLIC CRITICISM

Many Catholic authors, trying to be fair to Bultmann, have written articles that attempt simply to explain his ideas without raising much objection to them.[2] In general, they say the following: Bultmann, as a sincere Christian pastor, fears for the traditional Gospel message because it seems to describe things incompatible with modern science. The modern scientific mind takes a no-nonsense view of physical reality; the Bible, on the other hand, is filled with miracles, demons, possessions, and theophanies. Modern Christians, he says, must consider all such physical actions of God and of spirits to be mere myths.[3] But he insists that in spite of these myths God really does give us a message through the life of Christ as it is recorded in the New Testament. This message is "revealed" to us each time we encounter God while reading the Scriptures. God's real revelation is not a notification of a divine incarnation or resurrection, but a communication that helps us to interpret our own existential understanding of ourselves. Now, existentialism teaches us that we are wretched and sick with the impersonal security of money, power, and other things of this world. It teaches that we can resolve this condition and gain a more genuine and free "existence" by making definite decisions, decisions that arise from within our own persons. We achieve our utmost humanity and our utmost personality in making these spontaneous, responsible decisions—especially the basic decision to be one's self.[4] Having learned this from existentialism, Bultmann concludes that God's message (hidden in the mythology of the Bible) helps us to make these liberating decisions. God, he claims, reveals His forgiveness of our past reliance upon the security of this world. God also reveals in the words and deeds of Christ what He knows would be our own best decisions. We do well, therefore, to commit ourselves to God and follow His revealed suggestions. We are not dependent on God for our physical life, but since He assists us in making personal decisions, we do depend on Him for our spiritual life. Our commitment to God means three things for us: detachment from this world, obedience to God, and love of our neighbor.[5] One of the corollaries of Bultmann's thought is that we ought not to try to make *objective* sense out of the Gospel "myths". To talk about God in an objective manner is to abase Him.[6] The only sense we can legitimately make out of these "myths" is that God is here and now calling on us to commit ourselves to Him alone.

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[2] For instance: M. M. Bourke, "Rudolf Bultmann's Demythologization of the New Testament," *Proceedings of the Cath. Theol. Society of Amer.*, 12 (1957), 103-131; D. M. Stanley, S.J., "Rudolf Bultmann: a Contemporary Challenge to the Catholic Theologian," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* (we will use the symbol, CBQ) 19 (1957), 347-355; Ian Hyslop, O.P., "Myth, History and Revelation," *Blackfriars*, 29 (1958), 401-412; J. S. Dunne, C.S.C., "Two Contemporary Approaches to Theology," *Theol. Studies*, 21 (1960), 45-61; and P. J. Cahill, S.J., "Rudolph Bultmann's Concept of Revelation," CBQ, 24 (1962), 297-306.

[3] Here they correctly cite Bultmann's famous work, "New Testament and Mythology," printed in a German collection of articles by Bultmann and his critics, ed. H. W. Bartsch. Two volumes are available in English, *Kerygma and Myth* (London: SPCK, 1953 & 1963). The standard symbol for this work is "KM". Bultmann's work is in vol. 1; cf. pp. 1-12.

Since Bultmann's interpretation of God's message is so unusual, Catholics have been forced to devote their most earnest efforts not at paring and trimming his conclusions, but at analyzing his principles. "Radical demythologizing" calls for radical criticism.[7] This analysis rests heavily on the two French works of Fathers Malevez and Marlé.[8]

The leading and sharpest edge of the inquiry derived from Malevez aims at one of Bultmann's first principles: the impossibility of God's working in the natural world. The claim is that Bultmann has *not proved* God's non-causality in the physical world.[9]

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[4] R. Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology* (New York: Scribners, 1958), p. 57.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[6] S. M. Ogden, *Christ without Myth* (New York: Harpers, 1961), p. 25f.

[7] R. Marlé, S.J., "Demythologizing Assessed," *Heythrop Journal*, 2 (1961), 47.

[8] L. Malevez, S.J., *Le Message Chrétien et le Mythe* (Brussels: Desclée de Brouwer, 1954). R. Marlé, S.J., *Bultmann et l'Interprétation du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Aubier, 1956). Malevez's work has been translated into English as: *The Christian Message and Myth* (Westminster: Newman,

Malevez observed that Bultmann avoids the burden of proof by sometimes equating the word "myth" only with miracles, and other times with all physical action of God.[10] He pointed out that Bultmann's insistence on God's religious and revealing causality is really an admission in principle of God's physical causality.[11] Again, Malevez declared that Bultmann is too strict in refusing to allow "objective thinking" about God. Our minds, he argued, are participations in the very intelligence of God and, therefore, are somewhat competent to judge His revelation. We are no more "objective" than God is.[12] Finally, he criticized Bultmann's notion of "existence" as too transcendent and out of contact with both the essences of concrete realities and their every day history.[13]

Several Catholic articles on Bultmann have appeared in English since Malevez and his transmitters. J. A. O'Flynn pointed out, contrary to Bultmann's interpretation, that the New Testament itself *insists* on the *reality* of miracles, especially the Resurrection, as proof of our salvation (I Cor. 15:12-21). Bultmann, he noted, simply rejects this and other texts as later additions.[14]

1958). Previous to the translation, its contents came before the English-speaking world in such periodical literature as: V. T. O'Keefe, S.J., "A Recent Interpretation of Bultmann," *Theol. Stud.*, 16 (1955), 77-85; J. A. O'Flynn, "New Testament and Mythology," *Irish Theol. Quarterly*, 23 (1956) and 24 (1957); and D. M. Stanley, *op. cit.* (We will henceforth refer to Malevez in the English edition.)

[9] Malevez, *op. cit.*, p. 125; and Marlé, *Bultmann et l'Interprétation du Nouveau Testament*, p. 65.

[10] Malevez, *op. cit.*, p. 67 ff.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 149 ff.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 208 ff.

[14] J. A. O'Flynn, *art. cit.*, 24 (1957), 110. Cf. Bultmann's treatment of this text, KM, I, p. 39. O'Flynn's observation is not a new one; American readers had seen it in a digest of a Protestant work, F. Hofman, "Theology and Myth in the New Testament," *Theol. Dig.*, 3 (1955), 13.

In a summary of Catholic and Protestant criticism of Bultmann's biblical theology, Fr. J. C. Futrell added another objection. Bultmann, he said, presumes existentialism to be the *only* right philosophy, and this narrowness of philosophy, when applied to the Bible, cripples his exegesis.[15]

Fr. R. Marlé produced a series of English articles that comment on the liberal-conservative tensions in Bultmann's thought which have caused new splits among his disciples.[16]

Writing on Bultmann's epistemology, Fr. P. J. Cahill rightly noted that Bultmann places little confidence in the richness of human thought. The mind, said Cahill, can think about God subjectively and objectively, scientifically and existentially—all without the least bit of contradiction.[17] In a second article on Bultmann's theory of revelation, Cahill pointed out that Bultmann makes Christ a mere *symbol* through whom God reveals Himself. In effect, Bultmann leaves Christ indistinguishable from Buddha or Confucius.[18]

Finally, M. Nédoncelle contributed the objection that Bultmann involves *himself* too much in his accounts of biblical history. Consequently, his strictly personal and introspective viewpoints strongly color the facts he relates from the New Testament. Nédoncelle also reproached Bultmann for showing indifference to what occured in the mind of Christ while He revealed God's message, and for undervaluing the function of tradition in biblical theology.[19]

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[15] J. C. Futrell, S.J., "Myth and Message," CBQ, 21 (1959), 313 f.

[16] R. Marlé, S.J., "The Problem of the Historical Jesus," *Heythrop Journal,* 1 (1960), 229-232 and "Demythologizing Assessed," *ibid.,* 2 (1961), 42-47. Fr. Marlé has another article in the same journal that compares Bultmann's over-subjectivity with Cullmann's over-objectivity, "The Cullmann-Bultmann Discussion," 3 (1962), 267-271.

[17] P. J. Cahill, S.J., "The Scope of Demythologizing," *Theol. Studies,* 23 (1962), 79-92.

[18] P. J. Cahill, S.J., "Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of Revelation," CBQ, 24 (1962), 297-306. The article was digested in *Theol. Dig.,* 11 (1963), 105-108. The idea is similar to that of the Protestant, O. Cullmann, "Rudolf Bultmann's Concept of Myth and the New Testament," *Theol. Dig.,* 4 (1956), 136-139.

In spite of all these criticisms Catholic commentators are constant in finding praiseworthy similarities to their own theology in the works of Bultmann. Some have even suggested that Bultmann contributes to Catholic theology.[20] Especially do they commend Bultmann's recognition of the necessity of an antecedent philosophy in the construction of a theology, and also his idea that each and every Christian must *personally* encounter God in faith.[21]

BULTMANN'S PROBLEMS AND CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

Having heard the voice of Catholic criticism, we now wish to try a slightly more constructive approach. We propose to study Bultmann's major problems to see where they fit in Catholic theology; how they find sympathy there; and how they find perhaps even solution there.

It seems to us that Bultmann finds two problems for theology in the modern situation: the physical causality of God and the existential analysis of man. These are the same two principles that Karl Jaspers once chose as fundamental to Bultmannism:

> Bultmann's demand for the demythologizing of religion is based on two premises. The first is his conception of modern science and of the modern view of the world, which leads him to negate many articles of the Christian faith. The second is his conception of philosophy, which enables him to give an existentialist interpretation to certain contents of faith, that, in his opinion, are still true . . . .

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[19] M. Nédoncelle, "Bultmann's Escatological Individualism," *Theol. Dig.*, 11 (1963), 109 ff, taken from *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 37 (1961), 579-596. Dunne had already mentioned something similar to Nédoncelle's first point in criticizing Bultmann's "Kantian autonomy," *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[20] Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

[21] Cf. Malevez, *op. cit.*, p. 210; cf. also Marlé, "The Cullmann-Bultmann Discussion," p. 270.

> These premises are the main pillars upon which his argument is built.[22]

We will reflect on these two problems in turn.

God's Causality

First of all, we must clearly state that for Bultmann the "modern scientific mind" does not deny the principle of causality itself, only its universal application, notably its application to God. He writes:

> In this modern conception of the world the cause-and-effect nexus is fundamental. Although modern physical theories take account of chance in the chain of cause and effect in subatomic phenomena, our daily living, purposes and actions are not affected. In any case, modern science does not believe that the course of nature can be interrupted or, so to speak, perforated, by supernatural powers.[23]

However, we must also make it clear that Bultmann does not deny God *all* causality, but just *physical* causality. He admits there is an "analogous" sense in which God is a cause; namely, when He makes Himself known to a Christian through the Bible.[24] We need faith, Bultmann says, to recognize this kind of divine causality:

> God's action is hidden from every eye except the eye of faith. Only the so-called natural, secular (worldly) events are visible to every man and capable of proof. It is *within* them that God's hidden action is taking place.[25]

There are several reasons why Bultmann denies God's physical causality. First of all there is the general reason that divine causality is repeatedly a stumbling block for existential philosophy. It shows up most clearly in the problem of making inferences to God as the first cause. James Collins put his finger on the roots of the difficulty when he wrote:

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[22] K. Jaspers, "Myth and Religion," in a book of his correspondence with R. Bultmann, *Myth and Christianity* (New York: Noonday, 1958), p. 4.

[23] Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology,* p. 15. His school largely follows him in this; for example, G. W. Davies, *Existentialism and Theology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957), p. vii.

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 68. This is what Malevez meant in the place cited in note 11 above.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 61 f.

> A critical blind spot in many existentialist and phenomenological accounts of religion is their conventional acceptance of a bifurcation between the causal and descriptive methods, with the study of religion commited entirely to the latter method. Sometimes, the reason for making this restriction is an unspoken belief that there is no philosophical way of justifying the causal inference to God in the face of the Humean and Kantian critiques. To this is often added a consideration drawn from the doctrine of Husserl on the reduction of existential and real causal factors and the restriction of causality to physical things and instruments.[26]

The specific reason why Bultmann rejects the physical side of God's causality is that such activity seems both to disrupt the psychological unity and freedom of man[27] and to diminish God's eminently personal, loving, and spiritual nature. An interpreter of Bultmann articulated this latter point when he wrote:

> It [the New Testament attitude toward the world] is not a theoretical but an existential understanding. That is to say, we do not reason from the world and its usefulness to a Creator. Such arguments may have some force, but they lead to the God of metaphysics, an object of theoretical knowledge, and can never lead to the living God of religious faith, who is never an object.[28]

Bultmann's problem, therefore, is not primarily *whether* God is a cause, but *what kind* of a cause He is, physical or "hidden". And no matter what the case, this causality must do justice to both man's independence and God's transcendence, personality, and love.

[26] J. Collins, "The Religious Theme in Existentialism," *Philosophy and the Modern Mind*, ed. F. X. Canfield (Detroit: Sacred Heart Seminary, 1961), p. 43.

[27] Bultmann, KM, I, p. 6.

[28] J. Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), p. 62; cf. also Ogden, *op. cit.*, p. 25f.

This problem does not belong to Bultmann alone. It has a precedent in the history of Catholic theology. The question of God's action and man's independence came up in the early seventeenth century in the form of a controversy on the efficacy of God's grace. Bañez and his school held that God intrinsically and physically moves man's will by His grace. Molina, Noris, St. Alphonsus Ligouri and many other theologians took a position similar to Bultmann's: God moves man only extrinsically and morally by His grace. That is to say, God's grace is more of an *invitation* than a physical push to do something.[29] In trying to settle this question (which is still sometimes debated), Catholic scholars have had long experience coping with the same difficulties Bultmann experiences. In other words, the harmony of God's causality, His personal love for us, His transcendence, and our independence is a perennial theological problem, one in which all Christian thinkers are interested.

The more common opinion of the Catholic tradition is that God's grace is a physical reality, and, indeed, that all of God's causality is largely physical. This position does not at all embarrass Catholic interest in man's independence and in God's personality, transcendence, and love. On the contrary, Catholic theologians believe that God's physical causality gives us all the more reason to appreciate these qualities in God and in man. Selecting just one of these qualities, we will discuss how God's physical causality leads to an appreciation of His personality and His love for us.

After borrowing the causal-inference method from metaphysics to prove God's existence (which is to prove from physical phenomena that there is an ultimate and necessary cause),[30] Catholic theology carefully examines what can and what cannot be said of God as the first cause.[31] For instance, the ultimate cause must be all-perfect and all-powerful, otherwise it could not cause the perfections of natural things.[32] Amid these and other attributes, traditional writers give special attention to two particular attributes: *intelligence* and *choice*.

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[29] See J. Van der Meersch, art. "Grace," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique,* VI$_2$, 1664-1674; see also, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *Grace* (St. Louis: Herder, 1952), pp. 202-208. Unfortunately we do not have the space here to distinguish between the numerous non-Bañezist schools.

[30] For example, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.,* I, q. 2, a. 3. ed. Leonina, *Omnia opera,* vol. 4, (Rome: Poly. Vat., 1888).

It is absolutely necessary, they say, that the first cause of this intelligible and determinate world be intelligent:

> Since there are [determinate, natural] things that do not pre-establish their goals for themselves, because they do not *know* the formality of goal, these things have their goal predetermined for them by another, that is, by the author of their nature. This author is God, whom we have talked about before as the giver of all existence and as the supremely necessary being. He would not be able to predetermine goals for the natures of things unless He was intelligent. God, therefore, is an intelligent being.[33]

Similarly, since the ultimate cause is infinite and can make all things, it must have the power of choice, for it chose to make this finite world.[34] This power of choice by which God chooses to bestow existence and goodness on some things and not on others reveals God's love for the present world.

> God's will is the cause of all things. Therefore, as much as God chooses something, to that degree does it have existence or goodness. Anything of value that a thing has is chosen for it by God. But since

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[31] St. Thomas justifies speaking about God's "qualities" by pointing out that theology speaks *analogously* about God (*Summa theol.*, I, q. 13, a. 5) and that God's attributes are not really distinct from the person and substance of God, as they are in us (*Ibid.*, I, q. 13, a. 4 & a. 12).

[32] *Ibid.*, q. 4 and q. 25.

[33] "Cum ergo ipsa non praestituant sibi finem, quia rationem finis non cognoscunt; oportet quod eis praestituatur finis ab alio, qui sit naturae institutor. Hic autem est qui praebet omnibus esse, et est per seipsum necesse esse, quem Deum dicimus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Non autem posset naturae finem praestituere nisi intelligeret. Deus igitur est intelligens." St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentes,* I, c. 44., ed. Leonina, *Omnia opera,* (Rome: Garroni, 1913).

[34] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 4.

> love is nothing other than choosing good for something, it is manifest that God loves every existing thing.[35]

Indeed, God is the greatest lover of all, since His love is creative:

> His love, however, is different from ours. Our will is not the cause of the goodness in the things we love. Rather our will is caused to move with affection by the goodness of the object [already there]. . . . But God's love pours in and creates goodness in the beloved things.[36]

Now men ordinarily think of a person as an individual who acts out of knowledge and love. God, in His role as first cause, manifests in an eminent way the knowing and loving qualities of a true person.[37] Of course faith brings the Christian to an even greater realization of God's personality, as when the Scriptures record God's speech or when it reveals the trinity of divine persons.[38] Nevertheless, as the above reasoning shows, if the God of faith is the first cause and is bound up with physical action, He does not thereby lose His personality. Quite the contrary is true. God's causality assists the Christian's belief by giving him an ontological basis for acknowledging God as a person. Furthermore, it gives the faithful solid reasons for confidently communicating with God since they can be objectively sure that He understands them, that He loves them, and that He can help them.

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[35] ". . . voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum; et sic oportet quod in tantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, in quantum est volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde cum amare nihil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat . . ." (*Ibid.*, I, q. 20, a. 2).

[36] ". . . Deus omnia quae sunt, amat, non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab obiecto. . . . Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus." (*Ibid.*)

[37] *Ibid.*, I, q. 29, a. 3 and ad 1. It is interesting to note that an existentialist philosopher, Heidegger, who is trying to develop the notion of "personal being," says: ". . . thought is the sustaining and determining ground of being." M. Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1959), p. 196.

[38] *Ibid.*, I, q. 32, a. 1. John of St. Thomas argues that it is not necessary to distinguish the three persons in God in order to talk about and appreciate the divine personality. John of St. Thomas, O.P., *Cursus theologicus* (Paris: Desclée, 1931), vol. 4, disp. 34, art. 2.

Neither do Catholic theologians find it necessary to draw Bultmann's conclusion that God's physical causality on man disrupts man's psychological unity or freedom. Human freedom of will is freedom from the attraction of an irresistible object; it is not freedom from dependence on that external source of spiritual power necessary to move the will from a state of inaction to a state of activity. God, by His physical causality, is the external source of our will-power. But He is not an irresistible object, because of our inadequate knowledge about Him. One strong defender of God's physical causality wrote the following about grace:

> As in the natural order divine motion arouses in plants the vital processes by which they spontaneously flower and fructify, so in the supernatural order efficacious grace arouses in us, not only a spontaneous love of happiness, but the love of God; and this love is free, since God is not yet clearly seen and does not yet attract us invincibly. Efficacious grace thus properly moves toward this act specified by a good which does not attract irresistibly, and in so moving toward this act it does not change its nature, which depends on its own specification by the object. Thus it does not destroy, but *actualizes* our liberty and free mode [of action], a mode which is real beyond question, which can be produced in us and with us by the supreme creative cause, which from on high "pours forth all being and every modality of being," excepting only evil doing.[39]

The purpose of God's action is not to disrupt man's psychological unity. Quite the opposite. God's grace is necessary to *integrate* all of man's powers in a movement toward one sublime goal, union with God.[40] If there is any disunity in man, this comes from man himself. A disintegrated man is one who refuses God's elevating and unifying source of power to one noble goal, and orientates himself to many, ignoble goals.

[39] Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
[40] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 2.

In other words, Catholic theology, with its insistence on God's physical causality, nevertheless sympathizes with and achieves the ideals of Bultmann—in this case: God's personality and love and man's psychological unity.

Human Existence

We can also find analogues in Catholic doctrine for Bultmann's second basic principle: the value of applying existentialist philosophy to biblical exegesis.

In order to examine this second point fruitfully, we must appreciate the different meanings given to such terms as "essence" and "existence" in traditional and existential philosophy.

From the older philosophical point of view, every individual existing thing (man included) has both essence and existence. Its essence is its basic nature, *what* it is: man, rabbit, or flint. Its existence is simply the here-and-now *presence* of its nature in whatever degree of development or modification it has up to now attained. Logically speaking, nothing has existence without first having an essence that can exist.[41]

The existentialist philosophers apparently hold the same opinion for non-human things, but speak differently about man's case. One interpreter explains:

> With regard to anything else whatsoever, its essence precedes its existence. That is to say, I can conceive of a thing of a particular kind even if nothing of that kind in fact exists. If a thing of that kind comes into existence, it does so by being cast, as it were, into a predetermined role: it plays the part of a character which preceded the casting . . . .
>
> Now in the case of the human being the situation is reversed: for man and man alone, his existence precedes his essence. First a man *is;* and *what* he is is settled in the course of his

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[41] J. Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa philosophiae, aristotelico-thomisticae,* 9th ed. (Barcelona: Herder, 1951), II, n. 704.

> existence . . . . He is more than just a type, a character defined by some role or other . . . . The human being, in his every action defines his own essence.[42]

From this explanation it is obvious that the existentialists are not talking about man's basic human nature when they say that he defines his own essence. They do not mean to say that each man gives himself his own body, soul, and intellect. Even Bultmann says that "man can become only what he already is."[43] By the word "essence" the existentialists mean what we would call a *developed essence*, developed in moral, social, and intellectual qualities. Man cannot define his own basic human nature, but he can define the essence of his personality and character. He can define his own role in society.

"Existence" for these philosophers means the present *conscious* state of man's basic nature while it is still *emerging* into a more perfect moral, social, and cognitive structure. Existence is a kind of awareness, awareness that man is different, awareness that he alone can control his development.

Out of these considerations we can gather that existentialism and traditional philosophy have a common concern, namely, *man's development*. Existentialists call it "emerging existence" and "defining one's own essence." Traditional philosophers, applying the concept of act and potency, call it a movement from the potentialities of man's basic essence to the actuality of a personal knowledge, moral character, and social role in life.

Furthermore, the same *problem* arises in both philosophies from their common interest in human development. Man's development is infinitely variable. Traditional philosophy says he can know an infinite numbers of things[44] and that he can love and attach himself

[42] A. Kaplan, *The New World of Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 103.

[43] Bultmann, KM, I, p. 28.

[44] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I, q. 86, a. 2.

to an infinite number of values and situations.[45] "The existentialist," says Kaplan, "is a philosopher who approaches the basic problem of human existence in just these terms, that indeed, everything *is* possible. The problem then becomes to decide which among the infinite possibilities is to be actualized . . ."[46]

The existentialists spend much concern on these possibilities. Looking back on their lives they feel guilt for having missed opportunities. Looking forward they feel dizzy about the overwhelming maze of future possibilities. What depresses the existentialist most of all is that in spite of all his possibilities man is limited. He will never fulfill all of his potency. This concern for limitation so dominates existentialism that one observer has characterized this philosophy as "the ontology of human finitude."[47] The problem is for man to find some way of accepting his finitude with dignity, so that he can still say that he has defined his own essence, that he possesses "true human existence".

In general, the existentialists answer the question by suggesting that man must take his situation, poor as it is, into his own hands. He must carve out his own role in life by eliciting independent, responsible decisions and resolutions. Explaining Heidegger, Bochenski writes:

> Resoluteness alone lays bare the situation [of man in the world] by disclosing the insistent "thereness" present in it. It is the means by which men embrace their destiny and spontaneously accept their role in the world.[48]

As we have already pointed out, Bultmann inherits the existentialist notion that definite decisions lead to true human development, even at the theological level. One Protestant theologian wrote:

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[45] Gredt, *op. cit.*, I, n. 585.

[46] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[47] C. O. Schrag, *Existence and Freedom* (Northwestern Univ. Press, 1961), p. vii.

[48] I. M. Bochenski, O.P., *Contemporary European Philosophy* (Los Angeles: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1956), p. 169.

> The concept of decision occupies a central place in Bultmann's thought as it does in the thought of all existentialist philosophers and theologians. The life of faith is a life of decision. Rather it is a life of decisions, for man must decide afresh each time he encounters God.[49]

Except for the strong emphasis on sickness and dread, Catholic theology agrees. Man does achieve his true development in his most typically "human acts", acts of decision:

> Only those acts are properly human acts that are proper to man insofar as he is man. Man however differs from irrational creatures in this that he is the master of his acts. Thus only the actions that man has control of are properly called human actions. However, man is the master of his acts by reason of his intellect and will. Whence, freedom of decision is said to be a power of intellect and will. Therefore, we properly call those actions human that proceed from a deliberated decision of the will.[50]

Realizing that the problem of human development through decisions is common to the philosophy Bultmann accepts and to the philosophy that Catholic theologians accept, we are in a position to compare their respective applications of this notion to the things of God.

For Bultmann the particular decision that makes man most perfect is his decision to commit himself to God. He calls this commitment "faith". True existence is a life of faith; it is a believing existence.

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[49] H. P. Owen, *Revelation and Existence* (Cardiff: Univ. of Wales Press, 1957), p. 73.

[50] "Dicendum quod actionum quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt propriae hominis inquantum est homo. Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones vocantur proprie humanae, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem, unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Illae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deliberata procedunt." St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 1, a. 1.

Bultmann describes the contents of existentialist faith as detachment from the world and obedience to God—all centered in the figure of Jesus Christ. "Faith in the sense of obedient self-commitment and inward detachment from the world is only possible when it is faith in Jesus Christ."[51] If man commits himself in this way, God will do two things for his true existence. First, God will forgive man his past. Forgiven and detached from his past, the Christian need no longer feel guilty about his past failures; he can begin to develop his possibilities. Secondly, as the Christian reads the Bible, God will command him through the symbolism of Christ's life to actualize certain possibilities. If a Christian decides to limit his possibilities according to God's command, he can be sure that the limitations will give him no cause for dizziness or sickness.[52]

We can conclude from this and from Bultmann's strange silence about an afterlife that the ultimate perfection of man is supposed to be a life on this earth which a man generates for himself through his God-inspired decisions.

Catholic thought also finds true human development in God-orientated decisions, but with remarkably greater richness. Realizing that man's possibilities are infinite, Catholic doctrine takes up the problem of selecting among them the most perfect one. The question is usually put this way: what is the ultimate goal of man?[53]

The method of inquiry is first to enumerate all the possibilities (in general) and then to submit each of them to the verdict of human experience and finally to judge their harmony with the basic structure of human nature.[54] The constant result of these examinations is that the most perfect state a man can decide on is a condition of happiness that comes from eternal, face-to-face knowledge of God.[55] The reason is that only God with His infinite

[51] Bultmann, KM, I, p. 22.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 31 f; cf. also Macquarrie, *op. cit.*, p. 65 f.
[53] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I-II, qq. 1-4.
[54] *Ibid.*, q. 2.
[55] *Ibid.*, q. 3, aa. 1 and 8.

perfections and intense personal love can satisfy man's constant desire for knowledge and love. This is exactly what Christ promised when He said, "This is eternal life: to know Thee, the one true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent" (Jn. 17:3). If a man decides to pursue this goal and achieves it, then he attains Bultmann's state of human development, loss of guilt and worry, and much more besides. By communication with God's perfections and personality he comes to an actual contact with all those noble possibilities which he could not previously have because of limitations of lifetime, talent, etc.

Having seen the likeness and the differences between these two theologies as to the goal of human development, we can now compare their respective doctrines on the means of developing toward those goals. Now that we know what each thinks man must decide *for*, the question arises of *how* to make decisions.

Existentialist philosophers generally avoid this question. The important thing, they believe, is for a man to make his *own* decisions and in his own way.[56] Bultmann agrees that each man must make his own decisions:

> We would learn little if existential philosophy, as many people suppose, attempted to offer an ideal pattern of human existence. . . . Existentialist philosophy does not say to me "in such & such a way you must exist"; it says only "you must exist."[57]

Nevertheless, Bultmann does feel that this decision needs some specification. As we hinted above, Bultmann's method of making a decision is to read the Bible, to encounter God and His commands there, and to *obey* those commands. The method is direct and simple: the whole of moral theology consists in believing and obeying God's commands. If a man believes sincerely and brings his problems to the Scriptures, God, using the words of the Bible and especially

[56] Kaplan, *op. cit.*, p. 120 ff. The author there discusses both the defects and merits of such an attitude.

[57] Bultmann, *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, p. 55.

the examples from Christ's life, will reveal to him the proper decision for him to make. The only moral recommendations that Bultmann makes are the following: be detached from natural security, believe God's command; be willing to obey those imperatives, in particular the injunction to be charitable to your neighbor.[58] In other words, the best decisions are God's decisions, and the best way to find them out is to encounter them as God here-and-now reveals them in the Bible.

Catholic theology readily assents to Bultmann's insistence on belief and obedience toward the precepts in the Bible. Nothing could be more obvious in the Bible than its strain of revealed morality. "All Scripture," says St. Paul, "is inspired by God and useful for teaching, for reproving, for correcting, for instructing in justice; that the man of God may be perfect, equipped for every good work" (II Tim. 3:16 f). Commenting, St. Thomas says that the man of God is perfect and most developed when he lacks nothing. For that reason God instructs both his speculative and his practical intellect so that he will lack nothing either in knowledge or in readiness to perform good actions.[59]

Catholics grant that Bultmann expounds a laudable method of making personal decisions. But the brevity of his explanation is surprising. If the purpose of existentialist philosophy and theology is to understand human development better, it seems to Catholic eyes that all existentialists, and especially Bultmann, could profit much from traditional treatments on the methods of making decisions.

For instance, Catholic moralists have analyzed the components of human decision. On this basis they have determined the conditions under which the act is a truly human and free decision, and when it is merely a reflex motion.[60] They have described and warned against all possible kinds of circumstances that could affect a decision.[61] They have outlined the usual steps taken in coming to a decision[62]—for example, they have examined the need to take counsel: how much? and about what?

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[58] Bultmann, KM, I, p. 32f.

[59] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in epistolam Sancti Pauli secundam ad Timotheum,* cap. 3, lect. 3., ed. Parmae reimpressa, *Opera omnia,* 13 (New York: Musurgia, 1949).

Not only that, Catholic scholars have long tracts on the influence of our emotions on our decisions,[63] and on the effects of our habits.[64] Particularly interesting is the doctrine that moral perfection, the perfect method of making decisions, consists in a harmonious interplay of all our best habits, especially if these are dominated by an habitual love of God.[65]

Finally, Catholic doctrine proposes the greatest help of all in eliciting significant human choices. This assistance is something we have discussed above, namely, God's grace. The most perfect human decisions are those that join us to God, but we would have no power effectively to choose union with God if He Himself did not give our wills the physical force to do so. God is transcendent and out of the natural range of man's faculties (as Bultmann himself insists). When Christ, therefore, revealed that it is truly possible for man to merit personal communication with God in knowledge and love across this transcendence, He implied that God gives to man the proportionate power of meriting and communicating.[66]

We may summarize by saying that Catholic thought enlarges the meaning of existential human decisions in two dimensions: it enlarges the corporeal side of the acts by studying the influences of passion and circumstance; it deepens the spiritual side by investigating the divine goal and the divine power source of these decisions.

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[60] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.*, I-II, q. 6.

[61] *Ibid.*, q. 7.

[62] *Ibid.*, qq. 8-17.

[63] *Ibid.*, qq. 22-48.

[64] *Ibid.*, qq. 49-89.

[65] *Ibid.*, q. 65, aa. 1 and 2.

[66] *Ibid.*, q. 109, a. 5.

CONCLUSION

It has been said that existentialism is a kind of apology for religion since it makes man feel a need for a greater perfection than this life can provide.[67] Bultmann's theology tries to answer the need by recommending that each man decide to live according to the divine commands personally revealed to him in the Bible, in spite of the mythical causality there ascribed to God.

Our opening summary of Catholic criticism indicates that Catholic theologians cannot give approval to all the elements in Bultmann's answer. Nevertheless, they are intensely concerned with the same problem of human development and human need for a relationship with God. We have selected two points from Catholic doctrine—in counterbalance to Bultmann's two main principles—that suggest an even better answer to the problem. First of all, Catholic theologians insist on God's physical causality. Far from thereby complicating religious fulfillment with mythology, they propose that God's action in the world guarantees His own *personal* nature and assures man of the *power* to communicate with this personal God in spite of the latter's transcendence. Secondly, they have enriched the existential concepts of human perfection and human decision by elaborating on the nature of man's ultimate goal and on the contents and methods of performing human acts.

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[67] Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

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